In re K.E.G.

Decision Date02 April 2013
Docket NumberNo. DA 12–0364.,DA 12–0364.
Citation369 Mont. 375,298 P.3d 1151
PartiesIn The Matter of K.E.G., A Youth Under the Age of 18.
CourtMontana Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

For Appellant: Julie Brown; Montana Legal Justice, PLLC; Missoula, Montana.

For Appellee: Timothy C. Fox, Montana Attorney General; Pamela P. Collins, Assistant Attorney General; Helena, Montana, Scott Twito, Yellowstone County Attorney; Christopher Morris, Deputy County Attorney; Billings, Montana.

Justice BETH BAKER delivered the Opinion of the Court.

[369 Mont. 375]¶ 1 K.E.G. appeals a commitment order from the Montana Thirteenth Judicial District Youth Court, Yellowstone County, which ordered him to pay $78,702.09 in restitution. We reverse in part and remand with directions to the Youth Court to hold a new restitution hearing.

¶ 2 We restate the issue on appeal as follows: Did the Youth Court commit plain error when it concluded that K.E.G. was jointly and severally liable for the full amount of restitution for damages caused by the youths, without considering K.E.G.'s ability to pay that restitution?

PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

¶ 3 Between December 22, 2011, and January 1, 2012, the Billings Police Department responded to over 200 reports of vandalism. During this eleven-day period, vandals shot the windows out of homes and vehicles with air guns, damaged vehicles with baseball bats, and set two cars on fire. An investigation led by local school resource officers indicated that K.E.G., a fifteen-year-old male, had taken part in the vandalism.

¶ 4 On January 10, 2012, K.E.G. and his mother met with Officer Jerry Smidt of the Billings Police Department. K.E.G. waived his rights and provided a statement to Officer Smidt. He admitted to committing acts of vandalism on December 26 and December 27, but stated he did not participate on any other date. According to an affidavit submitted by the Yellowstone County Attorney, K.E.G. admitted that he had “hit two windows with the gun” and “four or five windows with the bat” on the first night and that he had “hit five windows with the BB gun and three with the bat” on the second night.

¶ 5 Approximately two weeks later, the county attorney filed a petition alleging that K.E.G. was a delinquent youth for having committed criminal mischief (common scheme), a felony, in violation of §§ 45–6–101 and 45–2–101(8), MCA. Other youths involved in the vandalism similarly were charged. K.E.G. denied the State's allegations at his initial appearance on February 9, 2012. During a change of plea hearing in late March, K.E.G. admitted to having committed criminal mischief, common scheme, as alleged in the State's petition. The youth then detailed the acts of vandalism he committed on December 26 and December 27. The Youth Court accepted K.E.G.'s admission and change of plea.

¶ 6 Because K.E.G. contested the State's attempt to hold him jointly and severally liable for all damages caused during the eleven-day period of vandalism, the parties briefed the issue of restitution prior to the court's dispositional hearing. K.E.G. argued that, since he had admitted to participating in only two of the eleven nights of vandalism, “his restitution should be jointly and severally liable for only December 26th and 27th” in the amount of $16,020.63. The State countered by asserting that the Youth Court should “impose restitution in the amount of $78,702.09” pursuant to §§ 45–6–101(4) and 45–2–101(8), MCA.

[369 Mont. 377]¶ 7 The Youth Court held a hearing on restitution and disposition on April 23, 2012. K.E.G. and the county attorney presented arguments on the proper amount of restitution. At the hearing, the Youth Court made the following comments:

With regard to restitution, the problem of course is that while you may not have been present at every act of criminal mischief, you have admitted to being responsible as part and parcel of a common scheme, and the common scheme asserted in the petition was the entire common scheme, and all of the days of this criminal mischief that went on with the various participants.

And it seems to me that because of that admission, you should in fact be joint[ly] and severally liable with any other defendants that are-or youth that are found to be responsible for the damage caused in this matter. And I am going to order that you be responsible for that restitution in the amount of $78,702.09. Now, I understand that in five years as a youth, it will be nearly impossible, unless some—something befalls upon you financially for you to pay that.

...

And my hope is that you will at least make some payments with restitution to make amends for the problems that you have caused basically unsuspecting people in our community.

(Emphasis added.) The Youth Court did not inquire into the extent of K.E.G.'s assets or his prospects for future earnings.

