In re J.E. Brenneman Co., Inc.

• Citation: 277 F.Supp.2d 518
• Decision Date: 26 June 2003
• Docket Number: No. CIV.A.01-1442.,CIV.A.01-1442.
• Parties: In the Matter of the Complaint of J.E. BRENNEMAN CO., INC., Bare Boat Charterer of the Crane Barge ATLAS, for Exoneration from or Limitation of Liability and In the Matter of the Complaint of Commerce Construction Corp., Inc. as an alleged successor to J.E. Brenneman Co., Inc., Bare Boat Charterer of the Crane Barge ATLAS, for Exoneration from or Limitation of Liability
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

Page 518

277 F.Supp.2d 518

In the Matter of the Complaint of J.E. BRENNEMAN CO., INC., Bare Boat Charterer of the Crane Barge ATLAS, for Exoneration from or Limitation of Liability and

In the Matter of the Complaint of Commerce Construction Corp., Inc. as an alleged successor to J.E. Brenneman Co., Inc., Bare Boat Charterer of the Crane Barge ATLAS, for Exoneration from or Limitation of Liability

No. CIV.A.01-1442.

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania.

June 26, 2003.

As Amended July 7, 2003.

Edward V. Cattell, Hollstein, Keating, Cattell, et al., Matthew H. James, Holstein Keating Cattel Johnson & Goldstein PC, Philadelphia, PA, for in the Matter of the Complaint of J.E. Brenneman Co., Inc., Bare Boat Charterer of the Crane Barge Atlas, for Exoneration from or Limitation of Liability.

Patricia M. Henrich, Reilly Janiczek and McDevitt P.C., Philadelphia, PA, for in the Matter of the Complaint of Commerce Construction Corporation, Inc., as an Alleged Successor to J.E. Brenneman Co., Inc., Bare Boat Charter of the Crane Barge Atlas, for Exoneration from or Limitation of Liability.

MEMORANDUM

YOHN, District Judge.

Plaintiff, J.E. Brenneman Co., Inc., brought this admiralty action pursuant to the Shipowners' Limitation of Liability Act ("Limitation Act") to limit or exonerate any of its possible liability arising from the May 2000 collapse of Pier 34 in Philadelphia. On June 29, 2001, this court stayed all state court proceedings against plaintiff in accordance with the terms of the Act. Currently before this court is plaintiff's motion to further stay all state court proceedings in which claims arising out of the pier's collapse are being litigated by and against all parties other than plaintiff. Because neither the Limitation Act nor the Anti-Injunction Act empowers this court to stay these proceedings, plaintiff's motion was denied.

Facts

Plaintiff, J.E. Brenneman Co., Inc. ("Brenneman"), is a "marine construction company." Pl. Mot. at 1. Sometime prior to 1994, HMS Ventures, Inc. ("HMS") and Portside Investors, L.P. ("Portside") entities which respectively leased and owned Pier 34 in Philadelphia, hired Brenneman pursuant to a "marine construction contract" to perform necessary repair work on the pier. Brenneman performed this work in 1994, 1995 and 1996 with the use of a crane barge named the "ATLAS." Pl. Mot. at 1-2; Compl. ¶¶ 4, 8, & 12. Since 1996, however, Brenneman has not done any work on the pier, and in 1998, it ceased active business operations. Id. at 2.

On May 18, 2000, Pier 34, which housed a restaurant and night club, collapsed, claiming the lives of three individuals and injuring thirty-five others. Pl. Br. at 1. As a result of the collapse, the victims of this tragedy brought multiple personal injury and wrongful death suits in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas against HMS and Portside, both of which, in turn, brought suit against Brenneman for negligence and breach of contract, and against Brenneman and others for contribution and indemnity. Pl. Mot. at 2. Subsequently, Brenneman was also joined as a defendant in the personal injury and wrongful death suits, in which the various defendants filed cross claims against each other for contribution and indemnification. Id.

On March 27, 2001, facing potential damages in the multi-million dollar range, Brenneman filed the current action in this court pursuant to the Limitation Act, which allows shipowners in certain situations to limit their liability for maritime accidents to the value of their vessel and their freight then pending. 46 U.S.C. § 181 et seq. (WEST 2003). That value is placed in a fund from which claimants are paid pro rata. As required by the Limitation Act, this court stayed all state court proceedings against Brenneman until the limitation case was concluded. Order (Yohn, J., June 29, 2001) (Doc. # 44 & 45). Soon thereafter, pursuant to the statutorily-required procedure, the parties who had claims against Brenneman filed those claims in this action.¹ Additionally, Brenneman and several of the claimants brought cross-claims, third-party claims, or both, seeking contribution and indemnification from one another, or asserting tort and contract claims against Brenneman or other parties.²

Because the cross-claims and third-party claims are strikingly similar to those being pursued in state court, Brenneman fears that duplicative litigation is likely, if not inevitable, and that the risk of conflicting court decisions is high. Pl. Br. at 5. Moreover, Brenneman asserts that, despite this court's stay, state court claims are nonetheless being filed against it on a regular basis. Pl. Br. at 4. By having to defend against these pleadings, Brenneman claims to be prejudiced. Id. As a result of these fears and concerns, Brenneman now moves to extend the stay against state actions against Brenneman to encompass those state court proceedings against and among all other named defendants in cases seeking remedies from the Pier 34 collapse.

