In Re Jan Carlos D.

• Decision Date: 15 June 2010
• Docket Number: No. 18448.,18448.
• Citation: 997 A.2d 471,297 Conn. 16
• Parties: In re JAN CARLOS D.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

297 Conn. 16

997 A.2d 471

In re JAN CARLOS D.^*

No. 18448.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Jan. 15, 2010.

Decided June 15, 2010.

Timothy J. Sugrue, assistant state's attorney, with whom were Paul D. Schneider, assistant state's attorney, and, on the brief, Timothy J. Liston, state's attorney, for the appellant (state).

Sharon A. Peters, special public defender, for the appellee (respondent).

ROGERS, C.J., and NORCOTT, KATZ, PALMER, VERTEFEUILLE, ZARELLA and McLACHLAN, Js.^**

McLACHLAN, J.

The sole issue before us in this appeal is whether General Statutes § 54-1f(a),¹ which provides that officers may arrest an individual without a warrant if the individual is apprehended in the act or on the speedy information of others, applies to juveniles who are served with a summons that alleges the commission of criminal offenses. The state appeals ² from the judgment of the trial court dismissing the juvenile delinquency proceedings brought against the respondent, Jan Carlos D., on the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction over the proceedings because the state had not commenced the proceedings on speedy information in violation of § 54-1f(a). We conclude that § 54-1f(a) does not apply to juveniles who receive such a summons and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The record reveals the following undisputed facts and procedural history. On June 4, 2008, pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-133(c), ³ the respondent was served with a summons alleging that, in connection with an incident that had occurred on May, 14, 2008, he had committed assault in the third degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-61, and disorderly conduct in violation of General Statutes § 53a-182.⁴ The respondent appeared in court on June 13, 2008, at which time the state filed a delinquency petition alleging that he had committed the foregoing crimes. At a hearing on July 23, 2008, the respondent orally moved to dismiss the charges on the basis of the delay between the incident during which the allegedly unlawful conduct took place and the service of the summons. Specifically, the respondent characterized the receipt of the summons as an arrest and argued that it was unlawful because it was not initiated on speedy information, which implicated the court's jurisdiction and, therefore, necessitated dismissal of the charges.⁵ The state argued that the proper remedy for the lack of speedy information was a motion to suppress rather than a motion to dismiss. The court dismissed the charges without prejudice on the ground that the respondent had not been arrested on speedy information.⁶ On August 11, 2008, the court granted the state's motion for permission to appeal pursuant to General Statutes § 54-96.⁷

On September 23, 2008, the state filed a motion for articulation, requesting that the trial court articulate the factual and legal grounds for its decision to dismiss the charges against the respondent. The Appellate Court granted the motion and, on January 21, 2009, the trial court issued an oral articulation. The trial court stated that it was relying on this court's decision in Sims v. Smith, 115 Conn. 279, 283, 161 A. 239 (1932), to support its conclusion that it had the authority to dismiss delinquency proceedings when the respondent was subject to a warrantless arrest that was not on speedy information as required by § 54-1f(a). Specifically, the court relied on our statement in Sims v. Smith, supra, at 283, 161 A. 239, that, “[t]he right to arrest without a warrant had its origin in the necessity of preventing the escape of offenders during the period of delay incident to the procuring of warrants. When there is time to procure a warrant without danger of the escape of the offender an arrest should not be made without it.”

The state argues that the court improperly dismissed the charges against the respondent because he was not subject to a custodial arrest and therefore was not arrested for the purposes of § 54-1f(a). The state reasons that the summons did not constitute an arrest because it merely directed the respondent to appear in court on the appointed day and time. ⁸ The respondent argues that § 54-1f(a), and the speedy information provision therein, apply in the present case because, pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-121,⁹ the Superior Court for juvenile matters sits as a criminal court when hearing delinquency proceedings.¹⁰

The issue of whether the trial court properly interpreted § 54-1f(a) presents a question of law, over which we employ plenary review. Key Air, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 294 Conn. 225, 232, 983 A.2d 1 (2009). “The process of statutory interpretation involves the determination of the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of the case, including the question of whether the language does so apply.... When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature.... [General Statutes] § 1-2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered.... When a statute is not plain and unambiguous, we also look for interpretive guidance to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter....” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 232-33, 983 A.2d 1. A statute is ambiguous if, when read in context, it is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation. State v. Orr, 291 Conn. 642, 654, 969 A.2d 750 (2009). Additionally, statutory silence does not necessarily equate to ambiguity. Manifold v. Ragaglia, 272 Conn. 410, 419, 862 A.2d 292 (2004).

