In re J.V.
Decision Date | 30 October 2012 |
Docket Number | No. 2011–0107.,2011–0107. |
Citation | 979 N.E.2d 1203 |
Parties | In re J.V. |
Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
Robert L. Tobik, Cuyahoga Country Public Defender, and Cullen Sweeney, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant, J.V.
William D. Mason, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Kristen L. Sobieski, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee, state of Ohio.
Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Jill Beeler and Amanda J. Powell, Assistant Public Defenders, urging reversal for amicus curiae Ohio Public Defender.
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, Alexandra T. Schimmer, Solicitor General, and David M. Lieberman and Elizabeth A. Matune, Assistant Attorneys General, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio Attorney General.
{¶ 1} In June 2005, pursuant to a plea agreement, the trial court found juvenile appellant J.V. delinquent and guilty of one count of felonious assault, one count of aggravated robbery, and the attendant firearm and serious-youthful-offender specifications. The court imposed a blended sentence: at least two years of incarceration at the Ohio Department of Youth Services ("ODYS") and a stayed adult sentence of three years. Several legal challenges that are immaterial here were filed while J.V. was incarcerated. Near the end of his sentence at ODYS, J.V. was involved in a fight that led the trial court to invoke the theretofore stayed adult sentence.
{¶ 2} On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the invocation of the stayed adult sentence. We accepted J.V.'s discretionary appeal, which presents two propositions of law. The first proposition of law states, "The invocation of an adult prison sentence upon a juvenile, pursuant to R.C. 2152.14, violates the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, Sections 10 and 16 of the Ohio Constitution." We conclude to the contrary that the invocation of the adult prison sentence was constitutional. The second proposition of law states, "A juvenile court does not have the authority to impose criminal punishment (including post-release control) after the delinquent child turns 21." We agree, and reverse that portion of the court of appeals decision.
{¶ 3} Because both propositions of law involve only questions of law, our review is de novo. In re M.P., 124 Ohio St.3d 445, 2010-Ohio-599, 923 N.E.2d 584, ¶ 13.
I. Constitutionality of Invocation Provisions of R.C. Chapter 2152
{¶ 4} R.C. Chapter 2152 is a relatively recent enactment of the General Assembly that became law on January 1, 2002. "The overriding purposes for dispositions under this chapter are to provide for the care, protection, and mental and physical development of children subject to this chapter, protect the public interest and safety, hold the offender accountable for the offender's actions, restore the victim, and rehabilitate the offender." R.C. 2152.01(A). We have addressed R.C. 2152.14, which allows for the invocation of the adult portion of a dispositional sentence, three times. State v. D.H., 120 Ohio St.3d 540, 2009-Ohio-9, 901 N.E.2d 209; In re M.P.; and In re C.P., 131 Ohio St.3d 513, 2012-Ohio-1446, 967 N.E.2d 729. But we have not addressed the constitutionality of the invocation provisions of R.C. 2152.14 in these cases. Our summary of R.C. 2152.14 in D.H. provides background to our analysis in this case:
D.H., 120 Ohio St.3d 540, 2009-Ohio-9, 901 N.E.2d 209, ¶ 31–38.
{¶ 5} With that background, it is clear that the issues before us have not been addressed. In this case, J.V.'s stayed sentence has been invoked, and he has challenged the constitutionality of two aspects of the invocation provisions of R.C. 2152.14, which were specifically not addressed in D.H. First, J.V. argues that the judicial fact-finding necessary to invoke the stayed adult sentence violates J.V.'s right to a trial by jury. Second, J.V. argues that the burden of proof should be the heightened "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of criminal trials rather than the lesser "clear and convincing" standard of R.C. 2152.14(E)(1). Unlike D.H., which did not require us to "address the constitutional ramifications of invoking the adult sentence under R.C. 2152.14 in light of Blakely and Foster, " today we squarely address these constitutional challenges. D.H. at ¶ 37.
{¶ 6} J.V. argues that R.C. 2152.14(E) violates his right to a trial by jury by allowing the judge to substitute his own judgment as to certain factual findings for a jury's. J.V. relies on Apprendi v. Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), which states, "Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."
{¶ 7} We conclude that the Apprendi line of cases is not even in play, because the juvenile court did not increase the penalty that J.V. was subject to. Apprendi does not prohibit all judicial fact-finding; it prohibits only that which increases the penalty beyond the statutory maximum. Id. at 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435. The "statutory maximum" is the maximum sentence "allowed by the jury verdict or by the defendant's admissions at a plea hearing." State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1, 2006-Ohio-856, 845 N.E.2d 470, at ¶ 7.
{¶ 8} In this case, based on delinquency admissions, J.V. was sentenced to a blended sentence. The adult portion of the sentence was stayed, "pending the successful completion of the traditional juvenile disposition." R.C. 2152.13(D)(1)(c). When the juvenile court invoked the stayed sentence because J.V. did not successfully complete his juvenile disposition, the judge did not increase J.V.'s sentence; he merely removed the stay. The sentence had already been imposed.
{¶ 9} As we have explained, R.C. 2152.14 does not require the stay to be lifted, and it allows the juvenile court to impose a lesser sentence than the stayed sentence when the adult portion of a stayed disposition is invoked. In In re C.P., we stated:
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