In re M. F. Scott & Nettie L. Scott for a Writ Prohibition Against Honorable T. B. Stuart

Decision Date30 June 1915
Citation22 Haw. 641
PartiesIN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF M. F. SCOTT AND NETTIE L. SCOTT FOR A WRIT OF PROHIBITION AGAINST HONORABLE T. B. STUART, THIRD JUDGE, CIRCUIT COURT, FIRST JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, TERRITORY OF HAWAII, AND JOSEPH LIGHTFOOT, ESQ., MASTER IN CHANCERY.
CourtHawaii Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HEREPETITION FOR WRIT OF PROHIBITION.

Syllabus by the Court

A circuit judge is not disqualified to hear or determine a partition suit by reason of a pecuniary interest therein because of his having made an order directing the payment of an attorney's fee for services rendered for the judge in a prohibition proceeding growing out of the partition suit, out of a fund in court belonging to the parties to the suit, such order having no connection with the subject-matter or issues of that suit.

An order or decree directing the payment of money, other than the payment into court for further disposition, is final in its nature and appealable.M. F. Scott for petitioners.

J. Lightfoot for respondents.

ROBERTSON, C.J., WATSON AND QUARLES, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT BY ROBERTSON, C.J.

This is a petition for a writ of prohibition to restrain circuit judge Stuart from proceeding further in the hearing of a suit in equity for the partition of certain land wherein the petitioners herein are plaintiffs, on the ground that the judge is disqualified by reason of pecuniary interest in the case. Org. Act, Sec. 84. The facts constituting the alleged disqualification are, in brief, these: The circuit judge had previously appointed the respondent Lightfoot as master in chancery in the partition suit under an order directing an inquiry into and a report upon the case which had become complicated; the petitioners applied to this court for a writ of prohibition alleging that the order appointing the master was made without jurisdiction; the writ was dismissed ( Scott v. Stuart, ante, p. 459); thereafter the respondent Lightfoot filed a motion in the partition suit, alleging that he had been “ordered by said judge to appear in said supreme court as the attorney for said judge and in his own behalf,” on the application for the writ of prohibition, asking for the allowance and payment to him of a suitable attorney's fee; the motion was granted, and an order was entered directing the clerk of the court to pay to Mr. Lightfoot the sum of one hundred dollars out of the fund on deposit in court in said suit as an attorney's fee for services rendered as above stated; thereupon the petitioners moved that Judge Stuart assign the case to another judge because he had, by the making of the said order, become disqualified from making any further order in the case; and the...

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