In re K. R.
| Decision Date | 16 May 2023 |
| Docket Number | A23A0570 |
| Parties | IN THE INTEREST OF K. R., a child. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Candace Dorrough-K. R.'s adoptive mother-appeals the juvenile court's order finding K. R., a minor, dependent based on its determination that she was abused and neglected. Specifically, Dorrough argues the juvenile court erred by (1) failing to make a finding of parental unfitness; (2) finding there was clear and convincing evidence of present dependency; and (3) failing to make specific findings of fact. For the following reasons, we affirm.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the juvenile court's judgment,[1] the record shows that Dorrough and Brandon Rueter are the adoptive parents of K. R., who was eight years old during the relevant time period. On March 22, 2022, an investigator with the Haralson County Sheriff's Office received a referral regarding K. R. and other children living in the home from a counselor at their school. The referral was based on allegations that K. R. "had a mark on her, . . . she was being physically punished with a wooden spoon, and it was happening on more than one occasion." In response, Starr Bowling-the supervisor of the Division of Family and Children Services' ("DFCS") child protective services unit-went to speak with the children at their school.[2] Afterward, Bowling reported to the investigator that the children were "saying pretty much what they said to the [school] counselor." And according to Bowling, Dorrough and Rueter had been foster parents for over nine years, and there had been a "consistent pattern of abuse and neglect allegations" made against them.
After Bowling's visit to the school, the investigator arranged forensic interviews for each of the children living in Dorrough's home. And in the interviews, all of the children made disclosures about specific instances in which Dorrough, inter alia, hit K. R. regularly with a wooden spoon. As a result, based on these interviews, the investigator filed charges against Dorrough for first-degree cruelty to children third-degree cruelty to children, and simple battery.[3] Some of the allegations underlying the first-degree cruelty to children charge were that Dorrough twisted K. R.'s arm behind her back, made her scream, hit her with the wooden spoon, and "yank[ed] [and] jerked [her] by the hair." The investigator testified that Dorrough was later charged with additional child-abuse offenses, but she did not specify which ones.
On April 29, 2022, after Dorrough was arrested, DFCS filed a petition for dependency as to Dorrough's two adopted children, K. R. and D. R.[4] According to DFCS, the children were subjected to abuse in the home while in the care of their parents. The juvenile court held a preliminary hearing, after which it found probable cause to show that both K. R. and D. R. were dependent as to Dorrough. And the juvenile court based its decision, in part, on Dorrough's failure to provide proper parental care and control and her arrest for child-abuse related charges. Even so, the court ruled that protective custody was unnecessary and allowed the children to remain with Reuter while Dorrough was incarcerated. But the court also ordered that once Dorrough was released from incarceration, she could not reside in the family home. Lastly, the court ruled that Dorrough could have unsupervised visitation with D. R., but any contact she had with K. R. must be supervised by Dorrough's parents.
Approximately a month after the preliminary hearing, the juvenile court held a final dependency hearing.[5] Ultimately, following the hearing, the juvenile court entered a detailed order, finding K. R. dependent as to Dorrough-but not Reuter-because clear and convincing evidence showed that she abused or neglected K. R.[6] Despite finding K. R. dependent as to Dorrough, it ruled K. R. would remain in the home with both Dorrough and Rueter; but it imposed certain conditions and limitations for that arrangement, including that there could be no corporal punishment of the children. Lastly, the court ordered that if any condition of its order was violated, K. R. would be removed from the home and her parents might be held in contempt. This appeal by Dorrough follows.
When analyzing an appeal from an order finding a child dependent, we review the juvenile court's finding of dependency "in the light most favorable to the lower court's judgment to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found by clear and convincing evidence that the child is dependent."[7] And in making this determination, we do not weigh the evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses, but instead "defer to the factual findings made by the juvenile court, bearing in mind that it must consider and protect the welfare of a child whose well-being is threatened,"[8]while also being mindful of the solemn obligation the judiciary has under both the federal and Georgia constitutions to-whenever possible-preserve the parent and child's fundamental right to familial relations.[9] Lastly, the party bringing the petition alleging dependency "carries the burden of proof, not the parent from whose custody the child will be removed."[10] With these guiding principles in mind, we turn now to Dorrough's specific claims of error.
