In re Interest of J. A.
| Decision Date | 23 October 2020 |
| Docket Number | A20A1193 |
| Citation | 850 S.E.2d 769,357 Ga.App. 331 |
| Parties | In the INTEREST OF J. A., a child. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
The Ryczek Firm, Richard T. Ryczek Jr., Lawrenceville, for Appellant.
Daniel J. Porter, District Attorney, Nhan-Ai Du Simms, Samuel Richard d'Entremont, Assistant District Attorneys, for Appellee.
J. A., a juvenile, was charged as an adult in superior court with two counts of armed robbery1 and one count of battery.2 J. A. moved to transfer his case to juvenile court,3 and the superior court denied the motion. J. A. filed this direct appeal, which we dismiss because we lack jurisdiction.4
In May 2019, the Gwinnett County District Attorney charged J. A. as an adult via indictment in superior court with two counts of armed robbery and one count of battery.5 J. A., who was 14 years old at the time of the commission of the charged offenses, moved to transfer his case to juvenile court pursuant to OCGA §§ 15-11-561 and 15-11-567. Following a hearing, the superior court denied the motion, noting in the order that there was "a significant factual dispute as to whether the robbery in this case was perpetrated using a firearm as defined in OCGA § 15-11-560 (h)."6 J. A. filed a direct appeal of the superior court's decision.
J. A. argues that the superior court erred by failing to transfer his case to juvenile court pursuant to OCGA § 15-11-567 (a), which mandates the transfer of a criminal proceeding against an accused appearing to be a child if the superior court does not have exclusive original jurisdiction. He points to the fact that the indictment here did not allege that the armed robbery was committed with a firearm, so the superior court did not have exclusive original jurisdiction under OCGA § 15-11-560 (b) (8).7 The State argues, among other things, that this appeal should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because a juvenile has no right to a direct appeal from a superior court order denying a request to transfer to juvenile court. The State is correct.
As Court has previously explained, the right to appeal is not constitutional, but instead depends on statutory authority. A statute draws its meaning, of course, from its text, and we must give the statutory text its plain and ordinary meaning, viewing it in the context in which it appears, and reading it in its most natural and reasonable way. The common and customary usages of the words are important, but so is their context. For context, we may look to other provisions of the same statute, the structure and history of the whole statute, and the other law — constitutional, statutory, and common law alike — that forms the legal background of the statutory provision in question. When we construe such statutory authority on appeal, our review is de novo.8
Under OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (1), an appeal may be taken from a final judgment "where the case is no longer pending in the court below[.]"
If the case remains pending, compliance with the interlocutory appeal procedure generally is required.9 Ordinarily, transfer orders are interlocutory.10 Nonetheless, J. A. contends and the dissent agrees that J. A. is entitled to a direct appeal under OCGA § 15-11-564 (a), which provides:
The Court concluded that "reading the statute in its most natural and reasonable way, OCGA § 15-11-564 provides that decisions regarding the transfer of juveniles to superior court , though interlocutory in nature, are directly appealable to the Court of Appeals."12
The issue here is whether "the court" referred to in subsection (a) of this Code section includes a superior court ruling on a motion to transfer a criminal case to juvenile court. OCGA § 15-11-2 (15) defines "court" as used in the Juvenile Code as "the juvenile court or the court exercising jurisdiction over juvenile matters," and the dissent argues that the superior court has jurisdiction over certain juvenile matters pursuant to OCGA § 15-11-560 (a) and (b) and is therefore necessarily included in that definition. But in this case, the superior court was not exercising jurisdiction over a juvenile matter because J. A. had been charged as an adult in an indictment filed in superior court. Instead, it was acting in its capacity as a superior court when considering the motion to transfer based on J. A.’s argument that the superior court lacked jurisdiction over what should have been a juvenile matter. The mere fact that J. A. was under 17 does not transform the superior court into a "court exercising jurisdiction over [a] juvenile matter[ ]" under OCGA § 15-11-2 (15).13
Furthermore, throughout the Juvenile Code, the General Assembly used the term "the court" to refer to the juvenile court.14 And we cannot overlook the General Assembly's use of the term "superior court" in OCGA § 15-11-564 (b), which provides:
The pendency of an interlocutory appeal shall stay criminal proceedings in superior court. A child transferred for trial as an adult in superior court shall be detained only in those places authorized for the preadjudication detention of a child as set forth in Code Section 15-11-504.
