In re Juhl

• Decision Date: 03 October 2012
• Docket Number: No. 11–1294.,11–1294.
• Citation: 822 N.W.2d 745
• Parties: In re the MARRIAGE OF Judy Kay JUHL and Jeffrey John Juhl. Upon the Petition of Judy Kay Juhl, Petitioner–Appellee/Cross–Appellant, and Concerning Jeffrey John Juhl, Respondent–Appellant/Cross–Appellee.
• Court: Iowa Court of Appeals

822 N.W.2d 745

In re the MARRIAGE OF Judy Kay JUHL and Jeffrey John Juhl.
Upon the Petition of Judy Kay Juhl, Petitioner–Appellee/Cross–Appellant,
and
Concerning Jeffrey John Juhl, Respondent–Appellant/Cross–Appellee.

No. 11–1294.

Court of Appeals of Iowa.

Oct. 3, 2012.

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Marshall County, Timothy J. Finn, Judge.
Appeal from the economic provisions of the dissolution of the parties' marriage. AFFIRMED ON APPEAL AND CROSS–APPEAL.
John K. Vernon of Dickinson, Mackaman, Tyler & Hagen, P.C., Des Moines, for appellant.

Brian D. Miller of Miller & Miller, P.C., Hampton, for appellee.

Heard by EISENHAUER, C.J., and DOYLE and TABOR, JJ.

EISENHAUER, C.J.

Jeffrey Juhl appeals and Judy Juhl cross-appeals from the economic provisions of the decree dissolving their marriage and the court's rulings on their post-decree motions. Jeffrey contends the court miscalculated his income, did not divide the marital assets equitably, and ordered excessive alimony. Judy contends the court ordered inadequate alimony. We affirm on appeal and cross-appeal.

I. Background

Jeffrey (born in 1964) and Judy (born in 1959) met in the 1980s, married, and had a son in 1989. During their marriage, Judy earned a degree in horticulture. She worked at various jobs during the marriage, but stopped working in 2006 when the family moved to Marshalltown. Her highest income during the marriage was about $28,000. Jeffrey also worked at various jobs and served in the National Guard. His highest income before attending medical school was about $28,000. In 2001 Jeffrey earned his medical degree. After Jeffrey completed an internship in Des Moines and a residency in anesthesiology in Omaha, he accepted a position in Marshalltown, and the family moved there in 2006. They bought a 6700 square foot home. In 2006 Jeffrey earned about $160,000.

In 2007 Jeffrey took a new anesthesiology position in Burlington. The parties purchased a small home there, but Judy and their son stayed in the home in Marshalltown so their son could finish high school. Working in Burlington and also substituting for anesthesiologists on vacation, Jeffrey earned about $400,000 in 2007, $577,000 in 2008, $527,000 in 2009, and $435,000 in 2010 according to his social security statements.¹

In 2010 Judy petitioned to dissolve the parties' marriage. A temporary order provided Jeffrey would pay spousal support of $6000 monthly, $4000 toward Judy's attorney fees, and certain monthly bills including the son's college expenses. After a trial, the court issued its decree in June 2011. The court found the parties had debts totaling over $906,000, had little to no equity in their homes, and had “relatively little in the way of cash assets for the court to distribute while dealing with the overwhelming debts of the parties.” For calculating spousal support, the court found Jeffrey's earning capacity to be $480,000 and Judy's to be about $25,000. The court ordered Jeffrey to pay permanent alimony of $5000 per month until he reaches age sixty-five. Given the parties' financial situation and the great disparity between their earning capacities, the court assigned Jeffrey all the real estate and essentially all the debt. It divided the personal property, savings accounts, income tax refunds, and any net proceeds from the sale of the Marshalltown home equally between the parties. The portion of pensions accumulated during the marriage was divided evenly. The court divided court costs equally and ordered Jeffrey to pay an additional $6000 of Judy's attorney fees.

Both Jeffrey and Judy filed post-decree motions to amend or enlarge. Jeffrey challenged the court's determination of his income, contending it was $20,000 too high. He also challenged the court's determination of Judy's monthly expenses. Jeffrey asked the court to reduce the amount of alimony and terminate it when Judy reaches age sixty-five. He also asked the court to assign Judy's credit card debt to her and to correct the inequitable division of marital property. He asked the court to use the parties' 2010 income tax refund to pay certain debts before dividing the remainder and to require Judy to leave the Marshalltown home in “a showable condition” when she moves out. Judy asked the court to modify the division of certain investment accounts, to divide the 2010 income tax refund equally, to modify or correct the division of certain vehicles and debts, and to correct the division of household goods.

The court granted the requests to divide the investment accounts equally, to pay certain joint debts from the 2010 income tax refund, to correct the allocation of motor vehicles, and to direct Judy to leave the house in showable condition. Concerning the household goods, the court ordered the parties to submit a proposed division to the court. It denied all other requests. Following submission of the proposed division of personal property, the court divided the remaining property.

II. Scope and Standards of Review

Dissolutions of marriage are equitable proceedings, and our review is de novo. Iowa R.App. P. 6.907; In re Marriage of Brown, 776 N.W.2d 644, 647 (Iowa 2009). Although we decide the issues raised on appeal anew, we give weight to the trial court's findings, especially concerning credibility of the witnesses. In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 773 (Iowa 2003). We defer to the district court's credibility determinations because of the trial judge's superior ability to measure witness demeanor. In re Marriage of Pundt, 547 N.W.2d 243, 245 (Iowa Ct.App.1996). “Precedent is of little value as our determination must depend on the facts of the particular case.” In re Marriage of White, 537 N.W.2d 744, 746 (Iowa 1995). We need not separately consider assignments of error in the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law, but make such findings and conclusions from our de novo review as we deem appropriate. In re Marriage of Wade, 780 N.W.2d 563, 566 (Iowa Ct.App.2010).

III. Merits

A. Jeffrey's Income. Jeffrey contends the court's determination his annual income was $480,000 is $20,000 too high. At the time of trial, Jeffrey's employment agreement in Burlington set his base pay at $430,000, plus medical director pay of $50,000, plus eligibility for a bonus of $20,000. The agreement ran through June 2011. Jeffrey points to a letter from his employer setting forth the terms of a proposed new employment agreement to begin in July 2011 with a base pay of $420,000, plus medical director pay of $40,000, and no bonus. Jeffrey also argues he no longer has his military pay because he retired in 2009, he no longer has income from working as a substitute, and he no longer has the forgivable loans from his Marshalltown job.

The district court discussed at length the difficulty in determining Jeffrey's income. The court considered the parties' income tax returns, the social security statements, the creative accounting used in preparing the income tax returns, the forgivable loans from Jeffrey's employers, the contributions to retirement accounts, the parties' exhibits and testimony. The court found Jeffrey was earning $479,998 at his employer in Burlington at the time of the dissolution. The court determined his annual income and his earning capacity for purposes of calculating...