¶ 8 After the hearing, the court entered a dispositional order that adjudicated K.E.G. a delinquent youth for having committed criminal mischief (common scheme), a felony, and committed him to the Department of Corrections until his eighteenth birthday, with recommended placement at Pine Hills Youth Correctional Facility. The court also ordered K.E.G. to “pay restitution in the amount of $78,702.09 ... joint and several in monthly payments of not less than $50.00 ... or 50% of his net wages whichever is greater, with the first payment due within 30 days.” The Youth Court retained jurisdiction over K.E.G. for restitution purposes until his twenty-first birthday, or until the restitution is paid in full. K.E.G. appeals from the portion of the dispositional order that ordered him to pay $78,702.09 in restitution.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 9 The court's determination of the appropriate measure of restitution is a question of law, reviewed for correctness. State v. Johnson, 2011 MT 116,¶ 13, 360 Mont. 443, 254 P.3d 578 (citing State v. Pritchett, 2000 MT 261, ¶ 18, 302 Mont. 1, 11 P.3d 539).

DISCUSSION

¶ 10 Did the Youth Court commit plain error when it concluded that K.E.G. was jointly and severally liable for the full amount of restitution for damages caused by the youths, without considering K.E.G.'s ability to pay that restitution?

¶ 11 K.E.G. argues that he should be responsible to pay restitution for the amount of damage that was caused only on the nights during which he participated in the vandalism and that the joint and several liability for restitution imposed under the criminal mischiefstatute should not be applied to youthful offenders. The State argues that, pursuant to § 45–6–101(4), MCA, “the Youth Court was authorized by the Youth Court Act to aggregate the damages, and thus to order K.E.G. to pay restitution, jointly and severally, with the right of contribution, to all of the victims for all ten days of the common scheme.” The State maintains that requiring full restitution imposes accountability and contributes to the youth's rehabilitation, arguing that it is not retributive simply because the youth will not be able to pay the full amount before the court loses jurisdiction over him. K.E.G. responds to this argument by pointing out that the Youth Court recognized it would be impossible for him to meet the restitution requirement, asserting that [i]f Mont.Code Ann. § 45–6–101(4) is the basis for the amount of restitution owed by K.E.G., the case should be remanded for a full consideration of K.E.G.'s ability to pay” $78,702.09 in restitution. K.E.G. claims that the Youth Court failed to fully consider K.E.G.'s ability to pay that amount as required by § 45–6–101(2), MCA.

¶ 12 The Montana Youth Court Act states that restitution is to be ordered by the youth court in “appropriate cases.” Section 41–5–102(2)(c), MCA. When determining whether restitution is appropriate, the youth court may consider a number of factors, “in addition to any other evidence.” Section 41–5–1521(1), MCA. Those factors include “the age of the youth, the ability of the youth to pay, the ability of the parents or guardians to pay, the amount of damage to the victim, and legal remedies of the victim.” In the Matter of T.M.R., 2006 MT 246, ¶ 14, 334 Mont. 64, 144 P.3d 809 (citing § 41–5–1521, MCA). Once the youth court determines that restitution is appropriate, it may order the youth to pay restitution. Sections 41–5–1513(1)(a), –1512(1)(d), MCA.

[369 Mont. 379]¶ 13 In this case, the Youth Court determined that restitution was appropriate and that K.E.G. should be held jointly and severally liable pursuant to § 45–6–101(4), MCA. Although the Dissent correctly notes that “ K.E.G. has not been ‘convicted’ of” violating the statute, it errs in concluding that this statute therefore “is inapplicable.” Dissent, ¶ 40. The Youth Court Act expressly authorizes the Youth Court to order a delinquent youth to pay restitution “for damages that result from the offense for which the youth is disposed....” In re T.M.R., ¶ 18 (quoting §§ 41–5–1512(1) (d), –1513(1)(a), MCA). The offense for which K.E.G. was disposed was § 45–6–101(4), MCA, which provides that [a]mounts involved in criminal mischiefs committed pursuant to a common scheme or the same transaction, whether against the public or the same person or several persons, may be aggregated in determining pecuniary loss.”

¶ 14 K.E.G. admitted to committing the offense of criminal mischief pursuant to a common scheme, which is “a series of acts or omissions motivated by a purpose to accomplish a single criminal objective or by a common purpose or plan that results in the repeated commission of the same offense....” Section 45–2–101(8), MCA. Because K.E.G. acknowledged that he acted as part of a common criminal plan that resulted in 200 reports of vandalism against homes and vehicles in Billings between December 22, 2011, and January 1, 2012, the Youth Court was statutorily authorized to impose restitution for the aggregate damages that resulted from that common scheme during the time period charged.

¶ 15 In re...

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    ...authorized were B.W.'s direct series of acts of criminal mischief on December 22 and December 29. B.W. argues that In re K.E.G., 2013 MT 82, 369 Mont. 375, 298 P.3d 1151, a case regarding another Billings youth involved in the same spree of vandalism, is distinguishable because the parties ......
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