In re M.J.B.
| Decision Date | 23 April 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 280A20,280A20 |
| Citation | 377 N.C. 328,856 S.E.2d 795 |
| Parties | In the MATTER OF: M.J.B. III, G.M.B., and J.A.B. |
| Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
Miller & Audino, LLP, Greenville, by Jay Anthony Audino, for petitioner-appellee Beaufort County Department of Social Services.
Tasneem A. Dharamsi, Charlotte, for appellee Guardian ad Litem.
Sean P. Vitrano, Wake Forest, for respondent-appellant mother.
¶ 1 Respondent-mother appeals from the trial court's 30 March 2020 orders terminating her parental rights in her minor children M.J.B. III (Mark),1 G.M.B. (Gerry), and J.A.B. (James).2 Upon careful consideration, we affirm the trial court's orders terminating respondent-mother's parental rights.
¶ 2 On 28 June 2019, the Beaufort County Department of Social Services (DSS) filed juvenile petitions alleging that ten-year-old Mark, eight-year-old Gerry, and six-year-old James were neglected juveniles. The juvenile petitions outlined DSS's years of involvement with respondent-mother and her failure to properly feed, bathe, and clothe her children or protect them from harm. Throughout the children's lives, respondent-mother had been financially and emotionally dependent on various males, placing herself at risk of abuse. In addition, respondent-mother's boyfriend, who subsequently became her husband, physically abused the children. After obtaining custody of the children, DSS placed them together in a licensed therapeutic foster home due to their special needs and the substantial trauma they had experienced.
¶ 3 The juvenile petitions were heard on 30 October 2019, and the children were adjudicated to be neglected juveniles. In its adjudication order, the trial court made findings of fact consistent with the allegations in the juvenile petitions (summarized above). Accordingly, the trial court set the permanent plan for the children as reunification with a concurrent plan of adoption.
¶ 4 Following a permanency-planning hearing on 8 January 2020, the trial court found that respondent-mother had not made substantial progress toward resolving the need for DSS intervention. Among other things, the trial court found that the children had revealed new information about the abuse they had suffered while under respondent-mother's care—including being hit, struck, and beaten by family members and being sexually abused by respondent-mother's boyfriends, including her now husband. Therefore, the trial court changed the children's permanent plan to adoption with a concurrent plan of reunification.
¶ 5 On 22 January 2020, DSS filed a motion to terminate the parental rights of respondent-mother on grounds of neglect and dependency. See N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1), (6) (2019). The termination motion was heard on 4 March 2020. On 30 March 2020, the trial court entered an adjudication order, concluding that both grounds for termination alleged in the motion existed; and a disposition order, concluding that it was in the best interests of the children to terminate respondent-mother's parental rights. Accordingly, the trial court terminated respondent-mother's parental rights. Respondent-mother now appeals.
¶ 6 Respondent-mother challenges the trial court's adjudication of the existence of grounds to terminate her parental rights pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1) and (6). Since "a finding of only one ground is necessary to support a termination of parental rights," we address only respondent-mother's challenge to the adjudication of neglect under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1). In re A.R.A. , 373 N.C. 190, 194, 835 S.E.2d 417 (2019). After careful review, we conclude that the unchallenged findings in this case combined with the challenged findings that are supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence are more than sufficient to support the trial court's determination that grounds existed to terminate respondent-mother's parental rights pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1). Accordingly, we affirm the orders terminating respondent-mother's parental rights.
¶ 7 The Juvenile Code provides for a two-stage process for the termination of parental rights: adjudication and disposition. N.C.G.S. §§ 7B-1109 to -1110 (2019). During the adjudicatory stage, "[t]he burden in these proceedings is on the petitioner or movant to prove the facts justifying the termination by clear and convincing evidence." N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(b) ; see also id. § 7B-1109(e) – (f). If one or more grounds exist, the trial court then proceeds to the dispositional stage where it determines whether termination of parental rights is in the children's best interests. N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a). On appeal, respondent-mother does not challenge the trial court's determination in the dispositional stage that termination was in the children's best interests.
