In re Jose C.

• Decision Date: 01 October 2007
• Docket Number: No. D049525.,D049525.
• Citation: 66 Cal.Rptr.3d 612,155 Cal.App.4th 1115
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: In re JOSE C, a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. The People, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Jose C, Defendant and Appellant.

66 Cal.Rptr.3d 612

155 Cal.App.4th 1115

In re JOSE C, a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

The People, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Jose C, Defendant and Appellant.

No. D049525.

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 1.

October 1, 2007.

Law Office of Kurt David Hermansen and Kurt David Hermansen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, San Diego, for Defendant and Appellant.

Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette and Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorneys General, Lise Jacobson and Steve Oetting, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

HALLER, Acting P.J.

A juvenile court found true an allegation that 16-year-old Jose C. committed the federal crime of bringing aliens into the United States (8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii)), and therefore that he fell within the court's jurisdiction under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602. Based on these findings, the court declared Jose to be a ward of the court, and sentenced him to time served in custody (58 days) and placed him on probation until his 18th birthday (April 8, 2008).

On appeal, Jose contends the state court had no jurisdiction over him because the sole basis of the juvenile petition was a federal crime. We reject this contention and affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY

On August 16, 2006, United States Border Patrol agents tracked footprints leading across the Mexican border into the California desert near Calexico. A Border Patrol agent in a helicopter saw several persons hiding in bushes. One of those persons, later identified as Jose, wore a long sleeve dark gray shirt. Jose motioned to the other individuals, and then hid an item under a bush. After detaining Jose and six other persons, an agent recovered a cell phone hidden under the bush. Jose was the only person wearing long sleeves. The federal agents arrested Jose, who was later transferred to state custody.

Two days later, on August 18, the Imperial County District Attorney filed a juvenile wardship petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, alleging a single count of illegally bringing six aliens into the United States without presentation at the border, in violation of 8 U.S.C. section 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii). At the outset of the jurisdictional hearing, Jose's counsel objected that the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction because the matter was a "federal case." The court overruled the objection, relying on the language of Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 which states the juvenile court has jurisdiction of a person under age 18 "when he or she violates any law of this state or of the United States or any ordinance of any city or county of this state defining crime. (Italics added.)

At the trial, two of the persons who had been detained with Jose testified that they had made arrangements with undisclosed parties for assistance to cross into the United States and had agreed to pay $1,800 once safely inside the country. They testified that Jose acted as their guide during the crossing. Jose told them when to move and what to watch for, he swept their footprints to remove their tracks, and he repeatedly spoke on a cell phone attempting to determine whether there were any immigration agents in the vicinity.

Based on this evidence, the court found the allegations in the petition to be true beyond a reasonable doubt, and declared Jose a ward of the court. At the dispositional hearing, the court declared the offense a felony, set the maximum term of confinement at 10 years, placed Jose on formal probation, and gave him credit for 58 days already served in juvenile hall.

DISCUSSION

Jose contends the superior court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the juvenile petition because the petition was based solely on his alleged violation of federal criminal law.

Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 provides that "any person who is under the age of 18 years when he or she violates any law of this state or of the United States or any ordinance ... is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, which may adjudge such person to be a ward of the court." (Italics added.) Jose acknowledges that by its terms, this statutory provision permits a California court to assume jurisdiction over a minor who violates a federal law, even if the federal law has no state law counterpart. Jose argues, however, that this statute is unconstitutional to the extent it permits a California court to adjudicate federal criminal law violations in a juvenile proceeding.

In analyzing this contention, we begin with the strong presumption that a state has concurrent jurisdiction over all cases brought under federal law. "[U]nder our federal system, the States possess sovereignty concurrent with that of the Federal Government, subject only to limitations imposed by the Supremacy Clause. Under this system of dual sovereignty, ... state courts have inherent authority, and are thus presumptively competent, to adjudicate claims arising under the laws of the United States." (Tafflin v. Levitt (1990) 493 U.S. 455, 458, 110 S.Ct. 792, 107 L.Ed.2d 887 (Tafflin).) "To give federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over a federal cause of action, Congress must, in an exercise of its powers under the Supremacy Clause, affirmatively divest State courts of their presumptively concurrent jurisdiction." (Yellow Freight System, Inc. v. Donnelly (1990) 494 U.S. 820, 823, 110 S.Ct. 1566, 108 L.Ed.2d 834, italics added.) This concurrent jurisdiction presumption can be rebutted only by: (1) "`an explicit statutory directive'"; (2) "`unmistakable implication from legislative history'"; or (3) "`a clear incompatibility between state-court jurisdiction and federal interests.'" (Tafflin, supra, 493 U.S. at pp. 459-460, 110 S.Ct. 792.)

