In re Joan K.
| Decision Date | 06 April 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. S–13800.,S–13800. |
| Citation | 273 P.3d 594 |
| Parties | In the Matter of the Necessity for the Hospitalization of JOAN K. |
| Court | Alaska Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Douglas Moody, Assistant Public Defender, and Quinlan Steiner, Public Defender, Anchorage, for Joan K.
Laura C. Bottger and Laura F. Fox, Assistant Attorneys General, Anchorage, and John J. Burns, Attorney General, Juneau, for State of Alaska.
Before: CARPENETI, Chief Justice, FABE, WINFREE, and STOWERS, Justices.
An adult woman diagnosed with a mental illness appeals her already completed 30–day involuntary commitment to Alaska Psychiatric Institute (API), arguing the evidence did not support the superior court's findings that: (1) she was likely to cause harm to herself or others due to her mental illness; and (2) API was the least restrictive alternative placement for her. Because our existing case law provides that an evidentiary-based “weight of the evidence” challenge to a completed involuntary commitment is moot absent accompanying legal issues appropriate for decision under the mootness doctrine's public interest exception, we asked the parties to submit supplemental briefing on mootness. As a result, we now confront a question not directly raised in our earlier cases: should our application of the mootness doctrine in this context accommodate the importance of collateral consequences arising from an involuntary commitment? We answer that question “yes” and therefore reach the merits of this appeal. On the merits, we affirm the superior court's involuntary commitment order.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
In February 2010 Joan K. disappeared from her mother's house.1 Three weeks later Joan's mother received a telephone call from an unknown woman saying Joan was “confused or impaired” and should be picked up. Joan's mother found Joan and brought her to Fairbanks Memorial Hospital (FMH). Emergency room staff examined Joan and found her “very confused”; she also tested positive for amphetamines and cocaine. Joan was admitted to the psychiatric ward, where she had been voluntarily hospitalized twice in November 2009.
The next day a FMH staff physician applied for an ex parte order authorizing Joan's involuntary hospitalization for a mental health evaluation.2 The superior court granted the application. Dr. Victor Bell, a psychiatrist, observed Joan over the course of five days. Dr. Stephen Parker, a psychologist, also observed Joan on two occasions. Neither Dr. Bell nor Dr. Parker contacted Joan's family or the psychiatrist who had previously treated Joan for a short time.
The superior court held a 30–day commitment hearing on March 1, 2010. 3 The court found that Joan had bipolar disorder and that this mental illness altered her perception of reality, causing Joan to use drugs. The superior court found she was therefore likely to cause serious harm to herself through illegal drug use. The court stressed that Joan was “not being detained because she [was] a drug addict.”
The superior court also found that as a result of her mental illness Joan was likely to cause harm to others, based on an incident at FMH and evidence of her unstable emotions. The court said Joan might “present aggressively out in the public in front of lay people who may not know of [Joan's] mental disability and who may react violently or who may be hurt by her, may not know how to talk her down and certainly are not going to have drugs available [such as Valium] to ameliorate her mood as was true here.”
The superior court found no less restrictive facility than API would adequately protect Joan and the public. Finding Joan had refused voluntary treatment, the court ordered her committed to API for a period not to exceed 30 days. Although the record does not indicate when API actually released Joan, 30 days from her commitment date was April 1, 2010.
Joan appeals the superior court's 30–day commitment order.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Mootness is a matter of judicial policy and its application is a question of law.4 We adopt the rule of law that is “most persuasive in light of precedent, reason, and policy.” 5 We review fact findings in involuntary commitment proceedings for clear error, reversing only if we are left with a “definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” 6 We review related questions of law de novo, “including whether the fact findings meet the statutory standards for involuntary commitment.” 7
IV. DISCUSSIONA. Mootness And Collateral Consequences
In Wetherhorn v. Alaska Psychiatric Institute we established that commitment-order appeals based on assertions of insufficient evidence are moot if the commitment period has passed, subject to the public interest exception. 8 Because Joan's post-release appeal from the superior court's commitment order is based on an assertion of insufficient evidence and neither Joan nor the State discussed mootness in their original briefs, we ordered supplemental briefing on that issue.
In her supplemental briefing, Joan suggests we should overrule Wetherhorn because it mistakenly focused on release from commitment, rather than vacating the commitment order, as the relief sought in a commitment-order appeal. She also argues the public interest exception to mootness applies because “[u]nless this court reviews commitment orders for sufficiency of the evidence, the masters and trial court judges hearing these cases will have no standards by which to measure the cases before them.” Finally, she argues that we should adopt the collateral consequences exception to mootness in commitment-order appeals. The State responds that Wetherhorn mandates dismissal of Joan's appeal as moot because: (1) the public interest exception to mootness does not apply; and (2) Joan has not established any actual collateral consequences resulting from her commitment order.