Had the legislature intended for the term "court" in subsection (a) of this Code section to refer to transfer decisions of both juvenile and superior courts, it would not have referred only to "superior court" in subsection (b). Moreover, subsection (b) of this Code section provides only that "[t]he pendency of an interlocutory appeal shall stay criminal proceedings in superior court." Reading subsection (a) as J. A. urges would mean that cases in juvenile court following an order regarding transfer could proceed during the appeal, while those in superior court could not, which arbitrary result we do not accept.
Contrary to the dissent's argument, exempting superior court transfer orders from direct appeal under OCGA § 15-11-564 (a) does not render meaningless the Code section's mandate that "the parties have the right to have review[ ]." OCGA § 15-11-564 (a) provides both parties with the right to directly appeal a juvenile court order regarding transfer. And the Code contemplates different avenues of appeal depending on the circumstances.15
Accordingly, OCGA § 15-11-564 (a) does not apply to the superior court's order denying J. A.’s motion to transfer his case to juvenile court. To appeal it, J. A. was required to comply with the interlocutory appeal procedures, which include obtaining a certificate of immediate review from the superior court and filing an application in this Court for interlocutory appeal.16 His failure to do so deprives this Court of jurisdiction over this appeal.
Appeal dismissed.
The statute under which our jurisdiction is invoked authorizes direct appeals from transfer rulings by both juvenile and superior courts. So I would reach the merits.
As for the merits, the indictment before us alleges a form of armed robbery over which juvenile and superior courts have concurrent jurisdiction. The authority to decide which court should exercise jurisdiction over a prosecution for that form of armed robbery is reposed in the juvenile court. So I would reverse with direction to transfer to juvenile court so that it can make that decision.
Our jurisdictional analysis should begin and end with the plain text of OCGA § 15-11-564 (a) : "The decision of the court regarding transfer of the case shall only be an interlocutory judgment which either a child or the prosecuting attorney, or both, have the right to have reviewed by the Court of Appeals." Our Supreme Court has explained that the phrase "have the right to have review[ ]" authorizes a direct appeal under OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) rather than an interlocutory appeal under OCGA § 5-6-34 (b). In the Interest of K. S. , 303 Ga. 542, 545, 814 S.E.2d 324 (2018) (emphasis in original).
Even if the majority was right and OCGA § 15-11-564 (a) did not apply to transfer decisions by superior courts, J. A. would still be entitled to a direct appeal. Before OCGA § 15-11-564 (a) was enacted, transfer orders had been determined to be final judgments subject to direct appeal. See In the Interest of K. S. , 303 Ga. at 544, 814 S.E.2d 324. So if "court" as used in OCGA § 15-11-564 (a) did not encompass superior courts, then transfer orders issued by superior courts would be subject to that prior law, and the order before us would be a final judgment subject to direct appeal.
But the majority is not right. "Courts" as used in OCGA § 15-11-564 (a) includes superior courts.
That is clear from the context. OCGA § 15-11-564 (a) is one of eight statutes that comprise Part 9 of the Juvenile Code. Part 9 is entitled "Transfers." It sets out a fairly complicated classification scheme, turning on the category and severity of the offense and the age of the child. (As explained below, the proper classification of this case is the substantive issue on appeal.)
Under that classification scheme, superior courts have exclusive jurisdiction over some cases, juvenile courts have exclusive jurisdiction over others, and the two classes of courts have concurrent jurisdiction over...
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