In re Lacy

• Decision Date: 26 November 1937
• Parties: IN THE MATTER OF VERNE LACY
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

112 S.W.2d 594

234 Mo.App. 71

IN THE MATTER OF VERNE LACY

Court of Appeals of Missouri, St. Louis

November 26, 1937

Original proceeding by Bar Committee of Eighth Judicial Circuit for the purpose of disbarring or disciplining Verne R. C. Lacy.

RESPONDENT DISBARRED.

Respondent disbarred.

Jos. H. Grand and James Garstang for informants.

(1) This is a disbarment proceeding, not an action, civil or criminal, but a proceeding sui generis where the court is calling its officer to account for his conduct. In Re Richards, 333 Mo. 907; In Re Sparrow, 90 S.W.2d 461; In Re H-S-, 229 Mo.App. 44. (2) Where an attorney has been tried and acquitted on a charge of criminal offense involving moral turpitude, the same act may be charged and proved as a reason for disbarment. In Re Richards, supra. (a) Gross misconduct, not amounting to the commission of a criminal offense, constitutes grounds for disbarment. In Re Tall, 93 S.W.2d 922. (b) Malpractice and misdemeanor such as warrants disbarment is a term not used in any technical sense to indicate offenses punishable by fine or imprisonment, but as the equivalent of professional misbehavior, and consists of conduct on the part of an attorney evidencing his unfitness for the confidence and trust which attend the relation of attorney and client, and the practice of law before the courts, showing such lack of personal honesty or good moral character as to render him unworthy of public confidence. In Re H-S-, 229 Mo.App. 44. (4) Evidence of jury tampering by investigator or acquaintance of investigator in association with a lawyer is sufficient to warrant a finding in a disbarment proceeding that such attorney has been guilty of improper conduct. Re Lowell A. Maybury (Mass.), 3 N.E.2d 248, 105 A. L. R. 976.

Sigmund M. Bass for respondent.

Verne R. C. Lacy per se.

St. Charles Bank v. Denker, 205 S.W. 208; Mina v. St. Louis Cooperage Company, 162 S.W. 741; In Re Sparrow, 90 S.W.2d 404; Ferris v. Snively, 172 Wash. 167, 19 P.2d 942, 90 A. L. R. 284: "We realize that law clerks have their place in a law office, and we recognize the fact that the nature of their work approaches in a degree that of their employers. The line of demarcation as to where their work begins and where it ends cannot always be drawn with absolute distinction or accuracy. Probably as nearly as can be fixed . . . is to say that it is work of a preparatory nature, such as research, investigation of details, the assemblage of data and other necessary information, and such other work as will assist the employing attorney in carrying the matter to a completed product, either by his personal examination and approval thereof by additional effort on his part. The work must be such, however, as loses its separate identity and becomes either the product or merged in the product of the attorney himself."

OPINION

SPRADLING, C. [112 S.W.2d 595]

[234 Mo.App. 73] This is an original proceeding in this court. It was instituted on the 2nd of November, 1936, by the Bar Committee of the Eighth Judicial Circuit for the purpose of disbarring or disciplining Verne R. C. Lacy; that on the 4th day of November, 1936, Verne R. C. Lacy entered his appearance in said cause, and waived the issuance and service of a citation; that on the 29th day of December, 1936, A. M. Spradling, a member of the Cape Girardeau County Bar, was appointed Special Commissioner to take the evidence, pass on both the law and the facts, and report his conclusions to this court; that on the 31st day of December, 1936, A. M. Spradling, duly qualified as Special Commissioner, and that, thereafter, he heard the evidence in said cause, and took the case under advisement, and now, having fully considered all the evidence in the case, and the briefs of the respective parties, reports herewith his findings of fact and conclusion of law in said cause.

The information in this cause charges and the proof shows:

That Samuel H. Lieberman, Grover C. Sibley, George M. Hagee, and Jesse McDonald are now, and were, at all times hereinmentioned, duly licensed and practicing attorneys at law within and for the State of Missouri, and are the duly appointed, qualified, and acting members of the Bar Committee of the Eight Judicial Circuit, and are hereafter referred to as "Informants." That respondent is, and was, at all the times herein mentioned, a duly licensed and practicing attorney in the City of St. Louis and State of Missouri. That subsequent to their appointment and qualification, the informants conducted informal investigations of the alleged professional misconduct of the respondent in the practice of his profession in St. Louis, Missouri, and, upon due notice to the respondent, held formal hearings in the city, and, thereafter, found the respondent guilty of professional misconduct, and guilty of acts showing him to be unfit to practice law. An information was then filed in this court charging respondent with unprofessional conduct and such charges may be summarized as follows:

[234 Mo.App. 74] 1.