1. Dorrough argues the juvenile court erred by failing to make a finding of parental unfitness, which is required in an adjudication of dependency. We disagree.
Dorrough is correct that "parental unfitness is essential to support an adjudication of dependency."[11] But Georgia law, as it currently stands, does not appear to explicitly require a finding of parental unfitness when, as here, the child is not removed from the parent's custody. To be sure, we have repeatedly held that "[a] juvenile court is not authorized to remove a child from a parent, even temporarily, unless clear and convincing evidence exists that the dependency resulted from unfitness on the part of the parent ...."[12] And in other cases, we have indicated that a child may be dependent without a finding of parental unfitness if that child remains in the custody of the parent at issue. Specifically, we have held that "[e]ven after finding a child to be dependent, a juvenile court can only remove a child from a parent's custody if it finds that the dependency resulted from unfitness on the part of the parent ...."[13]
Regardless, as explained in Division 2 (a) infra, under the circumstances of this case, a finding of parental unfitness and dependency is established through the same evidence of abuse and neglect as defined in OCGA § 15-11-2.[14] And importantly, although the juvenile court did actually not use the words "unfit" or "parental unfitness" in its written order, "[w]hen reviewing [a] juvenile court's order, we are mindful that [such] orders are construed according to their substance and function and not merely by nomenclature."[15] Here, in her one-paragraph argument, Dorrough summarily contends the juvenile court's order contained "no findings whatsoever with regard to parental unfitness ...." But this claim is belied by the record. Indeed, the juvenile court's order provides detailed factual findings regarding Dorrough's abuse and neglect of K. R.: (1) Dorrough spanked K. R. with a "big wooden spoon" on a regular basis, and the other children heard K. R. "crying and yelling"; (2) K. R. was the only child in the home who Dorrough spanked; (3) on one occasion, Dorrough hit K. R. with the spoon so hard she fell out of her bed and the other children heard her "screaming";[16] (4) two of the children in the home witnessed Dorrough pulling K. R.'s hair; (5) Dorrough would often tell K. R. "she was ugly, her clothes were nasty, . . . she stunk[,]" and her hair was "nappy"; (6) Dorrough yelled, screamed, and became erratic during K. R.'s therapy sessions; and in one session, she flew into a "rage" with K. R. sitting next to her; (7) Dorrough was criminally charged with child-abuse offenses based on the investigation into her physical abuse of K. R. in this case; (8) Bowling testified that, since Rueter and Dorrough began fostering children in 2014, there have been seven to nine DFCS investigations involving the family; and (9) the court-appointed special advocate ("CASA") recommended K. R. be found dependent in a detailed report.[17]Given the foregoing, Dorrough's claim the court made no factual findings that, in substance, relate to both a dependency determination and a finding of parental unfitness strains credulity.[18]
2. Dorrough also contends the juvenile court erred in finding that clear and convincing evidence supported its determination that K. R. was dependent. Again, we disagree.
Under OCGA § 15-11-2 (22), a "dependent child" is defined as a child who "[h]as been abused or neglected and is in need of the protection of the court ...."[19] And as previously explained "parental unfitness" is essential to supporting an "adjudication of dependency."[20] Importantly, "'[u]nfitness' . . . refers to intentional or unintentional misconduct resulting in the abuse or neglect of the child ...."[21] So, in making its determination as to dependency, "a juvenile court may consider evidence of past conduct, but the record must contain evidence of present dependency, not merely past or potential future dependency."[22] And as with dependency determinations, "[p]roof of parental unfitness must . . . be by clear and convincing evidence."[23] Needless to say, this constitutionally mandated standard of review "safeguards the high value society places on the integrity of the family unit"-i.e., the private realm of family life[24]-and "helps eliminate the risk...
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