In re Jones' Estate

• Decision Date: 14 December 1948
• Docket Number: 47344.
• Parties: In re JONES' ESTATE.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

35 N.W.2d 36

239 Iowa 1364

In re JONES' ESTATE.

No. 47344.

Supreme Court of Iowa

December 14, 1948

JOHNSTON & SHINN, of Knoxville, for appellant.

JOHNSON & JOHNSON, of Knoxville, for appellees.

MULRONEY Justice.

Ollie Jones as administratrix of the estate of her husband who died without issue, set off unto herself, as surviving spouse, the exempt personalty in the sum of $3600, paid all debts and expenses, and then disposed of the remaining assets in the sum of $10,775.07 by paying herself $7500 and one-half of the balance, and the other half of the balance over $7500 to the heirs of intestate's parents. Upon objection of some of the heirs the trial court ruled the surviving spouse must include the exempt personalty in the $7500 she receives under section 636.32, Code 1946. The widow appeals, asserting that under the above law and also section 635.7, Code 1946, she is entitled to have the exempt personal property and the balance of the estate, after payment of debts and expenses, to the amount of $7500 and one-half of the remaining balance.

I. Section 635.7 provides:

'When the deceased leaves a widow, all personal property which in his hands as the head of a family would be exempt from execution after being inventoried and appraised, shall be set apart to her as her property, and be exempt in her hands as in the hands of the decedent.'

Section 636.32 provides:

'If the intestate leaves no issue, the whole of the estate to the amount of seventy-five hundred dollars, after the payment of the debts and expenses of administration, and one-half of all of the estate in excess of said seventy-five hundred dollars shall go to the surviving spouse and the other one-half of said excess shall go to the parents. * * *' The single question presented upon the appeal is whether under the above statutes the widow of a deceased intestate spouse is entitled to the exempt personal property set off to her, in addition to the first $7500 after payment of debts and costs of administration.

We have often said the exemption statutes are to be liberally construed to protect the debtor and the family of which he is head. In re Kline's Estate, 237 Iowa 1086, 24 N.W.2d 481; Johnson v. Williams, 235 Iowa 688, 17 N.W.2d 405, and cases cited. Under the trial court's holding in this case the exempt personalty, if it exceeded $7500 in value, could not all be set apart to the widow. Any construction that would defeat the beneficent purpose of the exemption law needs to be thoughtfully examined.

Appellees argue in support of the trial court's ruling that section 636.32 is clear and unambiguous; that it leaves no room for construction; and that in plain terms it gives the widow the whole of the estate, which means exempt and non-exempt property, after the payment of debts and costs, to the amount of $7500.

II. The exempt property, by section 635.7, is 'set apart' to the widow as 'her property.' As said in Adkinson v Breeding, 56 Iowa 26, 8 N.W. 685, 686, the exempt property 'was not assets * * * to be administered upon as such.' Section 635.7 vests the absolute property in the exempt personalty in the widow immediately upon the death of intestate. The purpose of the inventory and appraisement is to identify the property to see if it is actually exempt. Adkinson v. Breeding, supra; Ellsworth v. Ellsworth, 33 Iowa 164; In re Estate of Smith, 165 Iowa 614, 146 N.W. 836; Sovereign Camp W. O. W. v. Snider, 227 Ala. 126, 148 So. 831.

To set apart the exempt personalty to the widow as her property means to take the personalty out of the property owned by the deceased at the time of his death--to appropriate it as 'her property'. Peru Cemetery Co. v. Mount Hope Cemetery, 224 Ind. 202, 65 N.E.2d 849. The exemption is a head of the family exemption. Its purpose is to protect the husband 'and the family of which he is the head.' In re Kline's Estate, supra [237 Iowa 1086, 24 N.W.2d 484]. The statute provides that when the head of the family dies the exempt property will be the widow's and exempt in her hands. The administrator does not take possession of the property as property of the deceased. Ellsworth v. Ellsworth, supra. He inventories and appraises the property and sets it apart from the deceased's assets 'as her property.' It forms no part of deceased's estate. It is not subject to the debts of, or distribution in the estate of the testator.

From the above it is manifest that section 636.32 makes no provision for distribution of the exempt personalty. It disposes of the testator's estate--the realty and the personalty that came into the administrator's hands. Counsel for appellees point to the use of the word 'whole' in the statute and argue that 'whole of the estate' includes all of the estate both exempt and nonexempt property. The phrase has been construed in wills to mean both realty and personalty. Equitable Guarantee & Trust Co. v. Rogers et al., 7 Del.Ch. 398, 44 A. 789. At any rate the word 'whole' is descriptive of the testator's estate. It means all or the entire estate of the decedent. As previously pointed out, the exempt personalty never becomes a part of the decedent's estate.

While the exact question has not before been presented to this court for decision, there are expressions in several of our opinions supporting the view here taken and decisions of this court where such an interpretation was no doubt assumed to be correct.

The earlier statute, section 3379, Code 1897 provides:

'If the intestate leaves no issue, one-half of the estate shall go to the parents, and the other half to the spouse; * * *.'

In Re Estate of Ring, 132 Iowa 216, 109 N.W. 710, 713, decided under the above statute, the exempt personalty was turned over to the widow but, upon objection to the final report by collateral heirs, this court held other grain sold by the administrator should have been terned over to her as exempt. It does not appear that there was objection to the turning over the exempt personalty to the widow and one-half the balance after debts and expenses, but the holding and language of the opinion support the views herein expressed. In the course of the opinion we held:

'Under...