That respondent, while acting as attorney for one John Lolordo, administrator of the estate of Vincenzo Lolordo, caused himself to be appointed successor trustee under certain deeds of trust on real estate in St. Louis, Missouri; that the said real estate belonged to the estate of Vincenzo Lolordo; that respondent, as trustee, sold the real estate, obtained the proceeds of the sale, and, after paying certain proper and lawful charges therefrom, wrongfully and improperly commingled said moneys with his own, and converted the same to his own use; that he retained, failed to pay over and to deliver to the estate money in excess of $ 10,000; and after judgment had been rendered against him in said cause for said amount, he continued to wrongfully withhold and retain the said money.

2.

That, respondent, on or about the 16th day of May, 1932, while acting as attorney for one Paul Richards, who had been indicted for kidnaping, offered or caused to be offered money and bribes to one Edward L. Anna, a prospective juror; that after the trial of said cause, the respondent paid or caused to be paid certain sums of money to Edward L. Anna who had served as a juror and voted for the acquittal of Richards.

3.

That, on numerous occasions, the respondent secretly and surreptitiously induced and caused one Henry West an employee of the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis, acting as a messenger for the sheriff of the City of St. Louis in the delivery of lists containing the names of persons summoned for jury service in the Criminal Divisions of the Circuit Court of the [112 S.W.2d 596] City of St. Louis, to allow and permit the accused for a consideration to copy from said list the names thereof; that respondent knew the lists were confidential, and that West, in permitting him to make copies, was violating the duty and obligation he owed the Circuit Clerk and the Sheriff of the City of St. Louis; and that respondent, knowing these facts, corrupted and induced the said Henry West to impart said information to him.

4.

That respondent, knowing one Paul Richards had been disbarred from the practice of law in this State, did associate the said Paul Richards with himself in the practice of law in his office, and caused the said Richards to act in the capacity of an attorney at law in various matters in which respondent was attorney. [234 Mo.App. 75] Count 1.

In January, 1925, Vincenzo Lolordo died intestate in the City of St. Louis. John Lolordo, his brother, was appointed administrator of the estate, and respondent was selected as his attorney. A claim for $ 25,000 was presented and allowed John Lolordo against the estate of his brother. There were no personal assets with which to pay the claim. Vincenzo Lolordo owned real estate at 3220 and 3103 Washington Avenue. The real estate was encumbered by deeds of trust. The respondent was appointed successor trustee under the deeds of trust for the purpose of selling the real estate. The property was sold and a controversy arose between John Lolordo, administrator, and respondent, his attorney, relative to the proceeds derived from the sale. The administrator instituted a proceeding in the Probate Court of the City of St. Louis against respondent for the purpose of discovering assets which he claimed respondent wrongfully withheld. The cause was tried in the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis, resulting in a verdict and judgment for plaintiff. The case was then appealed to the Supreme Court where it was affirmed. The facts and law of the case will be found reported in 88 S.W.2d 353.

The bill of exceptions, the abstract of the record, the briefs of both appellant and respondent and the mandate of the Supreme Court, in the above case, were all offered in evidence in this cause.

We have examined these offerings very carefully, and have reached the conclusion that we are unable to make a better and more definite statement of the facts than those made by the author of the opinion in the Supreme Court, and we, therefore, adopt this statement as contained in that opinion, as follows:

John (or Giovanni) Lolordo was, in 1925, appointed administrator by the Probate Court of the City of St. Louis of the estate of his deceased brother Vincenzo Lolordo. Defendant was the attorney for plaintiff as administrator and had also acted as Vincenzo's attorney during his lifetime. The assets of the estate included properties at 3103 and 3220 Washington Avenue. A petition was filed to sell this real estate under an order of the Probate Court, but, because of Vincenzo's widow being in Italy, so that her dower right could not be readily obtained, this was abandoned and the properties were sold under foreclosure of first deeds of trust thereon. While these properties were sold at a foreclosure sale, the amount for which they were to be sold was agreed upon as though they were to be sold at private sale and...