In re L.J.H.

• Decision Date: 19 February 2002
• Docket Number: No. 24179.,24179.
• Citation: 67 S.W.3d 751
• Parties: In the Interest of L.J.H., a child under seventeen years of age. P.W. and J.W., Intervenors-Appellants, v. Greene County Juvenile Office, State of Missouri, Petitioner-Respondent.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

67 S.W.3d 751

In the Interest of L.J.H., a child under seventeen years of age.

P.W. and J.W., Intervenors-Appellants, v. Greene County Juvenile Office, State of Missouri, Petitioner-Respondent.

No. 24179.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District, Division Two.

February 19, 2002.

Don Willoh, Springfield, for appellants.

Bill Prince, Springfield, for respondent.

NANCY STEFFEN RAHMEYER, Judge.

P.W. and J.W. ("Grandparents") appeal the denial of their motion to intervene in a juvenile proceeding concerning their four-year-old granddaughter, L.J.H.¹ The juvenile court took protective custody of the child pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 211² because of allegations of abuse and neglect. Grandparents filed a motion to intervene in the juvenile case pursuant to § 211.177. The juvenile court denied that motion and this appeal follows. We affirm.

Initially we must determine whether this court has jurisdiction to decide the matter even though the parties have not raised the issue. In the Matter of D.K. and C.K., 886 S.W.2d 188, 189 (Mo.App. S.D.1994). Grandparents have the right to intervene under § 211.177 in a custody proceeding in juvenile court unless it is against the child's best interest. Long v. Seely, 975 S.W.2d 208, 210 (Mo.App. E.D.1998). Rule 120.01(a)³ provides that appeals in juvenile court matters shall be allowed as provided by statute. The right to appeal in juvenile matters is usually conferred by § 211.261. That statute would not normally apply to grandparents whose motion to intervene brought under § 211.177 is denied. Section 211.261.1 states in part:

An appeal shall be allowed to the child from any final judgment, order or decree made under the provisions of this chapter and may be taken on the part of the child by its parent, guardian, legal custodian, spouse, relative or next friend. An appeal shall be allowed to a parent from any final judgment, order or decree made under the provisions of this chapter which adversely affects him. An appeal shall be allowed to the juvenile officer from any final judgment, order or decree made under this chapter, except that no such appeal shall be allowed concerning a final determination pursuant to subdivision (3) of subsection 1 of section 211.031.

Nowhere in § 211.261 is a grandparent allowed to directly appeal from a denial of his or her motion to intervene brought under § 211.177. Instead of using § 211.261, grandparents wishing to appeal from a denial of their motion to intervene must do so under § 512.020, a statute that grants any party aggrieved by any judgment of the trial court the right to appeal the case.⁴ Section 512.020 states in relevant part:

Any party to a suit aggrieved by any judgment of any trial court in any civil cause from which an appeal is not prohibited by the constitution, nor clearly limited in special statutory proceedings, may take his appeal to a court having appellate jurisdiction from any order granting a new trial, .... or from any final judgment in the case or from any special order after final judgment in the cause....

As the ruling denying their motion to intervene aggrieves Grandparents, they have standing to appeal under § 512.020. Long, 975 S.W.2d at 210. That determination does not end the inquiry.

It must also be determined whether the judgment of the juvenile court is final for purposes of appeal. Rule 74.01 defines when a judgment exists that can be appealed under § 512.020. Rule 74.01(a) dictates that a judgment is a writing denominated "judgment" or "decree," signed by the judge, and filed. A judge's order as to one of multiple claims or parties may also be appealed if the trial court makes an express determination that there is no just reason for delay. Rule 74.01(b); Southwestern Bell Media, Inc. v. Cummings, 803 S.W.2d 128, 129 (Mo.App. E.D.1990).

The only order in the legal file disposing of the motion to intervene is a docket entry made on February 21, 2001. After stating the appearances of the parties, it states: "Maternal Grandparents' Motion to Intervene-denied." The juvenile court judge signed his initials to that docket entry. Nowhere in the record on appeal is a writing with the word "judgment" or "decree" used in conjunction with the court's ruling on the motion to intervene. The docket sheet contains no reference to any judgment or decree denying the motion to intervene, nor did the juvenile court make a finding that there was no just reason for delay.

The judge's initials handwritten at the end of the docket entry meet the "signed by the judge" requirement of Rule 74.01(a). In the Interest of J.W.P., 986 S.W.2d 198, 199 n. 3 (Mo.App. S.D.1999). The question remains whether the ruling must have been denominated "judgment" or "decree" for it to be appealable. We find that it does not.

