In re J.P.

• Decision Date: 14 May 2004
• Docket Number: No. 03-0266.,03-0266.
• Citation: 136 S.W.3d 629
• Parties: In The Matter of J.P., A Juvenile.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

136 S.W.3d 629

In The Matter of J.P., A Juvenile.

No. 03-0266.

Supreme Court of Texas.

Argued February 4, 2004.

Decided May 14, 2004.

Robert James Kersey, Law Office of Robert Kersey, Granbury, for petitioner.

R. Kelton Conner, Chad Owen Bull, Assistant County Attorney Hood County, Granbury, for respondent.

John M. Vernon, Kirstin Donahue Dietel, Kirkpatrick & Lockhart LLP, Dallas, Allan Van Fleet, Vinson & Elkins, Houston, for Amicus Curiae Texas Appleseed.

Justice BRISTER delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice PHILLIPS, Justice HECHT, Justice OWEN, Justice O'NEILL, Justice JEFFERSON, Justice SCHNEIDER and Justice SMITH joined.

The trial court modified a prior juvenile order to commit J.P., an eleven-year-old boy, to the Texas Youth Commission (TYC). He appeals, arguing the trial court failed to make certain findings during modification that the statute expressly requires only in original commitment orders. We granted the petition because of a conflict in the courts of appeals on this question. We hold the plain words of the statute do not require the explicit findings J.P. demands.

At his original adjudication hearing,¹ J.P. was found to have engaged in delinquent conduct by (1) hitting and kicking a teacher at his school, (2) threatening to murder the teacher, an assistant principal, and some of his fellow students, and (3) threatening his mother a week later with a knife. Had he been an adult, these offenses could have constituted, respectively, a third-degree felony,² a Class A misdemeanor,³ and a second-degree felony.⁴

J.P. was placed on one year's probation in the custody of his parents. Four days later, sheriffs deputies were called to his home and found him breaking out windows with a broom handle. He was taken into custody, and shortly thereafter agreed (with the approval of his appointed attorney) to an order modifying his probation to provide for placement at the Hood County Regional Detention Center. After a number of incidents at the detention center, the disposition was again modified on April 22, 2002 to commit J.P. to TYC. He appeals from this last order.

The Legislature provided different rules for different stages of a juvenile proceeding. An adjudication hearing incorporates many of the features of a criminal trial, including the right to a jury trial, the right to remain silent, and the right to exclude evidence inadmissible under the rules governing criminal proceedings.⁵ By contrast, at a disposition hearing after adjudication, a juvenile has a right to a jury only in cases of possible transfer to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, and written reports may be considered even if the author does not testify.⁶ Finally, at a hearing to modify disposition, there is no right to a jury trial at all.⁷

The Legislature also provided for differences in disposition orders depending on the stage of the proceedings. In all such orders, the court must state in writing its reasons for the order and furnish a copy to the child.⁸ But if an initial disposition order places a child in TYC or on probation outside the home, it must expressly state that (1) removal from the home is in the child's best interests, (2) reasonable efforts were made to avoid removal, and (3) care and supervision the child needs to meet the conditions of probation cannot be provided at home.⁹ By contrast, none of these additional findings is expressly required in a modification order, which instead can provide for commitment to TYC if (1) the original disposition was for conduct constituting a felony or multiple misdemeanors, and (2) the court finds the child violated a reasonable and lawful order of the court.¹⁰

J.P. first argues that the modification order had to include written findings regarding best interests, reasonable efforts, and quality of in-home care. In drafting the Family Code (and other statutes as well), the Legislature often requires judges to "find" certain matters before taking certain actions,¹¹ but only occasionally requires those findings to be made in writing.¹² Here, the Legislature required several written findings in original orders, but did not require them in modified orders. We cannot interpret the statute to require otherwise without rewriting it.

Alternatively, J.P. argues that before making the modification order, the trial court had to make the same findings as would have been required for an original order, even if they did not have to be written into the modification order. He also argues the modification order here was improper because there was insufficient evidence to support these necessary but implied findings.¹³

As noted, the plain language of the Family Code requires written findings regarding best interests, reasonable efforts, and quality of in-home care in an original disposition order, but not in a modified one. We must give effect to this difference in plain language unless doing so violates other provisions of the statute.¹⁴ Several appellate courts, including the court of appeals in this case, have held it does not.¹⁵

But the Eighth Court of Appeals has held to the contrary, requiring trial courts to make each of these findings and state them expressly in modification orders committing a juvenile to TYC.¹⁶ The court appeared to have two main concerns about applying the statute as written.

First, the court feared children could be removed from their homes and placed in TYC for probation infractions without considering their best interests or alternative arrangements.¹⁷ But it must be kept in mind that no original disposition of any kind could have been made unless the best interests of the child indicated protection or rehabilitation was needed.¹⁸ Further, the act of modification itself indicates an in-home alternative has been tried, and undoubtedly most trial courts would find these efforts reasonable because they ordered them. Finally, by finding a violation of probation, a court necessarily finds that in-home supervision was insufficient to ensure there were no such violations. Given the circumstances in which modified orders of commitment arise, the Legislature could have decided separate findings regarding the child's best interests and alternative arrangements were not necessary because they were necessarily included.

Second, the court feared that effective appellate review of commitment orders based on minor infractions would be precluded if the order simply stated that the child "violated a reasonable and lawful order of the court."¹⁹ But the statute does not require commitment to TYC for every probation violation; it provides only that a trial court's disposition "may be modified" in such circumstances.²⁰ This is a discretionary decision, and subject to review for abuse of that discretion. If a trial court arbitrarily removes a child from home for a trivial infraction, nothing in the statute prohibits the appellate judges of Texas from doing something about it.

Finally, neither of these concerns addresses what the Juvenile Justice Code itself indicates is its primary concern B the safety of the public:

51.01. Purpose and Interpretation

This title shall be construed to effectuate the following public purposes:

(1) to provide for the protection of the public and public safety;

(2) consistent with the protection of the public and public safety:

(A) to promote the concept of punishment for criminal acts;

(B) to remove, where appropriate, the taint of criminality from children committing certain unlawful acts; and

(C) to provide treatment, training, and rehabilitation that emphasizes the accountability and responsibility of both the parent and the child for the child's conduct;

(3) to provide for the care, the protection, and the wholesome moral, mental, and physical development of children coming within its provisions;

(4) to protect the welfare of the community and to control the commission of unlawful acts by children;

(5) to achieve the foregoing purposes in a family environment whenever possible, separating the child from the child's parents only when necessary for the child's welfare or in the interest of public safety and when a child is removed from the child's family, to give the child the care that should be provided by parents; and

(6) to provide a simple judicial procedure through which the provisions of this title are executed and enforced and in which the parties are assured a fair hearing and their constitutional and other legal rights recognized and enforced.²¹

In other parts of the Family Code, the best interests of children are often paramount; but in the Juvenile Justice Code, the best interests of children who engage in serious and repeated delinquent conduct are superseded to the extent they conflict with public safety.

Commitment to TYC by modification order is proper only if a juvenile originally committed a felony or multiple misdemeanors, and subsequently violated one or more conditions of probation.²² In such circumstances, the statute allows a trial court to decline third and fourth chances to a juvenile who has abused a second one.

Here, the evidence at the modification hearing showed that J.P. assaulted detention center officers, created a flood by plugging his toilet, assaulted other residents, and on several occasions threatened to commit suicide. On the other hand, there was evidence the death of his father shortly after he entered the detention center contributed to the deterioration of his behavior, and a grandfather from New Hampshire indicated willingness to raise J.P. there. The trial judge's comments indicate careful consideration of J.P.'s circumstances, of possible alternatives to commitment, and of potential dangers each option provided. Given J.P.'s original adjudication of delinquency for serious offenses (which he does not contest), the previous commitment to the Hood County Detention Center for further delinquent conduct (which he does not contest), and the many offenses...