¶ 8 "We review a trial court's adjudication under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111 ‘to determine whether the findings are supported by clear, cogent and convincing evidence and the findings support the conclusions of law.’ "
In re E.H.P. , 372 N.C. 388, 392, 831 S.E.2d 49 (2019) (quoting In re Montgomery , 311 N.C. 101, 111, 316 S.E.2d 246 (1984) ). "A trial court's finding of fact that is supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence is deemed conclusive even if the record contains evidence that would support a contrary finding." In re B.O.A. , 372 N.C. 372, 379, 831 S.E.2d 305 (2019). In re T.N.H. , 372 N.C. 403, 407, 831 S.E.2d 54 (2019) (citations omitted). As for the trial court's conclusions of law, this Court reviews them de novo. In re M.C. , 374 N.C. 882, 886, 844 S.E.2d 564 (2020).
¶ 9 A trial court may terminate parental rights for neglect if it concludes the parent has neglected the juvenile such that the juvenile is a "neglected juvenile" within the meaning of N.C.G.S. § 7B-101. N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1). A neglected juvenile is defined, in pertinent part, as one "whose parent, guardian, custodian, or caretaker does not provide proper care, supervision, or discipline; or who has been abandoned; or who lives in an environment injurious to the juvenile's welfare." N.C.G.S. § 7B-101(15) (2019). In some circumstances, the trial court may terminate a parent's rights based on neglect that is currently occurring at the time of the termination hearing. See, e.g. , In re K.C.T. , 375 N.C. 592, 599–600, 850 S.E.2d 330 (2020). However, such a showing is not required if, as in this case, the child is not in the parent's custody at the time of the termination hearing. In re N.D.A. , 373 N.C. 71, 80, 833 S.E.2d 768 (2019). Instead, the trial court looks to "evidence of neglect by a parent prior to losing custody of a child—including an adjudication of such neglect" as well as "any evidence of changed conditions in light of the evidence of prior neglect and the probability of a repetition of neglect." In re Ballard , 311 N.C. 708, 715, 319 S.E.2d 227 (1984). "The determinative factors must be the best interests of the child and the fitness of the parent to care for the child at the time of the termination proceeding. " Id. "After weighing this evidence, the trial court may find that neglect exists as a ground for termination if it concludes the evidence demonstrates ‘a likelihood of future neglect by the parent.’ " In re B.T.J. , 2021-NCSC-23, ¶ 11, 855 S.E.2d 459 (quoting In re R.L.D. , 375 N.C. 838, 841, 851 S.E.2d 17 (2020) ).
¶ 10 On appeal, respondent-mother challenges several of the specific factual findings made by the trial court and then argues that the remaining findings do not support a finding that there was a likelihood of future neglect. Below, we address only those challenges that are necessary to support the trial court's adjudication that neglect existed as a ground for termination. While respondent-mother challenges other findings of fact, those findings are unnecessary to determine that there was a likelihood of future neglect, so we do not address them.
¶ 11 Respondent-mother's first relevant challenge is to finding of fact 53: Relying on parenting-profile evaluations completed approximately one month apart in August and September of 2019, respondent-mother contends that the trial court's finding of a lack of progress is not supported by the evidence. To the extent this contention involves the "pre-test and post-test," we agree that the evidence does not support a finding that respondent-mother "did not learn anything." Rather, the record reflects that respondent-mother's pre-test and post-test showed slight improvements in each of the five parenting constructs evaluated. Thus, we disregard that portion of the finding. See In re J.M. , 373 N.C. 352, 358, 838 S.E.2d 173 (2020) ().
¶ 12 However, the record contains sufficient evidence to support the finding that respondent-mother has been "unable to make any progress" in her parenting skills. Regarding the tests, respondent-mother only improved her scores by one to two points, leaving her in the medium risk range for all five categories. According to the social worker, this did not indicate demonstrable change. More concerningly, the social worker testified that respondent-mother did not use any of the parenting skills taught in the class when she visited with her children. Respondent-mother does not challenge the trial court's finding that each visit "was a retraumatizing episode [for the children] evidenced by...
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