In re Lennies H.
| Decision Date | 19 January 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. A106010.,A106010. |
| Citation | 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 13,126 Cal.App.4th 1232 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | In re LENNIES H., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. The People, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Lennies H., Defendant and Appellant. |
The People, Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
Lennies H., Defendant and Appellant.
[25 Cal.Rptr.3d 14]
Kimberly B. Fitzgerald, First District Appellate Project, for Appellant.
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General and Ronald E. Niver, Deputy Attorney General for Plantiff and Respondent.
SEPULVEDA, J.
The minor Lennies H. appeals from the jurisdictional and dispositional findings of the Solano County Juvenile Court, adjudging him to be a ward of the court in connection with one count of felony car-jacking. The minor's sole contention on appeal is that the juvenile court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the search of his pocket, revealing the car keys from the stolen vehicle, exceeded the scope of a patsearch permitted by Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889. We affirm.
On October 23, 2003, at approximately 8:45 p.m., Adam Allen was standing near his vehicle in the Four Oaks area of Sacramento, when two people approached him from behind. One person put a gun to his head and said, "Don't move." The second person removed Allen's car keys from his pocket; a third person was also present.
After his car keys were taken, Allen was told to get on the ground and the three people left in his vehicle, a burgundy Chevrolet TrailBlazer with gold trim bearing the license plate No. 4UIT448. Allen reported the incident to the Sacramento Police Department.
On October 24, 2003, at approximately 3:30 p.m., Corporal John Garcia of the Vallejo Police Department responded to the 1100 block of Roleen after receiving a report that the vehicle stolen the previous day in Sacramento had been in the area. The officer was advised that three Black males had used a firearm to take the vehicle. Corporal Garcia went to the 900 block of Roleen, where he surveilled the vehicle from 3:30 p.m. to 6:06 p.m. During that period, Corporal Garcia saw three Black men (the minor, a codefendant, and a person not identified at the hearing) walk "half a dozen or more" times from a nearby residence and "kind of look around, look at the vehicle, go on the sidewalk again, look at the vehicle and then look side to side up and down the street...."
Corporal Garcia, together with two other officers, decided to approach the minor and the codefendant as they were walking from the vehicle to the residence. Corporal Garcia asked them to stop and said that he wanted to talk to them. Corporal Garcia asked them if they had any knowledge about the Chevrolet TrailBlazer and if they had any keys in their possession. The minor and the codefendant denied having any knowledge about the TrailBlazer and denied that they possessed any keys.
During this time, Officer Brian Bates walked to where the TrailBlazer was parked and opened the unlocked driver's door to allow his K-9 dog to enter the vehicle. After the dog sniffed the floor-boards and the driver's seat, Officer Bates commanded it to track. The leashed dog then pulled Officer Bates in the direction of the three males who were sitting on the curb across the street.1 The dog did not walk specifically to the minor or the codefendant.
After the dog tracked from the vehicle to where the minor was sitting, Corporal Garcia conducted a patsearch. While patting the minor's left front pants pocket, Corporal Garcia felt what he thought were keys. He stated that he knew the object was not a weapon and that it was immediately apparent that it was keys. Corporal Garcia removed the keys from the minor's pocket, after the minor denied any knowledge of the keys. Upon removing the keys,
Corporal Garcia saw they bore a Chevrolet insignia. He handed the keys to Officer Bates, who pushed a button on the key fob that activated the horn and the lighting and also the locking system. The minor was then handcuffed, arrested, and transported to the Vallejo Police Department. At the police station, after being advised of and waiving his constitutional rights, the minor admitted his involvement in the car theft.
Based on these facts, a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 was filed alleging the minor committed the following felonies: (1) carjacking (Pen.Code, § 215, subd. (a)), with a firearm enhancement (Pen.Code, §§ 1203.06, subd. (a)(1), 12022.5, subd. (a), former subd. (a)(2)); and (2) conspiracy to commit a carjacking (Pen.Code, §§ 182, subd. (a)(1), 215, subd. (a)).
The minor filed a motion to suppress, arguing, among other things, that his
statement and the set of keys had to be excluded because they were the product of an illegal search. The juvenile court conducted an evidentiary hearing and denied the motion. The court sustained count I (carjacking), while finding the weapons enhancement of that count untrue, and did not sustain count II (conspiracy to commit carjacking). The court then declared the minor a ward of the court and placed him on probation in a youth facility, and determined his maximum period of confinement to be nine years. This appeal followed.
A. Standard of Review.
The standard of review of a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress is well established and is equally applicable to juvenile court proceedings. "`On appeal from the denial of a suppression motion, the court reviews the evidence in a light favorable to the trial court's ruling. [Citation.] We must uphold those express or implied findings of fact by the trial court that are supported by substantial evidence and independently determine whether the facts support the court's legal conclusions. [Citation].'" (In re William V. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1464, 1468, 4 Cal.Rptr.3d 695).
B. The Juvenile Court Did Not Err in Denying the Motion to Suppress.
The minor does not dispute that the police had reasonable suspicion to detain and patsearch him, but contends that the officer lacked legal justification to remove the keys from his pocket.
A Terry search is limited to "an intrusion reasonably designed to discover guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden instruments for the assault of the police officer." (Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. at p. 29, 88 S.Ct. 1868.) As a general rule, an officer may not search a suspect's pockets during a patdown unless he or she encounters an object there that feels like a weapon. (People v. Dickey (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 952, 957, 27 Cal.Rptr.2d 44.) However, under what has been termed the "plain-touch" exception to the warrant requirement (People v. Dibb (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 832, 835, 43 Cal.Rptr.2d 823), the officer may seize an object that is not a weapon if "its incriminating character is `immediately apparent'" (People v. Dickey, supra, 21 Cal.App.4th at p. 957, 27 Cal.Rptr.2d 44). "If a police officer...
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