This same issue was addressed by the Western District Court of Appeals in In the Interest of C.A.D., 995 S.W.2d 21 (Mo. App. W.D.1999). C.A.D. was a direct appeal filed by C.A.D.'s mother after the family court ordered that C.A.D. be kept in the custody of the Department of Mental Health rather than in his mother's custody. The document from which C.A.D.'s mother appealed was signed by the judge, but was not denominated an "order" or "judgment" anywhere in its heading or body. C.A.D., 995 S.W.2d at 26. The court noted:

Generally, "[a] final and appealable judgment disposes of all issues in the case and leaves nothing for future determination, unless a trial court has specifically designated the order as a final judgment for purposes of appeal." Bay's Texaco Serv. & Supply Co., Inc. v. Mayfield, 792 S.W.2d 50, 51 (Mo.App. E.D.1990). However, "[t]he standard for a `final' judgment in a juvenile matter differs from that under general civil law. The very nature of a juvenile proceeding entails an on-going case which does not result in a `final' order, as that term is generally defined. The juvenile court's exercise of continuing jurisdiction over a child, however, does not defeat a right to appeal." In the Interest of N.D., 857 S.W.2d 835, 842 (Mo.App. W.D.1993).

Id. at 26-27. The court found that once a disposition of the juvenile is made by the juvenile court, there is nothing left for further determination and the judgment is final and appealable. Id. at 27. The court then examined the requirements of Rule 74.01 as it applies to dispositional orders of juvenile courts. The court noted the importance of making custody determinations as expeditiously as possible because those determinations involve young children and any delay would be detrimental to the best interests of the children involved and would not "conduce to the welfare of the juvenile and the best interests of the state" as required by Rule 110.02. Id. On that basis, the court held "that the denomination requirement of Rule 74.01(a) is inconsistent with, and inapplicable to, dispositional orders of juvenile courts, and such orders are appealable pursuant to Rule 120.01 and § 211.261." Id. at 28.

While C.A.D. is not directly on-point to this case, we choose to follow its reasoning and apply it to the facts here. In the case at hand the dispositional phase had not yet been reached when the motion to intervene was denied. In addition, § 211.261 is not available to support an appeal, for reasons discussed above. Nonetheless, it is evident that the juvenile court's ruling on the motion to intervene was a complete determination of the rights of the grandparents. That ruling forever barred them from taking part in the underlying termination case.⁵ If we were to hold that the denial of the motion to intervene is not a final, appealable judgment at the time the ruling is made, then Grandparents are forced to wait to appeal until the entire underlying termination case is heard and decided. This delay casts a pall over the juvenile proceedings if this court determines Grandparents should have been allowed to intervene at the outset, making L.J.H.'s custody insecure. Such a procedure cannot be in the best interests of L.J.H., Grandparents, or the state. Accordingly, we hold that the denomination requirement of Rule 74.01(a) is inconsistent and inapplicable to the juvenile court's ruling denying Grandparents' motion to intervene brought pursuant to § 211.177. The juvenile court's ruling denying Grandparents' motion to intervene is a final, appealable order.

We now turn to the merits of the case. Grandparents voluntarily abandoned their first point on appeal at oral argument. Therefore, we only address their second point. That point is as follows:

THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION TO INTERVENE BECAUSE THE GREENE COUNTY JUVENILE OFFICER DID NOT REBUT THE PRESUMPTION THAT APPELLANT ESTABLISHED A RIGHT TO INTERVENE UNDER 211.177 RSMo IN THAT THE ONLY EVIDENCE ADMITTED AT THE HEARING, PHOTOGRAPHS PURPORTED TO SHOW INJURIES SUSTAINED BY THE MINOR CHILD AND TESTIMONY THAT THE MINOR CHILD HAD BEEN PREVIOUSLY INJURED, DID NOT SATISFY THE JUVENILE OFFICER'S BURDEN OF PROOF THAT IT WOULD NOT BE IN THE CHILD'S BEST INTERESTS TO SUSTAIN THE MOTION.

A review of the evidence requires that the juvenile court's ruling be affirmed.

The juvenile court's ruling denying the motion to intervene will be reversed only if there is no substantial evidence to support it, it is against the weight of the evidence, or it erroneously declares or applies the law. Long v. Seely, 975 S.W.2d 208, 210 (Mo.App. E.D.1998). The power to set aside the juvenile court's judgment should be exercised with caution and with a firm belief that the judgment is wrong. Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. banc 1976). We consider the facts in the light most favorable to the juvenile court's judgment. In re the Interest of S.L.J. and E.M.J., 3 S.W.3d 902, 907 (Mo. App. S.D.1999).

By the express terms of § 211.177 the test for determining whether a grandparent's motion to intervene should be granted is not whether intervention would be in the best interests of the child, but...