In re Lion Air Flight JT 610 Crash
Docket Number | 18 C 07686 |
Decision Date | 25 May 2023 |
Parties | In Re Lion Air Flight JT 610 Crash |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
This Order applies to: Case No. 19 C 01552 Case No. 19 C 07091
AMENDED MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This consolidated action arises out of an aviation accident involving a Boeing commercial jet which crashed into the Java Sea off the coast of Indonesia, resulting in the death of everyone on board. Defendants Boeing, Rockwell Collins, Inc. and Rosemount Aerospace, Inc. (collectively “Defendants”) filed motions seeking the application of the Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C §§ 30301-08 (“DOHSA”) to the two remaining actions, Chandra v. Boeing, case no. 19 C 01552, and Smith v. Boeing, case no. 19 C 07091. R. 1399, 1401. Defendants also seek a ruling that the application of DOHSA preempts all other causes of action and mandates a bench trial in each case. For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' motions are granted.
On October 29, 2018, Lion Air Flight JT 610 began experiencing serious mechanical problems almost immediately after takeoff from Jakarta, Indonesia. R. 1391 ¶¶ 43, 44. The passengers on board the Boeing 737 MAX 8 experienced erratic movements and fluctuations in altitude due to a faulty automatic flight control system called MCAS, which overrode the pilots and attempted to turn the plane into a nosedive over two dozen times. Id. at ¶¶ 4, 45. After a few minutes, the plane headed out over the ocean, and approximately five minutes after that, the plane crashed into the Java Sea at a high speed about 18 nautical miles off the coast of Indonesia. See id. ¶ 46. There were no survivors. Id. at ¶ 5.
The resulting litigation involved 87 individual actions asserting wrongful death and other claims arising out of the accident against Boeing and other defendants on behalf of 186 decedents. All actions were either filed in or removed to this Court and eventually consolidated under the master docket, In Re Lion Air Flight JT 610 Crash, 18 C 07686. Boeing has now fully settled the claims of 184 decedents. The remaining claims are those brought by the families and representatives of two decedents: Liu Chandra, an Indonesian businessman (Chandra v. Boeing, case no. 19 C 01552); and Andrea Manfredi, an Italian professional cyclist and entrepreneur (Smith v. Boeing, case no. 19 C 07091).[1]
The plaintiffs in the Chandra matter (the “Chandra Plaintiffs”) originally filed suit in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois. See Chandra, No. 19 C 01552, Dkt. 1. They allege wrongful death arising under DOHSA and the Illinois Wrongful Death Act based on theories of strict products liability, negligence, and negligent failure to warn. See, e.g., R. 1391 at pp. 15-24. They also make survival claims for property damage and pre-death fear and injury. Id. Boeing removed the case to this Court, citing the Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act (“MMTJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1369, and the Court's admiralty jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331(1). Chandra, No. 19 C 01552, Dkt. 1. In its removal paperwork, Boeing included a jury demand. Id. The operative Third Amended Complaint demands a jury trial and alleges the Court has subject matter jurisdiction in diversity and under the MMTJA and DOHSA. R. 1391 ¶¶ 16, 18-19; id. at p. 57.
Mr. Manfredi's family and the administrator of Mr. Manfredi's estate, Laura Smith, (the “Manfredi Plaintiffs”) filed suit in this Court, invoking its diversity jurisdiction. See Smith, No. 19 C 07091, Dkt. 1. The operative Second Amended Complaint asserts wrongful death and survival claims under theories of strict products liability, negligence, and breach of implied warranties. R. 1378 ¶¶ 201-320, 468-80, 489-95. The Manfredi Plaintiffs also plead survival claims of pre-death injury, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and claims arising under various fraud statutes, including the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Practices Act, 815 ILCS 505/1 (“ICFA”) and the federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (“CFAA”). Id. They seek punitive damages and demand a jury trial. See id. at pp. 4, 118-19
Defendants filed motions in each of the Chandra and Smith cases, seeking the Court's determination that DOHSA applies, preempts each set of Plaintiffs' non- DOHSA claims, and mandates a bench trial.[2] See R. 1399, 1400, 1401, 1402. The Chandra Plaintiffs do not dispute that DOHSA governs their wrongful death claims, but nonetheless insist that their survival claims for property loss and pre-death injury are not preempted by DOHSA and that they retain their right to a jury trial. The Manfredi Plaintiffs dispute DOHSA's application entirely and similarly argue that even if it did apply, their survival claims for pre-death injury and fraud are not preempted and that they have the right to a jury trial. Though the parties in the Chandra and Smith cases have informally exchanged some discovery in furtherance of settlement discussions, they have not engaged in formal written or expert discovery.
