In re James
| Decision Date | 28 January 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 115,514 (Cons. w/ 115,516),115,514 (Cons. w/ 115,516) |
| Citation | 472 P.3d 205 |
| Parties | IN RE the ESTATE OF Fred Franklin JAMES, Sr., deceased, In the Matter of the Creditor Claims of: Pamela A. Flener, Plaintiff/Appellee, and Glenn Flener, Plaintiff, v. F. Nils Raunikar, Personal Representative of the Estate of Fred Franklin James, Sr., deceased, Defendant/Appellant, and Fred Franklin James, Jr., Appellant, and Dale Bryan James, Appellee. |
| Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
Clyde Muchmore, Mary H. Tolbert, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Appellants Fred Franklin James, Jr., and the Estate of Fred Franklin James, Sr., Deceased, F. Nils Raunikar, Personal Representative.
Douglas W. Sanders, Jr., Poteau, Oklahoma, for Appellant Fred Franklin James, Jr.
F. Nils Raunikar, Wilburton, Oklahoma, for Defendant/Appellant Estate of Fred Franklin James.
Douglas G. Dry, Tahlequah, Oklahoma, for Plaintiffs/Appellees Pamela A. Flener and Glenn Flener, and Bryan Dale James.
¶1 We granted certiorari to address whether two children who were named beneficiaries in a will were pretermitted heirs. We hold that heirs are not pretermitted because their beneficiary status on a non-probate asset differs from their bequests in a will. We reverse the trial court in part, and remand for proceedings consistent with our determination neither child was a pretermitted heir.
¶2 This cause concerns two cases with some of the same parties and with some of the same issues which were consolidated in the trial court under one case number. Nevertheless, even though the cases were consolidated, the trial court issued two separate decisional orders regarding each case. The first case is: Case 1, a probate proceeding. The second case is: Case 2, a breach of contract/creditor's claim proceeding against the estate involved in Case 1. Determinations that the trial court made in Case 1 influenced determinations that the trial court made in Case 2.
¶3 The decedent, Fred Franklin James, Sr., primarily known as "Duke" (decedent/father/Duke), had three children: Fred Franklin, Jr. (Fred.), Bryan Dale James, (Bryan/son) and Pamela Ann Flener (Pamela/daughter). Duke, suffering from terminal cancer
, executed a will on July 28, 2009. At that time he owned some real property, all of which is not all identified in the record, some bank accounts/Certificates of Deposits, and a life insurance policy. Included in his real property was a mechanics shop. In Article I of the will, he expressly acknowledged his three children. Article I provides in pertinent part:
¶4 Duke did not divide his estate among his three children equally. Instead, he provided for the three children as follows:
He also left two CD's in Latimer State Bank in trust for his disabled sister Donna Jean James.
¶5 Duke died nearly eighteen months later after the execution of his will on December 16, 2010. The challenges to his will and division of property began thereafter. Fred Franklin, Jr., filed the will for probate on January 14, 2011. On March 3, 2011, the daughter and her brother, Bryan, filed a contest to the will in the District Court of Latimer County. They objected to its admittance to probate, and to their brother Fred being appointed as personal representative pursuant to the terms of the will. They alleged that their father could not have possibly been of sound mind when he made the will because he had been diagnosed with terminal colon cancer
, was in severe pain, and was on pain killers. They also argued that because Fred had too much influence over their father during his lifetime, he was unqualified to serve as personal representative.
¶6 As evidence of too much influence, they showed that the decedent used another attorney to draft his will other than a long time attorney. They also argued that: 1) Fred, Jr. drove their father to the attorney's office where the will was drafted and arranged for the meeting, but Fred and the attorney both disputed their allegations; 2) Fred, Jr. had a tumultuous relationship with the siblings; and 3) Fred, Jr. was the stronger person in the relationship with his father. Fred, Jr. did work together with his father for many years and provided meals, transportation to medical appointments, and care for his father in his last years. However, there was no direct evidence that Fred, Jr. participated in procurement of the will.
