In re: M. J. S. Adoption

• Decision Date: 05 October 2000
• Docket Number: 99-00197
• Citation: 44 S.W.3d 41
• Parties: In Re ADOPTION OF M.J.S.IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT JACKSON
• Court: Tennessee Court of Appeals

In Re ADOPTION OF M.J.S.

No. W1999-00197-COA-R3-CV

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT JACKSON

April 20, 2000 Session

Filed October 5, 2000

Direct Appeal from the Chancery Court for Shelby County Nos. A5151-1, A5153-3(1)

Walter L. Evans, Chancellor

Cindy G. Snyder and Wolfgang W. Snyder appeal the trial court's final decree of adoption that permitted Appellee Debra Sue Langston to adopt the Snyders' fourteen-month-old grandson, M.J.S. The Snyders' daughter, Christine L. Snyder, previously had delivered physical custody of the child to Langston and had executed a surrender of her parental rights in favor of Langston. Both the Snyders and Langston filed petitions seeking to adopt the child, and the petitions were consolidated in one action. The trial court permitted the Snyders to participate in the adoption proceedings for the purpose of litigating the best interests of the child; however, the trial court refused to allow the Snyders to pursue their own petition for adoption of the child based on the court's ruling that Tennessee's adoption statutes did not give the Snyders standing to adopt the child. Based upon our interpretation of Tennessee's adoption statutes, we conclude that the trial court committed no reversible error in conducting these adoption proceedings, and we affirm the court's final decree of adoption.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed; and Remanded

Richard A. Gordon, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellants, Cindy G. Snyder and Wolfgang W. Snyder.

Diana L. Schmied, Germantown, Tennessee, and Hayden Lait, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellee, Debra Sue Langston.

Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter, and Dianne Stamey Dycus, Deputy Attorney General, for the State of Tennessee.

DAVID R. FARMER, J., delivered the opinion of the court. ALAN E. HIGHERS, J., filed a concurring opinion. HEWITT P. TOMLIN, JR., SP. J., filed a dissenting opinion

OPINION

On May 19, 1998, the Snyders filed a petition seeking to adopt their grandson, M.J.S., who was born in December 1997. The Snyders' petition for adoption alleged that the child and his mother, Christine L. Snyder (Mother), had lived with the Snyders until April 28, 1998. At the time they filed their petition, the Snyders did not have custody of the child, and they were uncertain as to the child's or the Mother's whereabouts. The Snyders recently had obtained information, however, that the Mother had surrendered her parental rights to the child, that the child was residing with Debra Sue Langston at an unknown address, and that Langston had filed a petition to adopt the child. Based on this information, the Snyders' petition named Langston, the Mother, and the child's unknown father as respondents. In the event Langston had filed a petition seeking to adopt the child, the Snyders asked the trial court to deem their petition for adoption as "a petition to intervene therein."

Contrary to the Snyders' belief, Langston had not yet filed a petition seeking to adopt the child. The next day, however, Langston filed a petition for adoption of the child. Langston's petition alleged that she acquired custody of the child from the Mother on May 2, 1998, that the Mother surrendered her parental rights to the child in favor of Langston before a judge of the Juvenile Court of Shelby County on May 8, 1998, and that, since that date, the child had resided continuously in Langston's home.

Initially, the petitions for adoption of the child were assigned to different parts of the Chancery Court of Shelby County. In response to Langston's petition, the Chancellor of Part III of the Chancery Court entered an Order of Reference whereby the Chancellor appointed the Adoption Resource Center as the child's next friend. The Order of Reference directed that agency to

investigate the condition and antecedents of the child for the purpose of ascertaining whether he is a proper subject for adoption, to make appropriate inquiry to determine whether the proposed adoptive home is a suitable one for the child, and to investigate any other circumstances or conditions which may have a bearing on the adoption and of which the Court should have knowledge.

The Chancellor of Part III subsequently entered an order transferring Langston's adoption petition to Part I of the Chancery Court for consolidation with the Snyders' adoption petition. Thereafter, all proceedings in the consolidated actions took place in Part I of the Chancery Court.