We ordered oral argument on the mootness question, directing that the parties be prepared to discuss the authority and appropriateness of issuing a vacatur order to remedy possible collateral consequences arising from an otherwise-moot commitment order.9
In response to our supplemental briefing order, Joan asserts that in Wetherhorn we “erred in focusing on the period of the commitment rather than the relief that Wetherhorn sought” when we held that an evidentiary-based challenge to a completed commitment is generally moot. Joan asserts the true relief Wetherhorn sought was vacating the “gravely disabled” finding; although not expressly stating it, she suggests the true relief she seeks is vacating the finding that she is a danger to herself or others.
Our order for supplemental briefing did not anticipate questioning Wetherhorn's fundamental holding, nor did Joan address the standards we impose for overturning our precedent.10 We therefore do not consider overturning Wetherhorn's holding that an evidentiary-based challenge to a completed 30–day commitment generally is moot.
Joan also argues her evidentiary-based appeal of her 30–day commitment should be considered under the public interest exception to mootness. She contends that given her bipolar disorder, she is likely to face future commitment proceedings and the issues of this case are likely to be repeated. She also contends we “must provide guidance to the trial courts” on the evidence necessary to meet the legal standards for: (1) finding someone a danger to self or others; and (2) least restrictive treatment alternatives. In connection with this latter argument, Joan cursorily asserts in her supplemental opening brief that her statutory right to appeal her commitment order is “meaningless” if we choose not to review the order.11 Although Joan's interpretation of the statute as overriding the judicial policy of not deciding moot cases appears overbroad, we do not need to address this argument, or her overall public interest exception argument, because we agree with Joan that we should adopt the collateral consequences exception to mootness in this context and consider the merits of her appeal.12
Joan notes that several other courts have applied the collateral consequences exception to mootness in the involuntary commitment context. She points to social stigma,13 adverse employment restrictions,14 application in future legal proceedings,15 and restrictions on the right to possess firearms 16 as recognized consequences from involuntary commitment orders. She argues we should adopt the collateral consequences exception to mootness and urges us to do so without adopting case-specific requirements; she contends a commitment proceeding will not focus on future collateral consequences and the record available for appellate review will be inadequate. Joan also argues that when we decline to review the merits of involuntary commitment orders, we should vacate them rather than leaving them in place.
The State acknowledges there are collateral consequences from an involuntary commitment order, but argues that: (1) an exception from the general rule of mootness requires a case-specific analysis; and (2) Joan has not established any actual collateral consequences arising from her involuntary commitment order. At oral argument the State also argued that certain collateral consequences from an involuntary commitment order, such as restrictions on the right to possess a firearm, are important, and we therefore should consider an appeal's merits rather than simply vacate the underlying commitment order.
We have previously recognized that the collateral consequences doctrine “allows courts to decide otherwise-moot cases when a judgment may carry indirect consequences in addition to its direct force, either as a matter of legal rules or as a matter of practical effect.” 17 Both Joan and the...
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D.L. v. Sheppard Pratt Health Sys., Inc.
...stigma of an involuntary admission constitutes a collateral consequence which prevents dismissal on mootness grounds. See In re Joan K. , 273 P.3d 594, 597 (2012) ; Bradshaw v. State , 120 Idaho 429, 432, 816 P.2d 986 (1991) ; In re Splett , 143 Ill.2d 225, 228-29, 157 Ill.Dec. 419, 572 N.E......
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In re B.B., 12–0158.
...due to a mental illness suffers collateral consequences. See, e.g., In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648, 651–52 (D.C.Cir.1973); In re Joan K., 273 P.3d 594, 597–98 (Alaska 2012); In re Morris, 482 A.2d 369, 371–72 (D.C.1984); Bradshaw v. State, 120 Idaho 429, 816 P.2d 986, 989 (1991); In re McCaskil......
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D.L. v. Sheppard Pratt Health Sys., Inc.
...stigma of an involuntary admission constitutes a collateral consequence which prevents dismissal on mootness grounds. See In re Joan K., 273 P.3d 594, 597 (2012); Bradshaw v. State, 210 Idaho 429, 432 (1991); In re Splett, 143 Ill. 225, 228-29 (1991); State v. Lodge, 608 S.W.2d 910, 912 (19......
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Of v. B.A.C.
...collateral consequences flowing from an involuntary hospitalization or commitment as an exception to mootness. See In re Joan K. , 273 P.3d 594, 598 (Alaska 2012) (including right to possess a firearm); In re B.B. , 826 N.W.2d 425, 431–32 (Iowa 2013) (considering stigma arising from adjudic......
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