People v. Michael D. (In re Michael D.)
| Decision Date | 20 March 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 1–14–3181.,1–14–3181. |
| Citation | 29 N.E.3d 1140 |
| Parties | In re MICHAEL D., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Michael D., a Minor, Defendant–Appellant). |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Michael J. Pelletier, Alan D. Goldberg, and Christopher Kopacz, all of State Appellate Defender's Office, of Chicago, for appellant.
Anita M. Alvarez, State's Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg, John E. Nowak, and Katarina Durcova, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.
delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
¶ 1 Defendant Michael D., a minor, was found guilty of one count of theft by deception, and placed on supervision for one year pursuant to a newly enacted provision of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (the Act). Pub. Act 98–62, § 5 (eff. Jan. 1, 2014) (amending 705 ILCS 405/5–615(1)
(West 2012)).
¶ 2 The new provision allows a trial court to “enter an order of continuance under supervision” even after “a finding of delinquency.” Pub. Act 98–62, § 5 (eff. Jan. 1, 2014) (amending 705 ILCS 405/5–615(1)
(West 2012)). Prior to the amendment of the Act, a trial court could enter a supervision order only before a finding of delinquency (In re Veronica C., 239 Ill.2d 134, 146, 346 Ill.Dec. 1, 940 N.E.2d 1 (2010) ), and a supervision order before a delinquency finding was an interlocutory order that was generally not appealable.1
In re M.W.W., 125 Ill.App.3d 833, 835, 81 Ill.Dec. 2, 466 N.E.2d 588 (1984) ; In re A.M., 94 Ill.App.3d 86, 90, 49 Ill.Dec. 630, 418 N.E.2d 484 (1981).
¶ 3 The question before us is whether we are also without jurisdiction to consider a supervision order entered after a delinquency finding, which the 2014 amendment now permits. The State argues that we lack jurisdiction, while defendant argues that we have jurisdiction and should proceed to review his substantive claims challenging the underlying finding of guilt.
¶ 4 For the following reasons, we agree with the State and conclude that the supervision order is interlocutory and that we lack jurisdiction to review it.
¶ 6 The facts of the underlying offense do not affect the resolution of the jurisdictional issue. Thus, we recite here only the procedural history of the case.
¶ 7 On October 30, 2013, the State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship which alleged that Michael D., who was then 16 years old, committed two counts of theft. Count I alleged that on or about September 27, 2013, defendant knowingly obtained control over stolen property, namely an “I-phone,” under such circumstances as would have reasonably induced him to believe that the property was stolen, and with the intent to deprive the owner permanently of its use and benefit.
¶ 8 Count II alleged that defendant obtained, by deception, control over the property of another, namely, $160 in cash, with the intent to deprive that person permanently of his money.
¶ 9 After a bench trial, on April 21, 2014, the court stated “[t]here will be a finding of guilty” and then entered a written “Trial Order,” which was a preprinted form. The order, as completed by the court, stated: “The court having heard the evidence and arguments at trial enters a finding of: Guilty of count(s) 1 + 2 of the petition.”
¶ 10 On July 14, 2014, defendant filed a motion to reconsider. On August 11, 2014, after hearing argument from both sides, the trial court stated: The trial court then entered a written “Continuance Order,” which stated “Motion to Reconsider Granted for Ct # 1, denied for Ct # 2” and which continued the case for sentencing.
¶ 11 In the presentence report, dated October 20, 2014, the probation officer recommended that “the minor be placed on 1 year Supervision” with certain conditions, such as community service.
¶ 12 At the sentencing hearing on October 20, 2014, the State asked for “one year probation,” and defense counsel responded: “Supervision is definitely something that we would argue for as [a] means of disposition in this case.” The only condition of supervision to which defense counsel objected was a referral to “Treatment Alternatives for Safe Communities, Inc.” (TASC), for a drug evaluation. The trial court held: “I am going to follow the recommendation of the probation officer, and place the minor on one year supervision with the probation officer.” The court also ordered the conditions recommended by the presentence report including the TASC referral, and advised defendant of his appeal rights. A six-month progress report was set for April 20, 2015, and the trial court appointed the State Appellate Defender to represent defendant on appeal.
¶ 13 In a written order entitled “Probation (Supervision) Order” order, dated October 20, 2014, the trial court adopted the probation officer's recommendation and placed defendant on “supervision” for one year with certain conditions, such as community service. The order, which is a preprinted form, provided the court with the option of circling either “Probation” or “Supervision,” and the court circled “Supervision,” so the order states: “you have been placed on Supervision.” The order informed defendant that, if he violated the terms of his supervision, the court could revoke it and “sentence you on the original offense.” A “Progress Report/Termination Hearing” was set for “4–20–14,” which contained a transcription error with respect to the year.
