In re Justin L.V.

• Decision Date: 28 December 2007
• Docket Number: No. 4-06-0239.,4-06-0239.
• Citation: 882 N.E.2d 621,377 Ill. App.3d 1073
• Parties: In re JUSTIN L.V., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Justin L.V., Respondent-Appellant).
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

882 N.E.2d 621

377 Ill. App.3d 1073

In re JUSTIN L.V., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Justin L.V., Respondent-Appellant).

No. 4-06-0239.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Fourth District.

December 28, 2007.

Justice MYERSCOUGH delivered the opinion of the court:

Respondent, Justin L.V., a minor, admitted he engaged in certain criminal conduct. As a result, the trial court adjudicated him a delinquent minor and ordered him committed to the Illinois Department of Corrections, Juvenile Division (JDOC). Within 60 days of entering its order of commitment, the court reviewed respondent's progress and determined that respondent should remain committed. Respondent appeals. We dismiss in part and affirm in part.

I. BACKGROUND

On August 18, 2005, the State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship, requesting that respondent, age 16, be adjudicated a delinquent minor pursuant to section 5-105(3) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Juvenile Act) (705 ILCS 405/5-105(3) (West 2004)). The State alleged that between August 13, 2005, and August 15, 2005, respondent committed the offenses of unlawful possession of a stolen vehicle in two counts (625 ILCS 5/4-103(a)(1) (West 2004)) and the offense of criminal damage to property (720 ILCS 5/21-1(1)(a) (West 2004)).

On August 24, 2005, the trial court entered an order for respondent's detention in the McLean County Juvenile Detention Center for four days until respondent's seventeenth birthday, at which time he was transferred to the Livingston County jail until his arraignment on September 13, 2005. At arraignment, the State made an oral motion to amend the petition to add seven counts, which alleged respondent committed seven additional offenses between June 2005 and August 2005. Specifically, the State alleged respondent committed three counts of criminal trespass to a vehicle (720 ILCS 5/21-2 (West 2004)), two additional counts of criminal damage to property (720 ILCS 5/21-1(1)(a) (West 2004)), one count of burglary (720 ILCS 5/19-1(a) (West 2004)), and one count of unlawful possession of cannabis (720 ILCS 550/4(a) (West 2004)). The trial court allowed the State's motion.

Respondent admitted each allegation except one count of criminal damage to property to which he pleaded not guilty. The trial court accepted the factual basis for the remaining counts, found respondent's admissions were made knowingly and voluntarily, and adjudicated respondent a delinquent minor. The court entered a home-confinement order pending sentencing. At an October 11, 2005, status hearing, respondent admitted the remaining count of criminal damage to property. After considering the factual basis of that charge, the trial court accepted respondent's admission.

On October 25, 2005, the trial court held a sentencing hearing. After hearing recommendations from the State and from respondent, the court stated that it was sentencing respondent to 60 days in JDOC. The court further stated that in 60 days, it would consider vacating the JDOC commitment and placing respondent "on some kind of probation." However, respondent's counsel advised the court that it was not authorized to sentence respondent to JDOC for a definite period of time:

"MR. MASON [(respondent's counsel)]: Actually I don't think you can sentence him to a specific time. You sentence him to DOC to return on December 20.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. MASON: At which time you can vacate.

THE COURT: Vacate that order or I can send him back depending on how things are going.

* * *

THE COURT: Since I'm setting this for review, should I advise him of his appeal rights now? I'm not sure how that works.

MR. MASON: Yeah[, p]robably[,] because you wouldn't resentence him. You would either vacate the sentence or return him."

The court also explained its intention to respondent:

"THE COURT: I will tell you this. I will bring it back in 60 days. I'm not going to argue with you about it. [Sixty] days is enough time for you to start getting help on your substance abuse, to look into your education and think about what your actions have been. And if what you are telling me is true, you can walk out of that prison in 60 days on that date; and you can put in place things that are going to keep you on the right track.

* * *

All right. So that's going to be the sentence."

The written order (1) provided that respondent's commitment was necessary to protect the public, (2) directed the sheriff to transport respondent to the appropriate reception center, and (3) required respondent to return to court on December 20, 2005, "for further court proceedings." The trial court also advised respondent of his right to appeal and admonished him pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 605. 210 Ill.2d R. 605. Neither the order of commitment entered by the court nor the docket entry entered following the hearing specified a term of commitment.