Jose contends the presumption of concurrent jurisdiction in this case is rebutted by an explicit statutory directive and by a clear incompatibility between state-court jurisdiction and federal interests. For the reasons explained below, we reject these contentions.

I. No Statutory Directive Divesting State Courts of Jurisdiction

The centerpiece of Jose's appellate argument challenging the court's subject matter jurisdiction is based on 18 United States Code section 3231, which provides: "The district courts of the United States shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of all offenses against the laws of the United States."¹ It is well settled that section 3231 provides federal courts with exclusive jurisdiction over federal criminal law claims. (See Tennessee v. Davis (1879) 100 U.S. 257, 262, 25 L.Ed. 648; People v. Tilehkooh (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 1433, 1445-1446, 7 Cal.Rptr.3d 226.)

Jose contends that because section 3231 expressly provides federal courts with exclusive jurisdiction and divests state courts of the power to adjudicate federal crimes, it necessarily precludes state courts from assuming jurisdiction of federal criminal law claims alleged in a juvenile delinquency proceeding. Jose emphasizes that although California labels juvenile delinquency proceedings as civil, the courts have widely recognized that juvenile delinquency proceedings are in reality, and for all practical purposes, criminal proceedings. (See In re Gault (1967) 387 U.S. 1, 21-24, 29-50, 87 S.Ct. 1428,18 L.Ed.2d 527 [juvenile delinquency matter is akin to a criminal prosecution and to insist otherwise is to adhere to "sentiment [or] folklore," "mere verbiage" and "cliche"]; In re Winship (1970) 397 U.S. 358, 365, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368; In re Kevin S. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 97, 109, 6 Cal. Rptr.3d 178; In re Gregory K (1980) 106 Cal.App.3d 164, 168 & 168-169, fn. 2, 165 Cal.Rptr. 35.)

The Attorney General counters that juvenile delinquency proceedings in California are statutorily designated to be civil in nature (Welf. & Inst.Code, § 203) and concern primarily the status of an individual (see In re Kasaundra D. (2004) 121 Cal. App.4th 533, 539-540, 16 Cal.Rptr.3d 920), and therefore fall outside of section 3231's exclusive federal jurisdiction rule for criminal cases. The Attorney General emphasizes the differences between a criminal and juvenile proceeding, including that juvenile proceedings do not result in the conviction of a crime. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 203; In re Dargo (1948) 86 Cal. App.2d 114, 117, 194 P.2d 34.) The Attorney General further points out that the courts have upheld state court jurisdiction over a civil claim even if the court is required to resolve as a predicate matter a legal issue normally subject to exclusive federal jurisdiction. (See Tafflin, supra, 493 U.S. at p. 464, 110 S.Ct. 792; Pan Am. Corp. v. Superior Court (1961) 366 U.S. 656, 664-665, 81 S.Ct. 1303, 6 L.Ed.2d 584; Lawrence v. Cohn (S.D.N.Y.1996) 932 F.Supp. 564, 581, fn. 16.)

Despite the interesting conceptual issues raised by the parties' arguments, we need not resolve whether a civil juvenile delinquency proceeding is in substance a criminal proceeding for purposes of state court subject matter jurisdiction. This is because the federal courts have specifically determined that the jurisdictional statute upon which the parties focus, section 3231, does not apply to a juvenile delinquency claim based on a federal law violation, and instead the governing jurisdictional rules are contained in the federal statutory scheme relating to the federal juvenile justice system. (§ 5001 et seq.; see In re Sealed Case (D.C.Cir.1997) 131 F.3d 208, 211; U.S. v. Chambers (6th Cir.1991) 944 F.2d 1253, 1258-1259 (Chambers).)

Before 1974, juvenile delinquency matters arising under federal law were subject to unlimited federal court jurisdiction, but prosecuting agencies had the discretion to surrender jurisdiction of certain juvenile cases to the states. (Act of June 11, 1932, ch. 243, 47 Stat. 301.) In 1974, Congress made sweeping changes to the federal juvenile justice system in an act titled the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention...