In re Interest of J.G.W.
| Decision Date | 08 November 2022 |
| Docket Number | ED 110147 |
| Parties | In the INTEREST OF: J.G.W. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
FOR APPELLANT: William P. Grant, 7733 Forsyth Blvd., Suite 1850, St. Louis, Missouri 63105, Rose A. Feldman, 2016 South Big Bend Blvd., St. Louis, Missouri 63117.
FOR JUVENILE OFFICER: Troy J. Anderson, 105 South Central, Clayton, Missouri 63105.
FOR JUVENILE: Alexandra R. Faulstich, 130 S. Bemiston, Suite 604, Clayton, Missouri 63105.
FOR ST. LOUIS COUNTY CHILDREN'S DIVISION: Dawn E. Blunda, 9900 Page Avenue, St. Louis, Missouri 63132, Megan L. Dittmann-Ryan, P.O. Box 899, Jefferson City, Missouri 65102.
The Mother of J.G.W. appeals the trial court's November 2021 order placing J.G.W., who has been in foster care since 2018, with a foster family residing in Washington D.C.1 The trial court's order, entered following a hearing, was based on its finding that the placement was in J.G.W.’s best interests. Mother claims in this appeal that the placement is not in J.G.W.’s best interests because of its likely impact on J.G.W.’s future visitation with Mother and his siblings and because he has no family members in Washington D.C. We affirm because the competent and substantial evidence on this record supports the trial court's finding that the modification of J.G.W.’s placement was in his best interests and the order was not an abuse of discretion.
In December 2018, J.G.W. was removed from his Mother's custody and came under the court's jurisdiction pursuant to section 211.030(1)2 after one of his younger siblings drowned in a portable cooler and J.G.W. and his other siblings were found to be in need of care and treatment. Since then, the court has placed J.G.W. in several homes with relatives as well as with non-relative foster parents. In October 2019, the court changed J.G.W.’s permanency plan from reunification with Mother to guardianship, and in August 2021, from guardianship to termination of parental rights and adoption.
In October 2021, the Children's Division filed the motion at issue here requesting the court approve the placement of J.G.W. with foster parents residing in Washington D.C. J.G.W. previously lived with these foster parents when they resided in the St. Louis area and he had remained in contact with them. Mother opposed the placement because it would prevent her and J.G.W.’s siblings from exercising in-person visitation and because J.G.W. has no family members in the Washington D.C. area.
At the hearing, the court heard from Mother, the proposed foster parents, a Children's Division representative, J.G.W.’s guardian ad litem, and J.G.W.’s then-current foster parent. On November 11, 2021, the court issued its order granting the motion. In its order, the court summarized the factual basis supporting its finding that the requested placement was in J.G.W.’s best interest. That factual basis, discussed in additional detail below, included J.G.W.’s need for a more permanent placement, the dwindling likelihood of reunification with his Mother due in large part to Mother's disruptive and dysfunctional conduct, and the shared desire of both J.G.W. and the proposed foster parents that the placement be ordered. Finally, the court imposed the following conditions on its placement order:
A decision by the court in juvenile matters is subject to the same standard of review applicable to court-tried civil cases. R.D. v. J.D. , 842 S.W.2d 560, 561 (Mo. App. W.D. 1992). Such a decision will be affirmed unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, unless it is against the weight of the evidence, or unless it erroneously declares or applies the law. Murphy v. Carron , 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. banc 1976). We defer to the trial court's credibility determinations and we view conflicting evidence in the light most favorable to the decision. R.D. v. J.D. , 842 S.W.2d at 561. The trial court's judgment is presumed valid, and the burden is on the appellant to demonstrate that it is incorrect. Interest of C.E.B. , 565 S.W.3d 207, 211 (Mo. App. S.D. 2018).
