In re Jonas
| Decision Date | 16 March 2017 |
| Docket Number | Docket: Cum–15–345 |
| Citation | 164 A.3d 120 |
| Parties | IN RE Edwin R. JONAS III |
| Court | Maine Supreme Court |
James M. Bowie, Esq. (orally), Thompson & Bowie, LLP, Portland, for appellant Edwin R. Jonas III
Aria Eee, Esq. (orally), Board of Overseers of the Bar, Augusta, for appellee Board of Overseers of the Bar
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.
Edwin R. Jonas has moved for reconsideration of our opinion issued in the above-captioned matter. See In re Jonas , 2017 ME 48, 2017 WL 1052644. He primarily asked us to reconsider our holding that the Maine Rules of Evidence did not apply. By order dated April 14, 2017, we declined to alter our holding, and we have previously denied Jonas's motion for reconsideration on that ground.
In the alternative, however, Jonas has argued that the matter should be remanded for the single justice to consider the evidence that, although presented to the single justice, was excluded based on the application of the Maine Rules of Evidence. We sought and received a response from the Board, which objected to the motion for reconsideration and argued that if any remand is ordered, it should be limited to allowing the single justice to consider evidence from Secretary of the Interior Ryan Zinke, who was allegedly unable to appear in person or by phone.
Having considered the arguments of Jonas and the Board, we are persuaded that we must amend our opinion to authorize a limited remand for the single justice to consider whether to admit, as evidence upon which reasonable people would rely, (1) specific evidence that Jonas offered and the justice excluded based on the Rules of Evidence and that was not otherwise admitted at trial, and (2) at the discretion of the single justice, evidence of events or decisions that occurred after the close of evidence in the original trial before the single justice.
After determining whether any previously excluded—or new—evidence should be admitted, the single justice must decide whether any newly admitted materials or recent developments alter any aspect of her decision.
It is therefore ORDERED that Jonas's motion for reconsideration of our opinion affirming the single justice's decision is GRANTED in part. We withdraw our previous opinion and issue an amended opinion of this date.
[¶ 1] In 2013, Edwin R. Jonas III, who had been admitted to the Maine Bar in 1987, petitioned for reinstatement to the Bar from his administrative suspension for failing to register in 1995. A single justice of the Maine Supreme Judicial Court (Gorman, J. ) ultimately denied Jonas's petition for reinstatement. Jonas now appeals to us, in our capacity as the Law Court,1 challenging the processes employed by the Grievance Commission, the Board of Overseers of the Bar, and the single justice in reviewing his petition for reinstatement. Jonas also challenges the single justice's evidentiary rulings during the de novo hearing on his petition, and the Board's and the single justice's conclusion that he failed to meet his burden to show that he was eligible for reinstatement.
[¶ 2] The record reflects that Jonas has engaged in more than two decades of litigation with his ex-wife during which he was suspended from the bars of three states, jailed for contempt, declared a vexatious litigant, and admonished by a federal court for making frivolous arguments. Nonetheless, he seeks reinstatement to the Maine Bar asserting that, notwithstanding those judgments, he has the requisite character and fitness to practice law.
[¶ 3] In this appeal, Jonas challenges the process at every stage of the proceedings, the evidentiary determinations of the single justice, and the justice's ultimate findings and conclusions. We conclude that there was no error in process at any stage of the proceedings; that Jonas received more than sufficient notice and opportunity to be heard; and that his claims of a failure of due process are without merit. Nonetheless, because we have concluded on this appeal that the evidentiary standard applicable to Jonas's final de novo hearing was the more expansive "reasonable person" standard, rather than the Rules of Evidence, we remand for the single justice to consider whether to admit the evidence offered by Jonas that she excluded pursuant to the Maine Rules of Evidence and to determine the effect of any newly admitted evidence on her decision.
