In re Lambrix
| Decision Date | 14 January 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 14–15617–P.,14–15617–P. |
| Citation | 776 F.3d 789 |
| Parties | In re Cary Michael LAMBRIX, Petitioner. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
William McKinley Hennis, III, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Fort Lauderdale, FL, for Petitioner.
Application for Leave to File a Second or Successive Habeas Corpus Petition
28 U.S.C. Section 2244(b) by a Prisoner in State Custody.
Before ED CARNES, Chief Judge, TJOFLAT and HULL, Circuit Judges.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A), Cary Michael Lambrix has filed, through counsel, an application seeking an order authorizing the district court to consider a second or successive petition for a writ of habeas corpus. For the reasons below, we deny Lambrix's application for leave to file a second or successive habeas petition.
In Florida state court in 1984, Lambrix was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder and received two death sentences for his 1983 murders of Clarence Moore and Aleisha Bryant. Our prior decisions regarding Lambrix describe his criminal conduct and his dozens of state and federal petitions and motions. See Lambrix v. Sec'y, Florida Dep't of Corr., 756 F.3d 1246, 1256 (11th Cir.) (“Lambrix III ”), cert. denied sub nom., Lambrix v. Crews, –––U.S. ––––, 135 S.Ct. 64, 190 L.Ed.2d 61 (2014) ; Lambrix v. Singletary, 72 F.3d 1500, 1508 (11th Cir.1996) (“Lambrix I ”). For purposes of the instant successive application, we recount some of that history below.
On February 5, 1983, Lambrix brutally killed Moore and Bryant outside of his home by choking and stomping Bryant and hitting Moore over the head with a tire iron. Lambrix III, 756 F.3d at 1250. Lambrix then ate dinner with his girlfriend, Frances Smith; cleaned himself; borrowed a shovel; buried Moore's and Bryant's bodies in shallow graves; and used Moore's car to dispose of the tire iron and his own bloody shirt in a nearby stream. Id.; In re Lambrix, 624 F.3d 1355, 1358–59 (11th Cir.2010) (“Lambrix II ”). Following her arrest on unrelated charges, Smith advised law enforcement authorities about the murders and eventually led them to the buried bodies, the tire iron, and Lambrix's bloody shirt. Lambrix II, 624 F.3d at 1359. Smith was the State's key witness at Lambrix's trial. Id. at 1358. Smith offered the bulk of the damaging evidence against him, and her story was corroborated by the physical evidence. Id. at 1359. Moreover, other witnesses corroborated different parts of Smith's testimony, including neighbor John Chezem's testimony that Lambrix borrowed a shovel. Id. Witnesses Preston Branch and Deborah Hanzel testified that Lambrix told them he killed Moore and Bryant. Id.
Lambrix's first trial ended in a mistrial. Id. At Lambrix's second trial, a jury convicted him of two counts of first-degree murder, and the state trial court imposed two death sentences. Id. Lambrix's convictions and death sentences were affirmed on direct appeal. Lambrix v. State, 494 So.2d 1143 (Fla.1986). Lambrix filed a motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, which the state trial court denied. See Lambrix II, 624 F.3d at 1357. In 1988, the Florida Supreme Court, in separate opinions, affirmed the denial of Lambrix's Rule 3.850 motion and denied his state habeas petition. See Lambrix v. State, 534 So.2d 1151 (Fla.1988) (); Lambrix v. Dugger, 529 So.2d 1110 (Fla.1988) ().
Also in 1988, Lambrix filed a 28–claim § 2254 habeas petition in federal district court. The district court denied Lambrix's § 2254 petition, and this Court affirmed. Lambrix I, 72 F.3d at 1508. The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed our judgment.
Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 117 S.Ct. 1517, 137 L.Ed.2d 771 (1997).
Lambrix also has filed multiple successive state motions for postconviction relief, all of which were denied by the state trial court. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the denial of each of these successive postconviction motions. See, e.g., Lambrix v. State, 139 So.3d 298 (Fla.), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 135 S.Ct. 174, 190 L.Ed.2d 124 (2014) ; Lambrix v. State, 124 So.3d 890 (Fla.2013) ; Lambrix v. State, 39 So.3d 260 (Fla.2010) ; Lambrix v. State, 559 So.2d 1137 (Fla.1990).
