In re J.W.
| Docket Number | 21-0348 |
| Decision Date | 26 May 2023 |
| Parties | IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF J.W., Minor Child. JACOB VAN CLEAF, Proposed Guardian, Appellant. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Submitted December 15, 2022
On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, William A Price, Senior Judge.
The mother of the proposed protected person in an involuntary guardianship proceeding initiated by the mother's former attorney seeks further review from the court of appeals' reversal of the juvenile court's dismissal of the guardianship petition. DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; JUVENILE COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
Jacob van Cleaf (argued), Des Moines, appellant, pro se.
Alexis R. Dahlhauser (argued) of Neighborhood Law Group of Iowa P.C., West Des Moines, for appellee mother.
May, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
In December 2020, Attorney Jacob van Cleaf filed a pro se petition to establish an involuntary guardianship of J.W., the (then) nine-year-old daughter of his former client, whom we will refer to as "Mother." See Iowa Code § 232D.204 (2020). Not only was Mother van Cleaf's former client, he (and his law partner) had represented her in previous custody disputes involving her children- including the child over which he now seeks to be named the guardian. The juvenile court dismissed the petition on the basis that van Cleaf could not act as a petitioner in a case to establish a guardianship over his former client's daughter without violating several rules of professional conduct. On appeal, the court of appeals concluded that dismissal was not a proper remedy for any purported ethical violations and reversed the dismissal. On further review, we recognize the court's inherent authority to dismiss an action premised on the rules of professional conduct and conclude the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion under the unique circumstances of this case. We therefore affirm the juvenile court's dismissal.
Mother met attorney Jacob van Cleaf in 2013 through Amelia Wildt, who worked as the office manager for van Cleaf's law firm. Mother needed legal assistance in a custody dispute with the father of one of her children, and she hired van Cleaf. Over the next three years, van Cleaf or his law partner, Colin McCormack, represented Mother in four more cases: a domestic violence case and three child custody proceedings. In one of those cases, McCormack filed an action on behalf of Mother in March 2016 to establish paternity and custody over the child at issue in this case, J.W., which was resolved by default judgment against the biological father in November. Both van Cleaf's and McCormack's representation of Mother ended in all matters in December.
Apparently, though, Mother's relationship with van Cleaf went beyond that of an attorney and a client. According to the petition for involuntary guardianship that started the instant litigation, Mother often left J.W. in the care of either Wildt or van Cleaf, each of whom eventually made a place for J.W. in their respective homes. Accordingly, the petition alleges Wildt and van Cleaf both acted as a de facto guardian for J.W.-Wildt since 2013 and van Cleaf since 2015 (although van Cleaf later asserted that his actions did not rise to the level of a de facto guardian until 2017). Indeed, van Cleaf asserts that J.W. has resided either with Wildt or, more recently, with him since 2014-that is, except for an elevenmonth period from June 2018 through May 2019, and "when not actively prevented from doing so by" Mother. In addition to providing J.W. with a home, Wilt and van Cleaf allegedly arranged for J.W.'s medical care, transported her to daycare, and made educational decisions for her when she reached school age. Mother, on the other hand, parented only when convenient, leaving J.W. in Wildt's or van Cleaf's care for months at a time without even visiting J.W.
That all ended on November 30, 2020, when Mother purportedly accosted van Cleaf, took J.W. from his care, and cut off all communications. On December 8, van Cleaf filed the instant petition for involuntary guardianship, identifying himself and Wildt as copetitioners and proposed coguardians.[1] The juvenile court appointed separate counsel for Mother and for J.W. as the proposed protected person. On motion filed by J.W.'s attorney, the court bifurcated the roles of attorney and court visitor and appointed a separate court visitor to serve J.W.'s best interests.
While attempts to serve Mother with the guardianship petition were underway, Mother's attorney brought to van Cleaf's attention several "serious ethical concerns regarding [his] involvement with this client and matter," and asked van Cleaf to alert the court. Van Cleaf did so, and in response, Mother filed a notice identifying eight specific ethics rules[2] she believed van Cleaf had, or would, violate if he continued in his role as petitioner in this involuntary guardianship proceeding. Mother sought dismissal of the petition in its entirety as well as "[a]ssurance that [neither] Mr. van Cleaf, nor any current or future firm of his employ, will seek guardianship or represent anyone seeking guardianship of any child of . . . Mother."
The juvenile court held an evidentiary hearing limited to the issue of the ethical concerns raised by Mother. Both J.W.'s court-appointed attorney and her court visitor agreed with Mother that van Cleaf had violated obligations owed to Mother as his former client and urged that the proper remedy was dismissal without prejudice so that "either the State of Iowa or another interested party without any ethical obligations to . . . Mother . . . may bring an action on behalf of the minor child to determine the merits of whether or not an actual guardianship is, in fact, appropriate." The juvenile court concluded that van Cleaf violated his duties to Mother as a former client under Iowa Rule of Professional Conduct 32:1.9, in addition to violating rules 32:1.8, 32:5.3(c), and 32:4.2(a).[3] In considering the proper remedy, the court could conceive of "no conditions or combination of conditions that would allow this litigation to go forward without further violations of Jacob van Cleaf's duties to his former client," even if van Cleaf were represented by counsel rather than appearing pro se. Therefore, the court concluded "[t]he only appropriate remedy is a dismissal of the Petition."
We transferred van Cleaf's appeal to the court of appeals, which reversed, finding no legal authority for the juvenile court to order dismissal as a remedy even if van Cleaf had violated, or would violate, the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct. The court of appeals noted that dismissal would raise "general concerns about" restricting a party's access to the courts and, in any event, the petition sufficiently stated a claim for relief to preclude dismissal as a remedy at the preanswer stage of the proceedings.
We granted Mother's application for further review.
On appeal, Mother moved to strike from the appellate record references to certain exhibits admitted at the evidentiary hearing since they were admitted "for the limited purpose [of] establish[ing] that Mr. van Cleaf had a 'claim' in this case" under Iowa Rule of Professional Conduct 32:1.6(b)(5). Mother cites no authority to support her motion, and under our appellate rules, the exhibits would generally be part of the record on appeal since they were filed in the juvenile court. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.801 (). In any event, the exhibits are not necessary to our resolution of the appeal, and we have not considered them. We therefore deny the motion to strike as moot.
We face two related issues: whether van Cleaf's actions do, or could, violate any rules of professional conduct, and if they do, what can or should be done to remedy any possible violations. We address each issue but in reverse order.
A. Is Dismissal an Available Remedy? The court of appeals faulted the juvenile court's failure to identify the legal authority that supported its dismissal of the guardianship petition as a proper remedy for van Cleaf's alleged rule violations, concluding that the court essentially granted a preanswer motion to dismiss. At that stage, the court of appeals reasoned, the court should have taken all allegations in the petition as true and could not have considered facts outside the petition, including Mother's assertion (assuming it to be legally correct) that van Cleaf's role as her former lawyer prevented both him and Wildt from serving as J.W.'s guardian. The court of appeals is mistaken for two distinct reasons.
First the court of appeals' assessment of the procedural posture of this case misses that the juvenile court held an evidentiary hearing on (and limited to) the effect of the alleged ethical issues. Even if we analogize Mother's enumeration of alleged ethical violations to a preanswer motion to dismiss, holding an evidentiary hearing on that issue was thus also analogous to construing the "motion to dismiss" as one for summary judgment, since at such hearings the parties present, and the court considers, evidence beyond that contained in the petition. Cf. George v. D.W. Zinser Co., 762 N.W.2d 865, 867 (Iowa 2...
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