In re Lavon S.

• Decision Date: 24 February 2016
• Citation: 26 N.Y.S.3d 310,136 A.D.3d 1044
• Parties: In the Matter of LAVON S. (Anonymous).
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

136 A.D.3d 1044

26 N.Y.S.3d 310

In the Matter of LAVON S. (Anonymous).

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

Feb. 24, 2016.

Salvatore C. Adamo, New York, N.Y., for appellant.

Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel, New York, N.Y. (Deborah A. Brenner and Janet L. Zaleon of counsel), for respondent.

JOHN M. LEVENTHAL, J.P., THOMAS A. DICKERSON, SHERI S. ROMAN, and JOSEPH J. MALTESE, JJ.

Appeal from an order of disposition of the Family Court, Kings County (Jacqueline D. Williams, J.), dated February 24, 2015. The order adjudicated Lavon S. a juvenile delinquent and placed him in a nonsecure facility for a period of 18 months. The appeal brings up for review a fact-finding order of that court dated February 2, 2015, which found that Lavon S. committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (two counts), criminal possession of a firearm, a violation of section 10–131(i)(3) of the Administrative Code of the City of New York, which prohibits unauthorized possession of certain ammunition, and false personation.

ORDERED that the order of disposition is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

The appellant contends that the evidence was legally insufficient to support the findings that he committed acts, which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (two counts), criminal possession of a firearm, and a violation of section 10–131(i)(3) of the Administrative Code of the City of New York. The appellant's legal sufficiency arguments are unpreserved for appellate review, except to the extent that he contends that there was insufficient evidence of his intent to use a weapon unlawfully against another (see Matter of Myron J., 123 A.D.3d 1030, 1031, 999 N.Y.S.2d 169 ; Matter of Christopher H., 123 A.D.3d 713, 713–714, 997 N.Y.S.2d 682 ; Matter of Rodolfo M., 79 A.D.3d 752, 752, 911 N.Y.S.2d 913 ; cf. CPL 470.05[2] ). In any event, viewing the evidence adduced at the fact-finding hearing in the light most favorable to the presentment agency (see Family Ct. Act § 342.2[2] ; Matter of David H., 69 N.Y.2d 792, 793, 513 N.Y.S.2d 111, 505 N.E.2d 621 ; cf. People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 467 N.Y.S.2d 349, 454 N.E.2d 932 ), we find that it was legally sufficient to support the subject determinations made in the fact-finding order. The factfinder was entitled to presume that the appellant, in possessing a loaded and operable firearm, intended to use it unlawfully against another (see Penal Law § 265.15 [4] ; People v. Galindo, 23 N.Y.3d 719, 724–725, 993 N.Y.S.2d 525, 17 N.E.3d 1121 ; People v. Campos, 93 A.D.3d 581, 582, 940 N.Y.S.2d 634 ; People v. Johnson, 46 A.D.3d 838, 839, 849 N.Y.S.2d 82 ; People v. Sheehan, 41 A.D.3d 335, 335, 838 N.Y.S.2d 83 ; People v. Steward, 213 A.D.2d 570, 570, 624 N.Y.S.2d 60 ).

Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see Matter of Chakelton M., 111 A.D.3d 732, 733, 975 N.Y.S.2d 95 ; Matter of Danielle B., 94 A.D.3d 757, 758, 941 N.Y.S.2d 685 ; cf. CPL 470.15[5] ), we nevertheless accord great deference to the factfinder's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see Matter of Myron J., 123 A.D.3d at 1031, 999 N.Y.S.2d 169 ; Matter of Christopher H., 123 A.D.3d at 713, 997 N.Y.S.2d 682 ; Matter of Chakelton M., 111 A.D.3d at 733, 975 N.Y.S.2d 95 ). Upon reviewing the record, we are satisfied that the Family Court's fact-finding determinations were not against the weight of the evidence.

The appellant's contention that the presentment agency violated the rule promulgated in People v. Rosario, 9 N.Y.2d 286, 213 N.Y.S.2d 448, 173 N.E.2d 881 by failing to disclose a sealed document relating to a proceeding against an adult is without merit (cf. CPL 240.45[1][a] ; People v. Rodriguez, 262 A.D.2d 428, 429, 693 N.Y.S.2d 54 ; Matter of County of Nassau v. Sullivan, 194 A.D.2d 236, 237–238, 606 N.Y.S.2d 249 ; People v. Astacio, 173 A.D.2d 834, 834–835, 571 N.Y.S.2d 60 ). Moreover, the appellant's contention that this failure to disclose constituted a violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 is unpreserved for appellant review (see CPL 470.05[2] ; People v. Gardner, 12 A.D.3d 525, 526, 785 N.Y.S.2d 462 ; People v. Rodriguez, 281 A.D.2d 644, 645, 722 N.Y.S.2d 257 ) and, in any event, without merit.

The Family Court has broad discretion to limit cross-examination (see Matter of Sheldon G., 234 A.D.2d 459, 459–460, 651 N.Y.S.2d 570 ; cf. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 ). Generally, "curtailment [of cross-examination] will be judged improper when it keeps from the jury relevant and important facts bearing on the trustworthiness of crucial testimony"(People v. Ashner, 190 A.D.2d 238, 247, 597 N.Y.S.2d 975 ). Here, the Family Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in limiting the appellant's cross-examination of witnesses (see People v. Arroyo, 131 A.D.3d 1257, 1258, 16 N.Y.S.3d 769 ; see also People v. Willock, 125 A.D.3d 901, 902–903, 2 N.Y.S.3d 623 ; People v. Rivera, 98 A.D.3d 529, 529, 948 N.Y.S.2d 912 ; cf. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679, 106 S.Ct. 1431 ).

The appellant's contention that the Family Court violated...