In re Limehouse's Estate

• Decision Date: 29 July 1941
• Docket Number: 15304.
• Citation: 16 S.E.2d 1,198 S.C. 15
• Parties: In re LIMEHOUSE'S ESTATE. Claim of STALL. LIMEHOUSE et al. v. STALL.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

16 S.E.2d 1

198 S.C. 15

In re LIMEHOUSE'S ESTATE.

Claim of STALL.

LIMEHOUSE et al. v. STALL.

No. 15304.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

July 29, 1941

Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court of Dorchester County; G Dewey Oxner, Judge.

Proceeding in the matter of the estate of Emma C. Limehouse, deceased wherein W. E. Shuler and others, administrators of the estate of the deceased, petitioned for the determination of whether a claim of Mrs. Allen T. Stall against the estate should be allowed. From an order of the Circuit Court which affirmed an order of the probate court allowing the claim, J. D Limehouse, individually, and Theodore Limehouse appeal.

The order of the Probate Judge and the order of Judge Oxner follow:

Order of Probate Judge.

This matter comes before me upon the petition of W. E. Shuler, A T. Stall and J. D. Limehouse, administrators of the estate of Emma C. Limehouse, for the determination of whether or not a certain claim of Mrs. Allen T. Stall against the estate of Emma C. Limehouse should be allowed or disallowed. Upon summons issuing from this Court to all interested parties, including the claimant, a hearing was had on January 3, 1940, before me.

The verified claim filed by Mrs. Allen Stall totals $2,220 and consists of three items: The first for $630 for twenty-one months' board for Mrs. Emma C. Limehouse, the deceased; the second, $330 for eleven months' board for a nurse of Mrs. Limehouse, and third, $1,260 for nursing and personal services rendered Mrs. Emma C. Limehouse by the claimant over a twenty-one months period. At the hearing considerable evidence was introduced both for and against the claim, and it is upon the basis of this evidence alone that my decision must depend.

Laying aside for the moment the question of the effect of the relationship of the claimant with the deceased, I think it is clear from the evidence that the claim is proper both in nature and amount. A detailed analysis of the testimony is, in my opinion, unnecessary, it being sufficient for the purposes of this order to state that from that testimony I have arrived at the following findings of fact:

Miss Emma C. Limehouse, the sister of claimant's mother, in October, 1936, requested claimant to take her into her home and care for her. At that time Miss Limehouse, a paralytic since her youth, was an invalid and was unable to move around and do such things as bathe herself without assistance. Prior to the time that Miss Limehouse became completely bedridden, about eleven months before her death, she had to be cared for in the Stall home as an invalid. Throughout that period, Mrs. Stall assisted her daily in moving around the house as from bedroom to dining room, bathed her, dressed her, and looked after all her needs, some very unpleasant. During the last eleven months of Miss Limehouse's stay in the Stall home, claimant's duties were much multiplied. Miss Limehouse during that period was in bed during the entire time and could not help herself at all. Although a practical nurse was called in to help care for Miss Limehouse, the sick lady was in such condition that one person could not care for her. Mrs. Stall assisted throughout the day in giving Miss Limehouse medicine and food (care and persuasion being apparently required in both), in bathing her, in lifting her from bed to toilet, and in changing the bedclothes many times a day--a most unpleasant necessity of Miss Limehouse's paralytic condition. During the nights, the care of the patient devolved almost wholly upon claimant and most constant attention was required. The constant attendance required by the sick lady naturally prohibited claimant from having any life outside of her home, even sadly disrupted her life with the rest of the family in the home. The nursing and other personal services rendered Miss Limehouse by claimant and the bills that she has rendered for them, based upon a rate of $2 a day, is entirely reasonable.

I further find as to the claim for board for Miss Emma C. Limehouse: That Miss Limehouse lived in claimant's home from October, 1936, to July, 1938, and that claimant during that period fully furnished her room, meals and other nourishment, and did her laundry. Special dishes were often demanded by Miss Limehouse and furnished by claimant. The charge of $1 a day for this board is entirely reasonable.