Discussion

Because this motion would require the court to stay pending state court proceedings, I must look to the Anti-Injunction Act ("AIA") for guidance. The AIA permits a federal court to stay state court proceedings only "as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments." 28 U.S.C. § 2283. As the Supreme Court has stated, the Anti-Injunction Act "is not a statute conveying a broad general policy for appropriate ad hoc application. Legislative policy is here expressed in a clear cut prohibition qualified only by specifically defined exceptions." Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 398 U.S. 281, 287, 90 S.Ct 1739, 26 L.Ed.2d 234 (1970) (citing Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Richman Bros., 348 U.S. 511, 515-16, 75 S.Ct. 452, 99 L.Ed. 600 (1955)). Furthermore, because its "prohibition against such injunctions in part rests on the fundamental constitutional independence of the States and their courts, the exceptions should not be enlarged by loose statutory construction." Id.; see also In re Prudential Ins. Co. of America Sales Practices Litigation, 314 F.3d 99, 103 (3d Cir.2002) (quoting In re Diet Drugs, 282 F.3d 220, 233 (3d Cir. 2002) for the proposition that "[t]he exceptions in the Anti Injunction Act are to be construed narrowly"). Indeed, our Court of Appeals has held that "`[a]ny doubts as to the propriety of a federal injunction against state court proceedings should be resolved in favor of permitting the state courts to proceed in an orderly fashion to finally determine the controversy.'" Id. at 103-04 (quoting Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281, 297, 90 S.Ct. 1739, 26 L.Ed.2d 234 (1970)).

Plaintiff in the instant case, making only passing reference to the AIA, argues that the Limitation Act demands the stay of court proceedings against a shipowner's alleged joint tort-feasors. Specifically, it argues that the Limitation Act and binding precedent interpreting the statute require limitation courts to exercise jurisdiction over "all claims asserted by and between all parties," thereby marshaling these claims "into a single forum for prompt, efficient and equitable distribution, and all assets for the equitable apportionment between successful claimants." Pl. Br. at 7. Because neither the plain statutory terms of the Limitation Act nor the case law interpreting the Act imposes such a broad-sweeping requirement on this court, plaintiff's motion was denied.³

The unambiguous language of the Limitation Act makes plain that the statute only applies to shipowners. Although this question appears to be one of first impression in this circuit, our Court of Appeals has established rules which this court must follow when engaging in statutory interpretation. When so doing, this court must "begin with the language of the statute itself." In re United Healthcare System, Inc., 200 F.3d 170, 176 (3d Cir. 1999). The Third Circuit has held that "[i]f the language of the statute expresses Congress's intent with sufficient precision, the inquiry ends there and the statute is enforced according to its terms." U.S. v. Gregg, 226 F.3d 253, 257 (3d Cir.2000) (citing United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241, 109 S.Ct. 1026, 103 L.Ed.2d 290). Thus, "[o]nce the plain meaning of the statute is determined, it is conclusive `except in rare cases in which the literal application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters.'" Id. (citing New Rock Asset Partners, L.P. v. Preferred Entity Advancements, Inc., 101 F.3d 1492, 1498 (3d Cir.1996) and quoting Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571, 102 S.Ct. 3245, 73 L.Ed.2d 973 (1982)).

The Limitation Act states that

[t]he liability of the owner of any vessel, ... for any loss, damage, or injury by collision, or for any act, matter, or thing, loss, damage, or forfeiture, done, occasioned, or incurred, without the privity or knowledge of such owner or owners, shall not ... exceed the amount or value of the interest of such owner in such vessel, and her freight then pending.

46 App.U.S.C.A. § 183(a) (WEST 2003); see also Zapata Haynie Corp. v. Arthur, 926 F.2d 484, 485 (5th Cir.1991)(emphasis added) (citing 46 App.U.S.C.A. § 183 for the proposition that "a shipowner's liability for any damage arising from a disaster at sea occasioned without the privity or knowledge of the shipowner shall be limited to the value of the vessel and its freight."). Pursuant to the statute and the rules promulgated thereunder, once a shipowner has filed his federal limitation action in compliance with the law, "all claims and proceedings against the owner or the owner's property with respect to the matter in question shall cease." 28 U.S.C. Rule F(3) (Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims)(emphasis added).⁴ The...