Langston responded to the Snyders' petition for adoption by filing a motion to dismiss the petition. In support of her motion to dismiss, Langston contended that the Snyders had not met the statutory requirements for filing an adoption petition because they had neither physical custody of the child nor the right to receive physical custody of the child pursuant to the applicable provisions of Tennessee's adoption statutes. See Tenn. Code Ann. 36_1_111(d)(6), 36_1_115(b), 36_1_116(b)(5) (1996 & Supp. 1998). On the same day that Langston filed her motion to dismiss, the Snyders filed a motion in which they sought various forms of relief, including the return of the child to their home, access to confidential information pertaining to Langston's adoption of the child, and the right to intervene in Langston's adoption proceedings.

On June 25, 1998, the trial court entered an order denying Langston's motion to dismiss the Snyders' adoption petition. In a separate order, the trial court declined to act on the Snyders' request for the return of the child to their home; however, the trial court ruled that the Snyders' petition for adoption would be deemed a petition to intervene in the pending adoption proceedings brought by Langston, and the court permitted all parties and their attorneys to have access to certain documents pertaining to the pending adoption proceedings. Langston requested permission from the trial court to pursue an interlocutory appeal of these rulings, but the trial court denied Langston's request. See Tenn. R. App. P. 9.

In October 1998, Langston filed a motion for summary judgment in which she again asked the trial court to dismiss the Snyders' adoption petition. In support of her motion, Langston reiterated her argument that the Snyders had failed to meet the statutory requirements for filing an adoption petition because the Snyders had neither physical custody of the child nor the right to receive physical custody of the child pursuant to the applicable provisions of Tennessee's adoption statutes. Langston additionally challenged the Snyders' right to intervene in the pending adoption proceedings.

In their memorandum of law and response opposing Langston's motion for summary judgment, the Snyders acknowledged that the Mother had surrendered her parental rights to the child and had delivered physical custody of the child to Langston. Nevertheless, the Snyders insisted that, in order to protect the child's best interests, the trial court was required to conduct a hearing on the merits of both adoption petitions to determine which of the petitioners, the Snyders or Langston, should be permitted to adopt the child.

Despite the Snyders' objection that the child's best interests could be served only by holding a contested hearing on both adoption petitions, the trial court granted Langston's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the Snyders' petition for adoption. In support of its ruling that the Snyders lacked standing to file an "independent adoption petition," the trial court observed that the following facts were undisputed: Langston received physical custody of the child from the Mother on May 2, 1998; the Mother lawfully surrendered the child to Langston in the Juvenile Court of Shelby County on May 8, 1998; Langston had maintained physical custody of the child since May 2, 1998; and the Snyders did not have custody of the child at the time they filed their adoption petition on May 19, 1998. The trial court indicated that it was making no determination on the Snyders' right to intervene in the pending adoption proceedings "at this time," but the court ruled that the Snyders would "be allowed to be heard in the adoption hearing" and that the Snyders' attorney would "be allowed to cross-examine witnesses and present deposition testimony and present evidence as to the best interest and welfare of the child."

After the trial court orally granted Langston's motion for summary judgment, but before the court had entered a written order containing its rulings, the Snyders filed another pleading that they titled "Intervening Petition for Adoption." The intervening petition alleged, inter alia, that the Mother had surrendered her parental rights to the child, that the child was in the physical custody of Langston, and that the Snyders did not presently have custody of the child. As authority for their intervening petition, the Snyders referenced the provisions of section 36_1_116(f)(1) of Tennessee's adoption statutes. See Tenn. Code Ann. 36_1_116(f)(1) (Supp. 1998).

Langston responded to the Snyders' Intervening Petition for Adoption by filing another motion to dismiss. In addition to repeating her argument that the Snyders had failed to meet the statutory requirements for filing an adoption petition, Langston contended that the cited provisions of the adoption statutes did not give the Snyders any right to intervene in the pending adoption proceedings.

In its subsequent order entered on Langston's motion, the trial court stopped short of dismissing the Snyders' intervening petition. Instead, the trial court ruled that the Snyders had "no standing at this time to petition for adoption" but that the Snyders would be allowed to intervene in the pending adoption proceedings for the limited purpose of presenting evidence as to Langston's fitness. The trial court's order also disposed of several pretrial motions filed by the Snyders. In one of its rulings, the trial...