I further find as to the claim for board for nurse: That during the last eleven months of Miss Limehouse's life it was necessary that a practical nurse attend her and that the nurse live in the Stall home. Three such nurses attended Miss Limehouse, succeeding each other and for each of them claimant furnished room, board, laundry and transportation. The claim of $1 a day for this board is entirely reasonable.

I further find generally: That when Miss Limehouse came to live in claimant's home she expressed a willingness and desire to pay for her care and thereafter repeatedly expressed the intention that the Stalls should be compensated for their services. Although the Stalls received some small gifts from Miss Limehouse, including a second hand radio and a small heater to heat the room in which Miss Limehouse slept, and were brought some little produce from a farm in which Miss Limehouse had a life estate, there was no intention made apparent that she was applying these minor commodities on the compensation due claimant. None of Miss Limehouse's other relatives contributed to her support or assisted in any substantial way in her care.

It should be pointed out in connection with my findings that the charges made by claimant against the estate were reasonable, that both Dr. E. D. Tupper, the attending physician, and Mrs. Minnie Alexander, the practical nurse, testified that the per diem rate used by claimant in the computation of her claim were unusually low and certainly reasonable. Both of these witnesses were in a position to judge the competency of Mrs. Stall's work and both had broad professional experience on which to base their conclusions that the charges were reasonable.

I have found as a fact above that Miss Limehouse when she came to claimant's home and several times thereafter expressed an intention to compensate claimant for her services. It is true that certain testimony as to the expression of this intention by Miss Limehouse was objected to by counsel for certain heirs of the estate on the ground that its admission violated Section 692 of the 1932 Code. However, counsel did not object to the testimony of Mrs. Stall and of Mrs. Alexander as to statements of Miss Limehouse along this line, and the testimony which he did object to, that of Mrs. Whaley and Mr. D. R. Allen, was testimony of witnesses who were neither parties to the suit or had any interest in the outcome of the action so as to come within the class of witnesses whose testimony was prohibited by Section 692. However, even were there no testimony of what Miss Limehouse stated her intentions were as to paying Mrs. Stall, I would be constrained to hold that under the other evidence the circumstances in this case are such as to show an intention on the part of both parties that the services be paid for. See Gaston v. Gaston, 80 S.C. 157, 61 S.E. 393, and Kaminer v. Kaigler, 113 S.C. 222, 102 S.E. 20.

The administrators take the position that no matter how proper the present claim might be were it filed by a person not related to Miss Limehouse, Mrs. Stall is barred from recovery by the fact that she was Miss Limehouse's niece and that the presumption is that the services and board were rendered by her gratuitously.

The law as to the presumptions which arise in cases of this kind is perhaps better stated in the case of Jones v. Jones, 129 S.C. 8, 123 S.E. 763, 764, than in any other decision, the Court there saying: "The applicable principles are clearly and justly settled by the decisions of this court. The main inquiry is whether or not the services were rendered gratuitously; for, if so, they cannot afterwards be converted into a charge. Upon that issue certain presumptions which control the burden of proof enter. If the relation between the two parties was such as to have created a moral or legal obligation upon the claimant to render the service in question, the presumption is that it was rendered in response to such obligation, without thought of compensation. The burden is then upon the claimant to remove this presumption, which he may do by evidence that the service was intended to be compensated for, and, if so, he may recover accordingly. If no such relation existed, the presumption follows the usual course that one who receives the benefit of another's service is under an implied obligation to compensate him therefor. The burden is then upon the administrator to remove this presumption, which he may do by evidence that the service was intended to be rendered gratuitously, and, if so, the claim will be denied." (Citing numerous cases).

I do not believe under the law that the relation of aunt and niece, of itself, is such a relationship as necessarily raises a presumption that services rendered to the aunt by the niece were rendered gratuitously. From 28 R.C.L. 682 Section 17: "The general principle is not disputed, that the presumption of an intention not to demand pecuniary compensation for services rendered is stronger or weaker according to the proximity or remoteness of the relationship. In the practical application of this principle, the Courts have proceeded on the theory that, in any case where a relationship more remote than that of parent and child is involved, something more than the relationship itself must be shown in order to overcome the effect of the primary implication that a person who accepts valuable services does so on the...