“[W]e are [also] guided by the principle that the legislature is always presumed to have created a harmonious and consistent body of law.... [T]his tenet of statutory construction ... requires us to read statutes together when they relate to the same subject matter.... Accordingly, [i]n determining the meaning of a statute ... we look not only at the provision at issue but also to the broader statutory scheme to ensure the coherency of our construction.” (Citation omitted, internal quotation marks omitted.) Hatt v. Burlington Coat Factory, 263 Conn. 279, 310, 819 A.2d 260 (2003); Felician Sisters of St. Francis of Connecticut, Inc. v. Historic District Commission, 284 Conn. 838, 850, 937 A.2d 39 (2008) (“[T]he legislature is always presumed to have created a harmonious and consistent body of law.... [T]his tenet of statutory construction ... requires [this court] to read statutes together when they relate to the same subject matter.” [Internal quotation marks omitted.] ).

Pursuant to § 1-2z, we begin with the text of the statute. Section 54-1f(a) provides in relevant part: “Peace officers ... shall arrest, without previous complaint and warrant, any person for any offense in their jurisdiction, when the person is taken or apprehended in the act or on the speedy information of others....” The plain language of the statute offers no clear guidance regarding whether § 54-1f(a) applies to juveniles, as it neither explicitly includes nor excludes juveniles from its purview. We turn our attention, therefore, to other related statutes. The legislature has provided specific protections for juveniles regarding speedy information. Section 46b-133(a) provides in relevant part: “Nothing in this part shall be construed as preventing the arrest of a child, with or without a warrant, as may be provided by law, or as preventing the issuance of warrants by judges in the manner provided by section 54-2a except that no child shall be taken into custody on such process except on apprehension in the act, or on speedy information, or in other cases when the use of such process appears imperative ....” ¹¹ (Emphasis added.) The statute also governs the arrest, release and detention of juveniles. General Statutes § 46b-133(b) through (d).¹²

Section 46b-133 is part of a larger legislative scheme governing the adjudication of criminal matters involving juveniles. See General Statutes § 46b-120 et seq. It is well established that “the legislature has [created] a separate system for the disposition of cases involving juveniles accused of wrongdoing”; State v. Kelley, 206 Conn. 323, 329, 537 A.2d 483 (1988); and, accordingly, “delinquency proceedings in juvenile court are fundamentally different from criminal proceedings.” State v. Ledbetter, 263 Conn. 1, 13, 818 A.2d 1 (2003). “Indeed, adjudication as a juvenile rather than prosecution as an adult carries significant benefits, chief among which are a determination of delinquency rather than criminality; General Statutes § 46b-121; confidentiality; General Statutes § 46b-124; limitations with respect to sentencing; General Statutes § 46b-140; erasure of files; General Statutes § 46b-146; and isolation from the adult criminal population. General Statutes § 46b-133[d]; see also In re Tyvonne M., 211 Conn. 151, 158-61, 558 A.2d 661 (1989). State v. Angel C., 245 Conn. 93, 103, 715 A.2d 652 (1998). Thus, [a] delinquency petition does not charge a child with having committed a crime and ... adjudication of a juvenile offense is not a conviction ... and does not permit the imposition of criminal sanctions.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ledbetter, supra, at 14, 818 A.2d 1.

When read in the context of the statutory scheme applicable to juveniles, therefore, the inapplicability of § 54-1f(a) within that framework is plain and unambiguous. Indeed, the legislature's establishment of an “unambiguous statutory framework ...