Defendants do not articulate a standard under which the Court should decide their motions. Defendants base their arguments on the pleadings, however, they do cite to a public crash investigation report by the Indonesian government (the “Report”). See, e.g., R. 1400 at 7; R. 1438 at 8. The Manfredi Plaintiffs, in turn, attach evidentiary material outside the pleadings to their brief in opposition, argue for the application of the summary judgment standard, and request additional discovery under Rule 56(d). R. 1425-1 (attaching expert affidavit). Meanwhile, the Chandra Plaintiffs argue for the application of the Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss standard. R. 1422 at 3.
The Report cited by Defendants is a foreign government report and a matter of public record, and the Court may take judicial notice of it without converting Defendants' motions to ones for summary judgment. Menominee Indian Tribe of Wis. v. Thompson, 161 F.3d 449, 456 (7th Cir. 1998) (“Judicial notice of historical documents, documents contained in the public record, and reports of administrative bodies is proper.”); see also Color Switch LLC v. Fortafy Games DMCC, 377 F.Supp.3d 1075, 1089 n.6 (E.D. Cal. 2019) ( ). The fact that a plaintiff attaches evidentiary materials outside the pleadings to its brief does not convert a defendant's motion to a summary judgment motion. Thompson v. Illinois Dept. of Prof'l Regulation, 300 F.3d 750, 754 (7th Cir. 2002). Furthermore, it is within this Court's discretion to handle this motion as a straightforward motion to dismiss, especially where early resolution of an issue, like the application of DOHSA, would streamline the case. Levenstein v. Salafsky, 164 F.3d 345, 347 (7th Cir. 1998) ( ).
Thus, the Court will construe Defendants' motions under the Rule 12(b)(6) standard to decide the application of DOHSA as a matter of law on the face of the pleadings. A Rule 12(b)(6) motion challenges the “sufficiency of the complaint.” Berger v. Nat. Collegiate Athletic Assoc., 843 F.3d 285, 289 (7th Cir. 2016). In applying this standard, the Court accepts all well-pleaded facts as true and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Tobey v. Chibucos, 890 F.3d 634, 646 (7th Cir. 2018).
Though the Chandra Plaintiffs do not dispute DOHSA's application to their wrongful death claims, the Manfredi Plaintiffs do. DOHSA is the source of law for deaths resulting from wrongful acts, neglect, or default on the high seas more than three (or in a commercial aviation accident, twelve) nautical miles from the shore of the United States. 46 U.S.C. §§ 30302, 30307. The Supreme Court has consistently applied DOHSA to aviation accidents occurring on the high seas, like the crash which occurred here. See Dooley v. Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd., 524 U.S. 116 (1998); Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd., 516 U.S. 217 (1996); Offshore Logistics v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207 (1986); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618 (1978); Exec. Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 263-64 (1972) ( ); see also 46 U.S.C. § 30307 ( ).[3] The weight of the case law in other circuits is that when a plaintiff is fatally injured over the high seas, DOHSA applies. LaCourse v. PAE Worldwide Inc., 980 F.3d 1350, 1357 (11th Cir. 2020) (); Bergen v. F/V St. Patrick, 816 F.2d 1345, 1348 (9th Cir. 1987); Kennedy v. Carnival Corp., 385 F.Supp.3d 1302, 1316 (S.D. Fla. 2019) ( ); see also Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 599-600 and n.5 (1974) ( )(DOHSA “by its terms covers deaths caused by injuries inflicted at sea, not simply deaths occurring on the high seas.”).
Citing Motts v. M/V Green Wave, a case in which the Fifth Circuit held that DOHSA applied when the injury occurred on the high seas but the prior negligence and the later death occurred onshore, the Manfredi Plaintiffs argue that the Court should instead consider the location of where the negligence is...
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