In re J.L.B.B.

• Decision Date: 19 June 2012
• Docket Number: No. COA12–151.,COA12–151.
• Citation: 727 S.E.2d 26
• Parties: In the Matter of J.L.B.B.
• Court: North Carolina Court of Appeals

727 S.E.2d 26

In the Matter of J.L.B.B.

No. COA12–151.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

June 19, 2012.

Appeal by respondent from order entered 7 December 2011 by Judge Laura Powell in Rutherford County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 12 June 2012.

King Law Offices, PLLC, by John B. Crotts, for petitioner-appellee Rutherford County Department of Social Services.

Pamela Newell, for appellee Guardian ad Litem.

Staples Hughes, Appellate Defender, by Annick Lenoir–Peek, Assistant Appellate Defender, for respondent-appellant mother.

MARTIN, Chief Judge.

Respondent (“mother”) appeals from an order terminating her parental rights to her son, J.L.B.B. (“Julian”). We affirm.

Julian was born to mother in November 2007. In May 2010, the Rutherford County Department of Social Services (“DSS”) received a report that mother did not pick up Julian from daycare because she had been arrested for assault and battery and was “highly impaired and unable to answer questions” at the time. DSS placed Julian in a foster home that had “specialized training” to “better meet [Julian's] special needs,” which included significantly delayed speech development, gross and fine motor skills delays, a feeding disorder, and an eye disorder.

On 6 July 2010, the trial court adjudicated Julian a neglected and dependent juvenile. In its order, the trial court found that mother admitted to “huffing paint,” smoking marijuana, and not taking her medications for mental health issues. Mother entered into a case plan that required her to address her mental health and substance abuse issues and to work with service providers “to show that she is able to effectively manage [Julian's] special needs and challenging behaviors.”

In September 2011, DSS filed a petition to terminate mother's parental rights under N.C.G.S. § 7B–1111(a)(2). After a hearing on the matter, on 7 December 2011, the trial court entered an order concluding that grounds existed to terminate mother's parental rights under N.C.G.S. § 7B–1111(a)(2) and (a)(7). The court then concluded that it was in the best interest of the child to terminate mother's parental rights. Mother appeals.

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Mother first contends DSS's petition did not put her on notice as to how she failed to make progress in correcting the conditions that led to the removal of Julian. We disagree.

N.C.G.S. § 7B–1104(6) provides that a petition for termination of parental rights shall state “[f]acts that are sufficient to warrant a determination that one or more of the grounds for terminating parental rights exist.” N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–1104(6) (2011). Although the factual allegations in such a petition need not be “exhaustive or extensive,” they must “put a party on notice as to what acts, omissions or conditions are at issue.” In re Hardesty, 150 N.C.App. 380, 384, 563 S.E.2d 79, 82 (2002). Moreover, in order to meet the statutory requirements, “sufficiently detailed allegations need not appear on the face of the petition but may be incorporated by reference.” See In re H.T., 180 N.C.App. 611, 617, 637 S.E.2d 923, 927 (2006) (emphasis added).

In the present case, DSS's petition alleged:

5. The petitioner is informed and believes that there exist one or more grounds for termination of the parental rights of the respondent mother [ ] to the minor child, [Julian] including the following:

a. [N.C.G.S.] § 7B–1111(a)(2) in that:

i. The parents have willfully left the juvenile in foster care or placement outside the home for more than 12 months without showing to the satisfaction of the court that reasonable progress under the circumstances has been made in correcting those conditions which led to the removal of the juvenile.

Although the above allegation would constitute a “bare recitation” of the statute and, standing alone, would be insufficient to meet the statutory requirement as set forth above, In re Quevedo, 106 N.C.App. 574, 579, 419 S.E.2d 158, 160,appeal dismissed,332 N.C. 483, 424 S.E.2d 397 (1992). Paragraph 1 of the petition further provides that a copy of the order adjudicating Julian neglected and dependent “is attached hereto as Exhibit ‘A’ to the petition and incorporated herein by reference.” In this underlying order, the court found:

6. DSS became involved with the child on May 14, 2010 due to a report that the mother had been arrested for assault and battery and the child was at daycare with no other arrangements for pick up. [Mother] was highly impaired and unable to answer questions.

....

9. [Mother] admits to huffing paint and smoking marijuana and also admitted she is no longer taking her medications for mental health issues. She is currently receiving disability.

10. [Mother] has been referred for parenting classes through Family Resources of Rutherford County. She maybe [sic] able to learn parenting techniques in these sessions [sic][I]t is unknown whether she will be able to learn effective methods to use with her special needs child in this venue. Her case plan asks her to address her mental health and substance abuse[ ] issues and to work with the various service providers to show that she is able to effectively manage his special needs and challenging behaviors.

Thus, because the order adjudicating Julian as neglected and dependent alleged sufficient facts—including mother's mental health and substance abuse issues—to put her on notice of the acts, omissions, or conditions that led to Julian's removal, see In re Quevedo, 106 N.C.App. at 579, 419 S.E.2d at 160 (“[T]he petition incorporates an attached custody award, ... and the custody award states sufficient facts to warrant such a determination [that grounds exist to warrant termination of parental rights].”), we hold that DSS's petition complied with the requirements of N.C.G.S. § 7B–1104(6). Therefore, we overrule this issue on appeal.

Mother next contends the trial court erred by concluding that grounds existed to terminate her parental rights pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B–1111(a)(2) because the court's findings of fact were not based on the evidence in the record, and the findings did not support the court's conclusion. See In re Allred, 122 N.C.App. 561, 565, 471 S.E.2d 84, 86 (1996) (“In a termination proceeding, the appellate court should affirm the trial court where the court's findings of fact are based upon clear, cogent and convincing evidence and the findings support the conclusions of law.”). Again, we disagree.

Under N.C.G.S. § 7B–1111(a)(2), a court may terminate parental rights on the ground that “[t]he parent has willfully left the juvenile in foster care or placement outside the home for more than 12 months without showing to the satisfaction of the court that reasonable progress under the circumstances has been made in correcting those conditions which led to the...