¶ 14 On October 20, 2014, the trial court also entered a “Sentencing Order” which was another preprinted form and which stated: The sentencing order reiterated the conditions stated in the supervision order and stated that the
¶ 15 On October 20, 2014, the trial court also entered a written order appointing the State Appellate Defender “for purposes of an appeal in this matter,” and on October 23, 2014, the State Appellate Defender filed a notice of appeal. This appeal followed.
¶ 17 The threshold question is whether we have jurisdiction to consider a juvenile supervision order entered after a finding of guilt. The State argues that we lack jurisdiction; and defendant argues that we have jurisdiction and should proceed to consider his substantive claims challenging the trial court's finding of guilt.
¶ 18 Defendant's postdelinquency supervision is permitted by a new provision of the Act (Pub. Act 98–62, § 5 (eff. Jan. 1, 2014) (amending 705 ILCS 405/5–615(1)
(West 2012))). Neither party cited a case discussing the 2014 amendment. Only one reviewing court has cited the 2014 amendment, and that case concerned an unrelated issue. In re Derrico G., 2014 IL 114463, ¶¶ 4, 52, 383 Ill.Dec. 679, 15 N.E.3d 457 ().
¶ 19 For the following reasons, we conclude that the order appealed from is an interlocutory order, and that we lack jurisdiction to review it. In re Lance H., 2014 IL 114899, ¶ 12, 388 Ill.Dec. 819, 25 N.E.3d 511
().
¶ 21 The issue of whether the Act and the applicable Supreme Court Rules authorize appellate jurisdiction in this case is a question of statutory interpretation, which we review de novo. People v. Almond, 2015 IL 113817, ¶ 34, 392 Ill.Dec. 227, 32 N.E.3d 535
(citing People v. Elliott, 2014 IL 115308, ¶ 11, 378 Ill.Dec. 424, 4 N.E.3d 23 ). The primary objective of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the legislature's intent, which is best indicated by the plain language of the statute itself. State ex rel. Pusateri v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 2014 IL 116844, ¶ 8, 386 Ill.Dec. 674 (citing Citizens Opposing Pollution v. ExxonMobil Coal U.S.A., 2012 IL 111286, ¶ 23, 357 Ill.Dec. 55, 962 N.E.2d 956 ). Where the language is plain and unambiguous, we apply the statute without resort to further aids of statutory interpretation. In re Lance H., 2014 IL 114899, ¶ 11, 388 Ill.Dec. 819, 25 N.E.3d 511. However, if a criminal statute is ambiguous, we will interpret the statute in the way most favorable to the defendant. Almond, 2015 IL 113817, ¶ 31, 392 Ill.Dec. 227, 32 N.E.3d 535 (citing People v. Carter, 213 Ill.2d 295, 302–04, 290 Ill.Dec. 182, 821 N.E.2d 233 (2004) ). We also consider the statute in its entirety, the reason for the law, the problems that the legislature intended to remedy with this law, and the consequences of construing it one way or the other. Almond, 2015 IL 113817, ¶ 34, 392 Ill.Dec. 227, 32 N.E.3d 535 (); People v. Eppinger, 2013 IL 114121, ¶ 21, 368 Ill.Dec. 529, 984 N.E.2d 475 ().
¶ 23 Since we must consider the Act in its entirety, we briefly describe here the overall scheme of the Act.
¶ 24 The Act provides for three distinct stages of a juvenile delinquency proceeding: “[ (1) ] the findings phase, [ (2) ] the adjudicatory phase, and [( 3) ] the dispositional phase.” In re Veronica C., 239 Ill.2d 134, 144, 346 Ill.Dec. 1, 940 N.E.2d 1 (2010)
; In re Samantha V., 234 Ill.2d 359, 365, 334 Ill.Dec. 661, 917 N.E.2d 487 (2009) ; People ex rel. Devine v. Stralka, 226 Ill.2d 445, 451, 315 Ill.Dec. 664, 877 N.E.2d 416 (2007).
¶ 25 The first or “findings” stage consists of a trial, which was previously called an “ ‘adjudicatory hearing.’ ” Veronica C., 239 Ill.2d at 144, 346 Ill.Dec. 1, 940 N.E.2d 1
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