[¶ 4] The single justice made detailed factual findings, which we do not report at length here, given the remand for her further consideration. Preliminarily, we note that this matter is complicated by the fact that, following the completion of the original proceedings, the applicable Maine Bar Rules were repealed and replaced in their entirety with rules that substantially changed the procedures for reinstatement since Jonas's petition was filed.2 See generally M. Bar R. (Tower 2015) (effective July 1, 2015). Except as otherwise indicated, all references to the Maine Bar Rules are to the rules that were in effect at the time of Jonas's petition. See generally M. Bar R. (Tower 2014).
[¶ 5] Jonas was admitted to the Maine Bar in 1987. Because of his failure to complete an annual registration, see M. Bar R. 6(b)(1), he was administratively suspended from the Maine Bar in 1995.
[¶ 6] In 1990, Jonas and his wife, Linda Jonas, were divorced in New Jersey. Since then, Jonas and Linda have been involved in highly contentious post-divorce litigation as Jonas repeatedly defied the court's orders regarding the payment of his support obligations and Linda's attempts to enforce them. During the course of that litigation, and in other litigation related to his bar status in other jurisdictions, Jonas has been sanctioned, suspended, and held in contempt. On multiple occasions, Jonas failed to attend hearings established to allow him to demonstrate compliance with court orders. Based on Jonas's "obstinate refusal to comply or properly respond to court orders," the New Jersey Appellate Division dismissed an appeal from Jonas, stating, "[Jonas's] defiance is especially egregious in light of the fact that he was an attorney-at-law of this State and was suspended in this state and others for his willful evasion of court orders."
[¶ 7] As a result of his actions, the New Jersey State Bar suspended Jonas for a period of six months beginning on September 2, 2005, for conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal and conduct that was prejudicial to the administration of justice. Jonas has not been reinstated in New Jersey.
[¶ 8] In 2006, Jonas was reciprocally suspended from the bar of Pennsylvania for a period of six months based on the discipline imposed in New Jersey. Jonas was reinstated to inactive status in Pennsylvania in 2014. In 2007, Jonas was reciprocally suspended from the Florida bar for a period of one year for committing conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal.
[¶ 9] At some point prior to 2009, Jonas moved to Montana, where he began a course of what the Montana court described as "harassing, duplicative, vexatious, and frivolous" litigation against his ex-wife when she sought to domesticate the New Jersey judgments. Eventually, the court granted Linda's motion to declare Jonas a vexatious litigant and found that in attempting to defy the New Jersey judgments, Jonas had willfully abused his litigation skills, had filed appeals in matters in which he had "no objective good faith expectation of prevailing," and had caused "needless expense and burden" to Linda.
[¶ 10] Jonas then filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Montana against Linda, her Montana attorney, the judge who had presided over Linda's action to domesticate the New Jersey judgments, and others. The federal court eventually ordered Jonas to show cause why he should not be sanctioned pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for making frivolous arguments. After Jonas failed to show good cause, the court issued a sanction in the form of an admonishment dated August 7, 2014. A copy of its admonishment was forwarded to the state bars of Maine, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. By the time the admonishment was forwarded to the Maine Bar, Jonas's reinstatement proceedings were already pending before the Maine Board of Overseers of the Bar.
[¶ 11] On September 20, 2013, Jonas filed a petition for reinstatement to the Maine Bar with the Supreme Judicial Court and the Board of Overseers of the Bar. The matter was assigned to a single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court. Bar Counsel opposed the petition. On March 4, 2014, the Grievance Commission held a hearing concerning the petition for reinstatement. The Commission recommended to the Board that Jonas be conditionally reinstated to the bar. Both Jonas and Bar Counsel objected to some aspect of the Grievance Commission's recommendations. In response, the Board created a "Special Panel" of the Board to review the evidence adduced at the Commission's hearing, seek additional written arguments from the parties, and make a recommendation to the Board as a whole as to whether the Board should recommend Jonas's reinstatement.
[¶ 12] Once the Special Panel completed its work, the full Board met.3 The Board found that Jonas did not meet his burden to establish that he should be reinstated. The Board concluded that the Grievance Commission had failed to consider the necessary factors in determining whether to recommend reinstatement. On September 24, 2014, the Board recommended to the single justice that Jonas's petition for reinstatement be denied.
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