Between October 26, 2005, and November 10, 2005, respondent was housed at the Illinois Youth Center in St. Charles. He was transferred to the Illinois Youth Center in Harrisburg on November 10, 2005, to begin individualized treatment. According to the warden and the counselor at St. Charles, in letters presented to the trial court at the December 20, 2005, hearing, respondent was "cooperative," "exhibit[ed] a positive attitude," and was "a positive leader." However, after arriving at Harrisburg, respondent's behavior was less positive. On November 11, 2005, respondent received a "major disciplinary report" for filing a false claim that his roommate had sexually assaulted him. As punishment, respondent received seven days in confinement. In a December 5, 2005, report, the warden and the counselor at Harrisburg indicated that respondent's "weekly level performance has been level B and C," with level A being the highest. In addition to these reports, the State reported to the court at the December 20, 2005, hearing that respondent had received another disciplinary ticket on December 12, 2005, for allegedly stealing three books from a teacher.

At the December hearing, respondent's counsel argued that the October commitment to JDOC be vacated, stating:

"MR. MASON: * * * [W]e would recommend that [Justin] be released on probation. * * *

* * * [W]e would request that the [c]ourt vacate the commitment to [JDOC] and release him to his parents on a term of probation with a term of home confinement if the [c]ourt believes that would be reasonable to start things off with."

However, the State argued for respondent's continued incarceration, emphasizing respondent's negative performance:

"MR SPRAY [(Court Services)]: [The counselor] was I guess quite amazed that someone in Justin's position would have two [disciplinary tickets] knowing that he's going before a judge. * * *

He was pretty surprised that he had that type of incident reports written up on him knowing full well the [c]ourt was going to take that into consideration in whether or not you were to vacate his commitment order or send him back to [JDOC].

* * *

MR. SANBORN [(Assistant State's Attorney)]: * * * [I]t's the State's recommendation that [Justin] stay in [JDOC]. If we can't trust him not to misbehave when it counts, then society is not protected if [the court] would allow him to go home today."

The trial court expressed its dissatisfaction with respondent's performance in JDOC and indicated that it would not be vacating the October sentencing order:

"THE COURT: All right. Based upon the reports from the Illinois [JDOC], taking into consideration the nature of the original offenses, and coupled with the fact, Justin, that you've not been able to maintain positive conduct even for a short period of time, I don't think it would be appropriate to vacate the order today.

I don't understand what you were thinking. I don't understand what you were thinking with this. It's almost like you were asking me not to vacate the order. That's just completely unacceptable conduct to accuse somebody of something like that. * * *

So I don't think I'm going to vacate that order today. * * *

* * *

THE COURT: My question, Mr. Mason, is do I set this for another status? My understanding is that if I commit him to [JDOC] they then release him when they think he is ready to be released.

MR. MASON: That is correct.

THE COURT: And I do nothing further at this point or I set it for a status?

MR. MASON: No. You don't need to do anything. If your decision is to commit him back to [JDOC], that's it. You don't need to have any further court reviews.

THE COURT: That is my decision."

The docket entry following the December hearing indicates that the trial court "decline[d] to vacate" the October 25, 2005, sentencing order, and respondent was returned to JDOC custody.

On January 19, 2006, respondent filed a motion to reconsider sentence, alleging (1) the sentence was against the manifest weight of the evidence, (2) the sentence was not in respondent's best interest, and (3) the social-investigation report indicated that respondent would benefit from intensive outpatient substance-abuse treatment. On March 14, 2006, the trial court denied respondent's motion, indicating, "I have listened carefully to Mr. Mason. I have reviewed his motion, and I have reviewed the case file. I have not heard anything today that would suggest that the [c]ourt's sentence on December 20[ ] was the wrong sentence." This appeal followed.

II. ANALYSIS

On appeal, respondent claims the trial court was not authorized under the Juvenile Act to impose a sentence of 60 days in JDOC for "evaluation." He further claims the indeterminate term in JDOC imposed following the initial 60 days violated double jeopardy. In addition, respondent argues that the case must be remanded because respondent's trial counsel failed to file a certificate as required by Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (210 Ill.2d R. 604(d)) and that respondent is entitled to credit for time served. We dismiss in part for lack...