In re J.S.B., A06A0522.

Decision Date17 February 2006
Docket NumberNo. A06A0522.,A06A0522.
Citation277 Ga. App. 660,627 S.E.2d 402
PartiesIn the Interest of J.S.B. et al., children.
CourtGeorgia Court of Appeals

Melvin R. Horne, Cairo, for appellant.

Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Shalen S. Nelson, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Charissa A. Ruel, Assistant Attorney General, Clark & Bellamy, Brian D. Bellamy, Thomasville, for appellee.

BLACKBURN, Presiding Judge.

Following the termination of her parental rights to J.S.B., S.S.H., and S.T.H., the children's natural mother appeals, contending that the evidence was insufficient to support the juvenile court's ruling. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse.

On appeal, we must determine whether, after reviewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the juvenile court's judgments, any rational trier of fact could have found by clear and convincing evidence that the natural parent's rights should have been terminated. In the Interest of H. Y.1 In addition, this Court neither weighs evidence nor determines the credibility of witnesses; rather, we defer to the juvenile court's fact-finding and affirm unless the appellate standard is not met. In the Interest of C.R.G.2

Viewed in this light, the evidence shows that the mother's parental rights to seven previous children had been terminated due to her unrehabilitated substance abuse, failure to pay child support, and failure to comply with reunification case plans. She subsequently gave birth to J.S.B. on March 13, 2000 and to twins S.S.H. and S.T.H. on July 9, 2001. When S.T.H. in October 2003 broke her leg, the mother waited two days before seeking medical attention despite the child's limping and obvious pain. The mother then became incarcerated a few days later and left the children with their grandmother (who had previously been disapproved as a placement resource), requiring the local DFCS to take custody of the children for several days until the mother was released. When her residence shortly thereafter burned down and she again became incarcerated, Department of Family and Children Services (DFCS) again took custody of the three children. DFCS eventually filed a deprivation petition, and the mother did not appeal the juvenile court's subsequent finding of deprivation as to all three children. A reunification plan was ordered; however, based on dissatisfaction with the mother's level of compliance with the plan, less than two months later DFCS petitioned to terminate the mother's parental rights. Following a hearing, the juvenile court granted the petition and terminated her rights, which she now appeals.3

1. Two-Step Review. As her sole enumeration of error, the mother contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the juvenile court's order terminating her parental rights. We disagree.

The termination of parental rights under OCGA § 15-11-94 involves a two-step analysis. First, the juvenile court must determine whether there is clear and convincing evidence of parental misconduct or inability, as defined in OCGA § 15-11-94(b). Parental misconduct or inability is found when: "(i) the child is deprived; (ii) lack of proper parental care or control caused the deprivation; (iii) the cause of the deprivation is likely to continue; and (iv) continued deprivation is likely to cause serious physical, mental, emotional or moral harm to the child." In the Interest of J.L.K.4 See OCGA § 15-11-94(b)(4)(A)(i)-(iv). "Second, if the juvenile court finds clear and convincing evidence of parental misconduct or inability, it must consider whether termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the child, considering the child's physical, mental, emotional, and moral condition and needs, including the need for a secure, stable home." In the Interest of H.Y., supra at 503, 606 S.E.2d 679.

2. Parental Misconduct or Inability. The evidence supported a finding of the mother's parental misconduct or inability.

(a) Deprivation. The juvenile court previously adjudicated the children to be deprived and took judicial notice of its deprivation order in the order terminating the mother's parental rights. As she never appealed the deprivation finding, she is now bound by it. See In the Interest of J.J.5

(b) Lack of Proper Parental Care or Control Caused Deprivation. The second criterion for finding parental misconduct or inability requires a showing that a lack of proper parental care or control caused the deprivation. The statute sets forth several conditions that a juvenile court may consider regarding this issue, including:

(i) A medically verifiable deficiency of the parent's physical, mental, or emotional health of such duration or nature as to render the parent unable to provide adequately for the physical, mental, emotional, or moral condition and needs of the child;. . .

( v) Physical, mental, or emotional neglect of the child or evidence of past physical, mental, or emotional neglect of the child or of another child by the parent.

OCGA § 15-11-94(b)(4)(B)(i), (v).

(i) Medically Verifiable Mental Deficiency. The mother was diagnosed with antisocial personality disorder, anger control problems, and mild mental retardation. Despite these mental and emotional deficiencies, she disputed her need for psychological therapy and consistently neglected to take the medication prescribed to treat her mental health condition. As a result, the mother had difficulty understanding parenting concepts, as well as communicating with her children. These deficiencies further led to an inability to provide for one of the children's physical needs when she failed to promptly seek medical treatment for S.T.H.'s broken leg. In addition, these deficiencies rendered the mother unable to maintain employment and a stable, safe home environment, and thus unable to provide adequately for the mental and emotional needs of her children.