In child custody and relocation cases, "[o]ur standard of review requires great deference to the trial court in determining a child's best interests." Aubuchon v. Hale , 453 S.W.3d 318, 322 (Mo. App. E.D. 2014). "The determination of what is in a child's best interest is an ultimate conclusion for the trial court based upon the totality of circumstances." In re K.M.W. , 342 S.W.3d 353, 359 (Mo. App. S.D. 2011). "A best interest determination involves the consideration of a myriad of factors, and no single factor is outcome-determinative." In re M.F. , 1 S.W.3d 524, 532 (Mo. App. W.D. 1999).
We will reverse only if the trial court abused its discretion in determining a child's best interests. See In re S. Y.B.G. , 443 S.W.3d 56, 59 (Mo. App. E.D. 2014). See also In re P.L.O. , 131 S.W.3d 782, 789 (Mo. banc 2004). "Judicial discretion is abused when a trial court's ruling is clearly against the logic of the circumstances then before the court and is so arbitrary and unreasonable as to shock the sense of justice and indicate a lack of careful consideration." Waisblum v. Waisblum , 968 S.W.2d 753, 755 (Mo. App. W.D. 1998).
After a child comes under the jurisdiction of the court pursuant to section 211.031(1), the court may place the child in a number of residential settings including in the custody of a relative or in a foster family home. Section 211.181. The court may modify its placement orders at any time, either on its own motion or on the motion of an interested party. Section 211.251. Prior to August 28, 2021, such modification orders were not appealable. But an amendment to section 211.261.2 now allows a parent to appeal placement modification orders on an interlocutory basis. And in such appeals, we find that because the child's best interest is the primary concern when changing or modifying the child's placement, the foregoing abuse of discretion standard applies to section 211.261.2 appeals.
The issue presented by Mother's sole point on appeal is whether there is competent and substantial evidence in the record supporting the trial court's best interests finding such that its decision was a proper exercise of its discretion. We find no abuse of discretion given the abundant evidence in the record supporting the court's decision.
Understandably, the best interest of the child analysis permeates child custody determinations in both family law litigation and juvenile court litigation. For instance, Chapter 211 begins at section 211.011 by declaring that when a child comes within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, "[t]he child welfare policy of this state is what is in the best interests of the child." See In Interest of R.L.P., 652 S.W.2d 185, 187 (Mo. App. E.D. 1983).
Likewise, the same best interests analysis dominates child custody questions in the dissolution of marriage setting pursuant to section 452.375.2 which sets forth eight factors the court shall consider in determining the best interests of the child. It is apparent from our review of its order that the court was guided by section 452.375.2's factors, and properly so in our judgment, to the extent those factors were applicable. Rosito v. Rosito , 268 S.W.3d 410, 416 (Mo. App. W.D. 2008) (). And it is readily apparent here that the court engaged in a fulsome analysis of J.G.W.’s best interests.
The court considered at length Mother's interests including her stated goals with respect to J.G.W.’s custody and her visitation with him and the court weighed those matters against the interests of J.G.W. in acquiring a more permanent placement. In this context, most of the evidence before the court ran counter to Mother's contentions. Throughout the nearly four years since J.G.W. was removed from Mother's custody. Mother engaged in a pattern of harassing and disruptive behavior towards several interested parties including some of J.G.W.’s prior foster parents, representatives of the Children's Division, and J.G.W.’s guardian ad litem. This conduct not only supports the court's placement order here but has made reunification with Mother increasingly less likely. The court was also aware of the Children's Division report showing concerns for Mother's untreated mental health diagnoses, her non-compliance with court-ordered services, and her inappropriate and disruptive conduct during supervised visits with her children. And the record demonstrated Mother only sporadically participated in the scheduled virtual and in-person visits with J.G.W.
Even Ms. Barbara, J.G.W.’s then-current foster parent, testified in favor of the motion because J.G.W. was in need of permanency which she was presumably unable to provide. By contrast, the proposed foster parents testified that they were willing to make J.G.W. a permanent part of their home.
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Lewis v. Lewis
...no substantial evidence to support it, unless it is against the weight of the evidence, or unless it erroneously declares or applies the law." Id. (quoting Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 banc 1976)). "The trial court's judgment is presumed valid, and the burden is on the appellant to d......