In re L.J.L.
| Decision Date | 29 June 2022 |
| Docket Number | 04-20-00611-CV |
| Parties | INTEREST OF L.J.L. and J.W.L., Minor Children |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
From the 407th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 2016-CI-08129 Honorable Angelica Jimenez, Judge Presiding
Appellant Justin W. Little appeals from the trial court's final orders entered after the rendition two Rule 11 agreements between Appellant and Appellee Christy B. Little. In three points of error, Appellant contends the trial court erred in entering the Rule 11 agreements as orders of the court because they (1) lacked essential elements necessary to support such agreements; (2) failed to conform to the agreed upon terms; and (3) added material terms not otherwise supported by evidence.
Appellant and Appellee divorced in August 2018. In their divorce decree, they were designated joint managing conservators of their two children. In September 2020, Appellee filed a petition to modify the parent-child relationship and to enjoin harassing behavior. She also filed an application for a protective order. Appellant filed a general denial.
The parties began a motions hearing on October 26, 2020, to resolve these issues before the court. On October 28, 2020 the parties halted the hearing and came to an agreement. Appellee's attorney read the terms of the agreement into the record. Appellant and Appellee agreed to the terms on the record. The trial court approved the agreement and rendered it as a final order, disposing of all orders before the court. The trial court set a hearing date in November 2020 to enter the order.
After the rendition of the trial court's order but before the hearing to enter it, Appellee filed a motion to enter the orders, a motion to reconsider the orders, an emergency motion to suspend Appellant's access to the children, and a motion for severance of her tort claims against Appellant from their divorce case. Appellee alleged that Appellant had already violated the terms of their agreement and wanted further modification of the agreement but conceded that the rendered judgment had to be entered before she could move for further changes to it.
At the hearing to enter the trial court's orders, Appellant's counsel announced not ready and moved to continue. He stated that Appellee's filings caused Appellant to reconsider the agreement in toto and that Appellant intended to hire new counsel. The trial court explained that the agreement had already been rendered as a final order. The trial court stated that the hearing to enter the order was meant to ensure that the final written order matched the terms of the agreement from the October 28, 2020 hearing. The trial court denied Appellant's counsel's motion to continue. Appellant was not present.
The trial court examined Appellee's proposed written terms of the parties' Rule 11 agreement. It overruled and sustained objections to the added provisions in Appellee's proposed order. The trial court signed the orders on November 20, 2020. Appellee's counsel signed the orders to approve them as to form, but Appellant's counsel did not.
On December 21, 2020, Appellant filed a motion for new trial, challenging the signed orders. The trial court did not address the motion for new trial, and the motion was denied by operation of law on February 4, 2021. Appellant filed his notice of appeal concurrent with his motion for new trial. We now address Appellant's points of error.
In the first of three points of error, Appellant contends that the trial court erred in entering its orders because they lacked essential elements necessary to support the parties' agreements. We disagree. After two days of motions hearing, the parties came to an agreement, and Appellee's counsel read the terms into the record. At the end of the in-court recitation, Appellee's counsel asked each party if they understood the terms and agreed to them. Each party responded that they did. Appellee's counsel also asked if the parties agreed to be bound to the terms if the trial court approved the agreements and rendered judgment. Each party said that they did. The trial court asked each party if they believed their agreement was in the best interests of their children, and they agreed that it was. The trial court approved the agreement, rendered it as a final order, and disposed of all issues before the court as agreed.
"The issue of whether a settlement agreement fails for lack of an essential term is a question of law to be determined by the court, unless there is ambiguity or unless surrounding facts and circumstances demonstrate a factual issue as to an agreement." Ronin v. Lerner, 7 S.W.3d 883, 888 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (citing Browning v. Holloway, 620 S.W.2d 611, 615 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
Rule 11 provides for parties to enter agreements on the record that are enforceable via court order. See Tex. R. Civ. Proc. 11; Padilla v. LaFrance, 907 S.W.2d 454, 459 (Tex. 1995). To create an enforceable Rule 11 agreement, parties must submit their agreement "in writing, signed and filed with the papers as part of the record" or make their agreement "in open court and entered of record." Id. "The purpose of Rule 11 is to ensure that agreements of counsel affecting the interests of their clients are not left to the fallibility of human recollection and that the agreements themselves do not become sources of controversy." ExxonMobil Corp. v. Valence Operating Co., 174 S.W.3d 303, 309 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. denied) (citing Padilla v. LaFrance, 907 S.W.2d 454, 464 (Tex. 1995) (Enoch, J., dissenting)). This means that if parties simply make an oral agreement that is not memorialized on the record, it will not be enforceable. See Matthews v. Looney, 123 S.W.2d 871 (Tex. 1939). But if parties make an agreement to dispose of their case in open court and the court renders judgment, then the agreement is enforceable as a contract. See ExxonMobil Corp., 174 S.W.3d at 309 (citing Padilla, 907 S.W.2d at 461).
A Rule 11 agreement could fail if it lacked essential elements. See Gen. Metal Fabricating Corp. v. Stergiou, 438 S.W.3d 737, 744 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (citing Ronin v. Lerner, 7 S.W.3d 883, 888 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.)). But it is important to note that "[e]ssential terms are those terms that the parties 'would reasonably regard as vitally important elements of their bargain.'" Id. (). "[T]he fact that the parties have left certain terms open for negotiation in an agreement that they intend to be binding does not make the agreement indefinite." Id. at 752; accord Kanan v. Plantation Homeowner's Ass'n Inc., 407 S.W.3d 320, 330 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2013, no pet.). Additional terms may not be necessary to support a Rule 11 agreement's effectiveness. See Stergiou, 438 S.W.3d at 747; Kanan, 407 S.W.3d at 330.
Here, the Rule 11 agreement explicitly modified the parent relationships with the children, set out custody details, and enjoined Appellant from contacting Appellee in certain manners or under certain circumstances. "These terms provided a basis for determining the existence of a breach and for giving an appropriate remedy, meaning they are sufficiently definite to enable a court to ascertain the parties' respective legal obligations." Stergiou, 438 S.W.3d at 752. Appellant identifies certain details as missing or questions as left open, but "to the extent these particular provisions are missing from the Rule 11 agreement, the cases on which Appellant primarily relies do not persuade us that the parties intended those provisions to be 'vitally important elements of their bargain.'" Stergiou, 438 S.W.3d at 746.
Alleged Material and Essential Terms-rights, duties, and powers of the parties
Appellant argues that the Rule 11 agreement failed to specify the rights, duties, and powers of each party as required under section 153.071 of the Texas Family Code. However, parties agreed that Appellee would be designated sole managing conservator, which includes many explicit statutory rights under Texas Family Code section 153.132. See In re Reiter, 404 S.W.3d 607, 610 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, no pet.). Furthermore, the parties outlined specific terms regarding Appellant's possessory rights during the Rule 11 recitation, which the trial court then accepted and rendered as an order of the court. See id. Appellant entered into the Rule 11 agreement modifying the parenting terms of the parties' final divorce decree. Those terms, once accepted by the court, satisfied the court's obligation to specify the parents' rights and duties. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 153.071; Interest of J.P., No. 13-18-00648-CV, 2020 WL 103858, at *6(Tex. App.-Corpus Christi-Edinburg Jan. 9, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (statutory terms implicit in agreement); see also McLendon v. McLendon, 847 S.W.2d 601, 606 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, writ denied) ().
Appellant also argues that the Rule 11 agreement is unenforceable because it does not provide for the manner in which the parties will choose Appellant's visitation weekends. However, this "argument is based on the [false]...
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