(ii) Physical, Mental, or Emotional Neglect. As mentioned, the mother failed to seek immediate medical treatment after S.T.H. broke her leg, showing physical neglect. In addition, the mother's incarcerations, which in turn forced DFCS to take custody of the children, demonstrated emotional neglect. Furthermore, the fact that she had previously lost her parental rights to seven other children because of substance abuse, failure to pay child support, and failure to comply with reunification case plans, showed her neglect of other children and therefore was properly considered as evidence supporting the contention that lack of proper care was the cause of her current children's deprivation. See In the Interest of B.B.6 Thus, the evidence satisfied the second criterion for finding parental misconduct or inability. See In the Interest of C.R.G., supra at 164, 611 S.E.2d 784.

(c) Cause of Deprivation Likely to Continue. Sufficient evidence demonstrated that the cause of the deprivation was likely to continue in this case. It is appropriate for a trial court to consider a parent's past conduct in determining whether the deprivation is likely to continue. In the Interest of C.B.H.7 As previously stated, the mother was shown to have difficulty developing parenting skills, resulting in her failure to seek immediate medical attention for her child's broken leg. Moreover, she consistently demonstrated a reluctance to improve her parenting skills. Indeed, the in-home counselor who attempted to teach the mother parenting skills testified that she did not believe that the mother would ever be able to develop adequate skills in light of her mental and emotional deficiencies. Additionally, she has failed to participate consistently in treatment for her mental health condition. See In the Interest of H. Y., supra at 504(1)(b), 606 S.E.2d 679. The mother's past felony conviction and incarcerations are also indicative of the likelihood of continued deprivation. See In the Interest of B.C.8 Thus, the third criterion for finding parental misconduct or inability was satisfied. See In the Interest of C.R.G., supra at 164, 611 S.E.2d 784.

(d) Continued Deprivation Likely to Cause Harm to Children. This brings us to the fourth criterion: whether any evidence shows that the continued deprivation is likely to cause serious physical, mental, emotional, or moral harm to the children. Although this is a difficult case, we find insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court's conclusion that continued deprivation is likely to cause serious harm to the children. Unlike other cases where we have found evidence of such harm, here no expert witness, such as a psychologist, testified that the mother's antisocial personality disorder or learning disability would be detrimental to the children by causing such things as anger problems or school problems. See In the Interest of S.A.B.9 Nor did any such witness testify that impermanency and instability were causing specific harms to the children. See In the Interest of M.E.S.10

Rather, the only attempt to show that continued deprivation might possibly cause the children harm came from the vague testimony of the DFCS caseworker, who testified that the mother's past history of arrests, mental health issues, and inability to maintain employment created an unsafe and unstable environment. We have previously held, however, that "[t]he mother's inability to care for her children does not necessarily mean that her current relationship with them is detrimental." In the Interest of D.F.11 See In the Interest of K.J.12 ("the fact that a mother is unemployed, without prospects for...

To continue reading

Request your trial
22 cases
  • In re R. S. T.
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • 16 mars 2018
    ...(cleaned up) ).16 In the Interest of E. M. D ., 339 Ga. App. at 202 (II) (B), 793 S.E.2d 489 ; see In the Interest of J. S. B ., 277 Ga. App. 660, 663 (2) (d), 627 S.E.2d 402 (2006) (reversing a termination order and noting that "the mother’s inability to care for her children does not nece......
  • In re J.E.
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • 30 mars 2011
    ...520, 526, 654 S.E.2d 651 (2007) ; In the Interest of A.T., 271 Ga.App. 470, 474, 610 S.E.2d 121 (2005) ; In the Interest of J.S.B., 277 Ga.App. 660, 663(2)(d), 627 S.E.2d 402 (2006) ; In the Interest of J.T.W., 270 Ga.App. 26, 36–37(2)(d), 606 S.E.2d 59 (2004) ; In the Interest of J.H., 267......
  • In re Interest of B.R.F.
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • 30 mars 2015
    ...of M.S.S., 308 Ga.App. 614, 620(2), 708 S.E.2d 570 (2011) (citations and punctuation omitted).45 See In the Interest of J.S.B., 277 Ga.App. 660, 661(2)(a), 627 S.E.2d 402 (2006).46 See In re A.R., 302 Ga.App. 702, 710(1)(c), 691 S.E.2d 402 (2010) (“The test in determining termination of par......
  • In re Interest of S.O.C.
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • 2 juillet 2015
    ...Ga.App. 859, 862, 555 S.E.2d 225 (2001).27 In the Interest of A.T., 271 Ga.App. at 473, 610 S.E.2d 121.28 In the Interest of J.S.B., 277 Ga.App. 660, 663(2)(d), 627 S.E.2d 402 (2006) (punctuation omitted).29 In the Interest of J.V.J., 329 Ga.App. at 428, 765 S.E.2d 389 ; see also In the Int......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 books & journal articles
  • Navigating a Potentially Changing Landscape in Child Welfare Appellate Review
    • United States
    • Mercer University School of Law Mercer Law Reviews No. 73-3, March 2022
    • Invalid date
    ...M. M. R., 336 Ga. App. 14, 24, 783 S.E.2d 415, 423 (2016) (quoting In re A. T., 271 Ga. App. at 473, 610 S.E.2d at 123; In re J. S. B., 277 Ga. App. 660, 663, 627 S.E.2d 402, 406 (2006)).40. In re S. O. C., 332 Ga. App. 738, 746, 774 S.E.2d 785, 792 (2015) (alterations in original).41. In r......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT