In re January
Decision Date | 06 December 1922 |
Citation | 246 S.W. 241,295 Mo. 653 |
Parties | IN THE MATTER OF M. T. JANUARY, Petitioner |
Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Petitioner discharged.
W. M Bowker for petitioner.
(1) No one can be compelled to give evidence in any sort of a proceeding that would tend to incriminate him or furnish any link in a chain of circumstances that might lead to his conviction of any criminal offense. Sec. 23, Art. 2, Mo Constitution; Ex parte Gauss, 223 Mo. 277; Ex parte Carter 166 Mo. 604. (2) A judgment finding a person guilty of contempt is not conclusive as to the facts stated therein, and upon habeas corpus the petitioner has a right to show that he was not guilty of contempt as charged by evidence aliunde the judgment and commitment. Ex parte Creecy, 243 Mo. 679; In re Howell, 273 Mo. 96. (3) If the question propounded to the witness is of such character that an answer might or might not incriminate the witness, it must rest with the witness to determine whether or not the answer to it would have such tendency, and in such case the court cannot compel him to answer. And it is further held that a witness cannot be compelled to furnish any one of the many links necessary to convict him of a crime. Ex parte Gauss, 223 Mo. 277. (4) Under the provisions of Section 6588 Laws 1921, page 414, it is made a crime for any person to either sell, possess, give away or transport intoxicating liquors within the State of Missouri. The only exception said statute provides is "possession of intoxicating liquor in the private residence of the owner thereof when such intoxicating liquor has been lawfully acquired and being lawfully used."
Jesse W. Barrett, Attorney-General, and Albert Miller, Assistant Attorney-General, for respondent; Ellison A. Poulton of counsel.
(1) Where the sale of intoxicating liquor is a crime under the prohibitory law, the purchaser is not a participant in the crime and he cannot excuse himself from testifying as to such purchase made by him, on the ground that his testimony would tend to incriminate him. Wakeman v. Chambers, 69 Iowa 169; State v. Teahan, 50 Conn. 92; State v. Rand, 51 N.H. 361; Ex parte Armstrong, 30 N. B. (Canada) 423; Ex parte Barker, 30 N. B. (Canada) 406; State v. Cullins, 53 Kan. 100; Wilson v. State, 130 Ark. 204; Harris v. State, 113 Miss. 457; Lott v. United States, 205 F. 28. (2) The prohibitory act does not make the purchase of intoxicating liquor a crime. R. S. 1919, sec. 6588, Laws 1921, pp. 413-414. (3) It is the province of the court to determine in the first instance under all the circumstances of the case whether any direct answer to a proposed question has a tendency to criminate a witness; and, it is the duty of the court, while it protects the witness in the due exercise of his privilege, to take care that he does not, under the pretense of defending himself, screen others from justice or withhold evidence which he may safely give. Ward v. State, 2 Mo. 120; In re Moser, 138 Mich. 302; Ex parte Irvine, 74 F. 954; Mason v. United States, 244 U.S. 366. (4) By resorting to a suit in habeas corpus, petitioner has elected to meet the presumption, which the present record does not exclude, that the trial court regularly and properly exercised whatever authority it had in the premises; and he has assumed the burden of showing that the order of commitment is void because the court was without authority to make it, in view of his claim that his answer to the question would incriminate him. Ex parte McBride, 158 Mo.App. 457; McGorray v. Sutter, 80 Ohio St. 407. (5) Since the purchase of intoxicating liquor is not a crime, and since an affirmative answer to the question propounded would show neither possession nor transportation of intoxicating liquor, an affirmative answer to this question would not tend to incriminate the witness. Ex parte Holliway, 272 Mo. 108, 115.
OPINION
In Banc.
Habeas Corpus.
This is an original proceeding instituted in this court for a writ of habeas corpus begun by the petitioner, alleging that he is illegally deprived of liberty by the Sheriff of Vernon County, Missouri. The facts of the case are undisputed, and agreed upon by the parties litigant. The petition for the writ reads as follows:
This petition was duly verified by the petitioner.
Upon the foregoing application being filed in and presented to this court, the writ in due form was issued, and directed to W. W. Marshall, Sheriff of Vernon County, and was duly served upon him. In due time the said sheriff made the following return to said writ:
"Now comes W. W. Marshall, Sheriff of Vernon County, Missouri, and for his return to the writ of habeas corpus issued and served upon him herein, states that the prisoner, M. T. January, was placed in his custody on the 5th day of October, 1922, by and under authority of a certain warrant of commitment as set forth in a certified copy of an order and judgment of the Circuit Court of Vernon County, Missouri, directing that said M. T. January stand committed to the county jail of said county for contempt of said court, as set forth in said order, and there to remain until he manifests a disposition to purge himself of said contempt, said warrant and commitment being in words and figures as follows, to-wit:"
Then follows, as a part of the return, a copy of the records of the Circuit Court of Vernon County, relating to the order adjudging the petitioner guilty of contempt:
In addition to the above return the sheriff, in obedience to the writ issued by this court, produced the body of the petitioner before this court to be dealt with according to law. All of which was duly verified by the sheriff.
Thereafter and on the 14th day of October, 1922, petitioner filed his answer to said return, which said answer, omitting caption, is in words and figures as follows:
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