¶7 Bryan also sought an increased share of the estate as an pretermitted child, should the will be admitted to probate. He acknowledged that he was mentioned in the will, but argues that he was omitted and entitled to an intestate share because the life insurance policy his father purported to leave him by creating a testamentary trust, was a non-probate asset.
¶8 The policy actually listed all three children as equal beneficiaries, rather than just Bryan. Bryan received $26,098.31 which was 1/3 of the proceeds of the policy (1/3 of $78,294.92) pursuant to being a co-listed beneficiary on the policy, rather than the entire amount of it as outlined in the will. Consequently, Bryan contends he took nothing under the will and was "omitted." Similarly, Pamela received $88,270.13 in CD proceeds directly from the bank because she was listed on CDs as a joint owner with her father, the decedent. Thus, the CD funds were also transferred outside of the will and probate process, and she received nothing else under the will.
¶9 On August 9, 2011, the trial court appointed a local attorney, F. Nils Raunikar, as special administrator and personal representative of Duke's estate, while the will contest unfolded. On July 16, 2012, Pamela and her husband Glenn Flener (collectively, the Fleners) filed a claim in Case 1 alleging that they had an oral contract with Duke to purchase real property known as the mechanic/body shop (the shop) that Duke bought in 1995. The Fleners alleged that they: 1) worked at the shop since Duke purchased it in 1995; 2) had completed the terms of an alleged oral shop purchase contract; and 3) were entitled to ownership of the shop after Duke's death.
¶10 A few months later, on September 28, 2012, the Fleners filed Case 2, a separate lawsuit as a breach of contract/a creditor's claim against Duke's estate also in Latimer County District Court, also asserting that essentially the same arguments that they had made in Case 1: 1) they had taken possession of the shop since Duke purchased it in 1995; 2) made improvements therein; and 3) had completed the terms for purchase under an alleged oral contract. Consequently, in Case 2, the Fleners asserted claims for breach of contract, and equitable estoppel based on part performance.2 The special administrator counterclaimed for unpaid rent since the decedent's death. On October 01, 2012, Glenn Flener, son-in-law of the decedent, added a personal creditor's claim for work done on a 1971 Ford Torino totaling $10,317.32 after the special administrator had rejected the claim.
¶11 The deed for the shop property had remained in the decedent's name since it was purchased in 1994. The shop property appeared in his depreciation schedules on his income tax forms to the IRS. The decedent leased a portion of the property to a drilling company to store equipment, etc. for $700.00 a month, which he also reported as rental income on his taxes. The only evidence that the Fleners had an oral agreement to purchase the property was that they had possession of it, made improvements to it, and made payments to the father for a brief period in 1997-1998.
¶12 Eventually, the cause proceeded to a trial on September 8-12, 15, and October 23, 2014. On June 20, 2015, the trial court signed an order regarding the probate proceedings which was filed the next day. In it, the trial court admitted the decedent's will to probate, but reserved the issues of the interpretation of the will and the determination of pretermitted heir for a separate dispositional order. On July 30, 2015, the trial court consolidated Case 2 with Case 1, in the "interest of more efficient judicial administration and disposition."
¶13 Even though they were consolidated, both the will contest and the creditors' claims proceeded, resulting in separate orders with evidence and issues overlapping in each case. On October 11, 2016, the trial court filed an order designating the status of heirs concerning Case 1, the probate proceedings. The trial court order provides in pertinent part:
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Chester v. Martin (In re Chester)
...property. Rather, it is an assurance that a child is not unintentionally omitted from a will.9 ¶13 Last year, we decided In re Estate of James, 2020 OK 7, 472 P.3d 205 which is instructive here. James primarily involved the question of whether a child is pretermitted if its beneficiary stat......
-
Brown v. Chapman (In re Jones)
...a child is to identify the child by name and expressly state the named child is to receive nothing. Estate of James, 2020 OK 7, ¶19, 472 P.3d 205, 211. But a testator also exclude a child by class. Crump's Estate, ¶6 (noting the will made no mention of the contestant by name or class). Sinc......