In re M.D.D.
| Citation | 774 N.W.2d 793,2009 SD 94 |
| Decision Date | 28 October 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. 25124.,25124. |
| Parties | In the Matter of M.D.D., A Delinquent Child. |
| Court | South Dakota Supreme Court |
Marty J. Jackley, Atty. Gen., Frank Geaghan, Asst. Atty. Gen., Pierre, SD, for appellee State of South Dakota.
David K. Wheeler of Morgan, Theeler, LLP, Huron, SD, for appellant, M.D.D.
[¶ 1.] M.D.D. admitted the allegations of a juvenile delinquency petition alleging simple assault and resulting injury of another person. The circuit court placed M.D.D. on probation and ordered her to pay restitution for the medical expenses Medicaid was required to pay for the treatment of the injured person. M.D.D. appeals the order of restitution. We affirm.
[¶ 2.] M.D.D. injured another person while driving a car. As a result of this incident, the injured person required medical care. The medical expenses were paid by Medicaid. In a juvenile proceeding arising from the incident, M.D.D. admitted to a juvenile delinquency petition alleging that her conduct constituted simple assault. She was placed on probation for 120 days. At a restitution hearing, the State requested that Medicaid be reimbursed for the medical expenses it was required to pay for the victim's injuries. M.D.D. argued that, in juvenile proceedings, the applicable statutes did not authorize restitution for third-party medical expense payers like Medicaid. The circuit court disagreed and ordered M.D.D. to pay restitution to Medicaid.
[¶ 3.] On appeal, M.D.D. argues that Medicaid, a third-party payor legally obligated to pay the medical expenses, is not entitled to restitution under either SDCL ch. 23A-28 () or SDCL 26-8C-7(1) and 26-8B-6(4) (). Statutory interpretation is a question of law we review de novo. State v. Wilson, 2008 SD 13, ¶ 14, 745 N.W.2d 666, 670.
[¶ 4.] SDCL ch. 23A-28 authorizes an award of restitution to specified "victims" in criminal cases. The definition of victim in SDCL 23A-28-2(5) includes third-party payors.1 The State suggests that we interpret this statute to apply in juvenile proceedings. We note, however, that under this criminal statute, the person seeking restitution must be a victim of "criminal activities" of a "defendant." Further, "criminal activities" only include "crime[s]" for which there is a "plea of guilty or verdict of guilty upon which a judgment of conviction may be rendered." SDCL 23A-28-2(2). Although these terms apply in criminal cases involving adults, none of them have application in juvenile proceedings.
[¶ 5.] In juvenile proceedings there are no criminal activities, crimes, pleas of guilty, verdicts of guilty, or defendants. Instead, an alleged "delinquent child" may be subject to an "adjudication and disposition" and can only admit or deny a juvenile petition. See SDCL 26-7A-43. Plainly, the different language used in the criminal restitution statutes does not reflect legislative intent that the criminal statutes (SDCL ch 23A-28) apply to restitution in juvenile proceedings under SDCL chs 26-8B and 26-8C.2
[¶ 6.] Therefore, the question is whether a delinquent child, as a part of a juvenile disposition, may be ordered to pay the restitution under the juvenile statutes. Unlike the criminal restitution statute that limits restitution to a defined group of "victims," SDCL 26-8B-6(4)3 broadly authorizes the court to order restitution in juvenile cases without language limiting or restricting the type of person or entity that may be reimbursed. The statute simply authorizes restitution for "any damage done to property or for medical expenses." Id. (emphasis added). In light of this broad, unqualified language, we conclude that the Legislature did not intend to limit restitution to any particular class of persons or entities that paid medical expenses as a result of the juvenile's delinquent behavior. Absent limiting language, we hold that the statute authorizes restitution to a third-party payor like Medicaid, who was legally required to pay medical expenses for damages caused by the juvenile's misconduct.
[¶ 7.] M.D.D.'s reliance on State v. Fryer, 496 N.W.2d 54 (S.D.1993) (superseded by statute as stated in State v. Galligo, 1996 SD 83, 551 N.W.2d 303), is misplaced. In that case, the Legislature chose to limit restitution to "victim[s]" in criminal cases, but the Legislature did not define that term. In interpreting the word "victim," this Court recognized the distinction between direct victims of criminal offenses and indirect victims, such as insurance companies. Id. at 55. That distinction is, however, inapplicable here because the word "victim" is not used in the juvenile restitution statute. As previously explained, unlike the criminal statute, the juvenile statute does not limit restitution to "victims." Therefore, Fryer's interpretive analysis of the word "victim" is inapposite in a juvenile proceeding.
[¶ 8.] M.D.D. also argues that the circuit court did not consider the "serious hardship or injustice" that restitution payments would cause her. See SDCL 26-8B-6(4), supra note 3 (). In this case, the circuit court determined the amount of restitution to be paid, but made no findings regarding possible hardship or injustice to the child. M.D.D. claims that a circuit court must make a finding on hardship in every case and that the court's failure to make such a finding—which M.D.D. claims was a disputed material issue—requires reversal. See St. Cloud v. Leapley, 521 N.W.2d 118, 125 (S.D.1994) .
[¶ 9.] Our review of the record, however, reflects that hardship was never an issue, let alone a disputed issue that required findings of fact in the restitution proceedings. As other courts have commented, if it is the juvenile's contention that he or she cannot afford to pay restitution, the juvenile bears the initial burden of at least raising the issue. See State v. Fellers, 37 Wash.App. 613, 620, 683 P.2d 209, 214-15 (1984) () (emphasis added).
[¶ 10.] At the restitution hearing, M.D.D. did not argue that potential hardship was required to be considered in every case or that restitution would constitute a hardship in this case. On the contrary, in its opening statement, the State indicated that the "sole issue" was whether the circuit court could legally order M.D.D. to repay Medicaid under the previously discussed restitution statutes, and M.D.D. agreed. Further, M.D.D.'s only argument involved the applicability of the criminal statutes in juvenile proceedings. Counsel's argument was that:
[SDCL 23A-28-2] applies to adult convictions.... It does not refer to adjudications for juvenile delinquencies, and therefore, I believe that statute does not apply in this case. And I believe that it doesn't apply for a good reason in that a juvenile matter, such a far reaching restitution order ... doesn't meet the same ends of justice in that the juvenile isn't going to have the same earning ability as an adult, and it is going to become more of a burden upon the family than it is upon punishment or making someone whole as it would in the case of an adult. The entire Title ... 26 and the subchapters referring to juveniles, subchapter 7(a) and then 8(a), 8(b) and 8(c) [sic] don't even mention the word restitution.
Thus, M.D.D. only mentioned that generally, juveniles do not have the same earning ability as adults.
[¶ 11.] This general reference to earning ability, made in the context of an argument on a different legal issue, did not bring the legal or factual arguments M.D.D. now asserts on appeal to the circuit court's attention. Considering the stipulated, limited nature of the restitution hearing and the failure to raise a suggestion of...
To continue reading
Request your trial