In 2010, Lambrix filed pro se with this Court a 145–page application for leave to file a second or successive § 2254 petition based on 12 claims, including several of the claims raised in the instant successive application. Lambrix II, 624 F.3d at 1361–68. Following a response by the State, we denied Lambrix's successive application, concluding that Lambrix's claims were barred by § 2244(b)(1) because they previously were presented in his initial § 2254 petition in 1988, or failed to assert a constitutional violation, or otherwise failed to meet the prongs of § 2244(b)(2)(B). Id. at 1362–67.1
And in 2014, this Court recently affirmed the district court's denial of Lambrix's pro se motion for appointment of counsel to file a successive § 2254 petition based on Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 1309, 182 L.Ed.2d 272 (2012). See Lambrix III, 756 F.3d at 1256–63. Notably, in that decision, we stated:
For the past thirty years, Lambrix has challenged the judgment of his convictions and two sentences of death entered against him by a Florida court in 1984. The litigation has gone on for too long. He has no viable federal remedies left for overturning his convictions or death sentences.
In the instant successive application, Lambrix indicates that he wishes to raise eight claims in a second or successive § 2254 petition.2 Specifically, Lambrix alleges that newly discovered evidence establishes that the State violated his constitutional rights, under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972), by withholding the following factual predicates or pieces of newly discovered evidence: (1) evidence of an alleged immunity deal that Frances Smith received from the State in return for her cooperation; (2) witness Deborah Hanzel's alleged recantation of her trial testimony; (3) evidence of a sexual relationship between Smith and a State investigator; (4) the tire iron used to kill Moore contained hairs that did not match the victims but were allegedly consistent with Smith's and a fake tire iron was admitted against Lambrix at trial; (5) evidence of bias by the judge who presided over Lambrix's second state trial; (6) evidence that Smith's testimony regarding a pond on the property where the murders occurred was false; and (7) evidence of a “conspiracy and collaboration” between the State and Smith. Additionally, Lambrix asserts (8) a freestanding claim of actual innocence, citing to the fundamental-miscarriage-of-justice doctrine enunciated in Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 115 S.Ct. 851, 130 L.Ed.2d 808 (1995), and House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 126 S.Ct. 2064, 165 L.Ed.2d 1 (2006).
Section 2244(b)(1) of Title 28 provides that “[a] claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under section 2254 that was presented in a prior application shall be dismissed.”28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1). Accordingly, in ruling on an application to file a successive petition, we must make a threshold determination of whether the claim to be presented in the second or successive petition was presented in the first petition. In re Hill, 715 F.3d 284, 291 (11th Cir.2013).
Further, even where a claim was not presented in a prior federal petition, the claim must satisfy the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2). Under that provision, we may grant the district court authorization to consider a second or successive habeas petition only if:
28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2). “The court of appeals may authorize the filing of a second or successive application only if it determines that the application makes a prima facie showing that the application satisfies the requirements of this subsection.” Id. § 2244(b)(3)(C).
Lambrix does not allege that any of the claims in his current application rely on “a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A). Instead, the heart of Lambrix's application is his broad argument that certain newly discovered evidence that he could not have previously discovered through the exercise of due diligence is sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for Brady and Giglio constitutional violations, no reasonable factfinder would have found him guilty of the two first-degree murders. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B). We conclude that all of Lambrix's proposed claims in the instant application are precluded by the law-of-the-case doctrine, the prior-panel-precedent rule, or both, or otherwise fail to meet the requirements of § 2244(b). We review these legal principles and then Lambrix's claims.
Under the law-of-the-case doctrine, “an appellate decision binds all subsequent proceedings in the same case.” United States v. Amedeo, 487 F.3d 823, 829 (11th Cir.2007) (). Three exceptions apply to the law-of-the-case doctrine: where “(1) a subsequent trial produces...
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