IN RE M.M.D.
| Decision Date | 30 June 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. 94-FS-620,94-FS-620 |
| Citation | 662 A.2d 837 |
| Court | D.C. Court of Appeals |
| Parties | In re M.M.D. & B.H.M., Appellants. |
APPEAL FROM THE SUPERIOR COURT, SUSAN R. WINFIELD, J.
THIS PAGE CONTAINED HEADNOTES AND HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.
APPEAL FROM THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, SUSAN R. WINFIELD, TRIAL JUDGE.
Nancy D. Polikoff, for appellants.
Laurie P. McManus, Asst. Corp. Counsel, with whom Garland Pinkston, Acting Corp. Counsel at the time the brief was filed, and Charles L. Reischel, Deputy Corp. Counsel, were on the brief, for the Dist. of Columbia as amicus curiae.
Michele Zavos, Elizabeth Hendrickson, Kathryn Kendell, and Shannon Minter filed an amicus curiae brief for the Nat. Center for Lesbian Rights, Gay and Lesbian Parents Coalition Intern., and Gay and Lesbian Parents Coalition of Metropolitan Wash., on behalf of appellants.
Before FERREN and STEADMAN, Associate Judges, and MACK, Senior Judge.
This case presents the question whether, under District of Columbia law, two unmarried persons — in particular, a same-sex couple living together in a committed personal relationship — may adopt a child. If the answer is yes, there is a second question: whether the fact that one member of the couple already has adopted the child creates any impediment to both members' joining in the adoption. We answer the first question "yes," the second question "no." The trial judge erred in answering each question but intimated that the adoption would be in the child's "best interests" if the law were otherwise — as we hold it here to be. We therefore reverse and remand for issuance of factual findings and, if still indicated, for entry of a decree granting the adoption appellants seek.
We quote the statement of facts from the trial judge's opinion (footnotes omitted):
Hillary is a healthy, happy, and delightful 2 1/2 year-old Black/Hispanic child who was born on August 15, 1991 in the District of Columbia. Hillary's biological mother is a young, attractive Black woman who met Bruce and Mark after reading an advertisement that they had placed in a local newspaper. The ad identified the petitioners as a gay couple who were seeking to adopt a child. Bruce and Mark are adult, white, homosexual males who have shared an intimate relationship for almost five years.
At the time she read the newspaper advertisement, the birth mother was several months pregnant and was not on good terms with her mother with whom she then lived. The birth mother, therefore, not only answered the ad, but shortly after meeting the petitioners, she began living with them. Eventually, she delivered Hillary on August 15, 1991. All went as planned when Hillary's mother signed her consent to an adoption of Hillary on September 9, 1991. Bruce filed the first petition to adopt the child on the following day.
The baby's natural mother and Bruce reached an agreement that the mother would continue to have visitation privileges with Hillary, even after the adoption was finalized. These visitation arrangements, however, did not proceed smoothly. Rather, the mother accused Bruce of denying her access to Hillary and eventually she filed a motion to vacate her consent to theadoption. This motion was submitted to this court and was scheduled for a hearing.
After much discussion and several preliminary hearings, the parties reached an accord which they reduced to writing. Essentially, Hillary's mother and Bruce agreed again to permit the mother to visit with Hillary even after a final decree of adoption was issued.
In their discussion with the court about this agreement, the parties expressly stated that they understood that under the District of Columbia law, the natural mother had no enforceable right to visit Hillary after a final decree of adoption was signed because the law in the District of Columbia, as the parties understood it, mandated that upon the signing of the final decree of adoption, all of the mother's rights as a parent would be terminated. No one suggested that this severance of Hillary's mother's rights was waivable. At the parties' request, this court reviewed the agreement and satisfied itself that the natural mother understood that she was in no way obligated to settle the case; that she could instead proceed with the hearing on her motion to vacate her consent; and that the agreement to allow continued visitation with Hillary could not be enforced under the law as it existed in the District of Columbia. This court was further satisfied that the mother's decision to reaffirm her consent to the adoption and to withdraw her motion to vacate her consent was voluntarily made. Therefore, since all of the evidence supported a finding that Bruce M. was a suitable person to adopt Hillary, and since Hillary was clearly suitable to be adopted, and because this court found that the adoption was in Hillary's best interest, this court signed the final decree of adoption in favor of Bruce M.1
In March 1993, both Bruce M. and Mark D. petitioned to adopt Hillary. In addition, Bruce M. signed his consent to the petition to adopt in favor of himself and Mark D.
The petitioners, Bruce and Mark, are thirty and thirty-five respectively. They are both Catholics who are members of a gay and lesbian religious organization called Dignity. Bruce has a Bachelor's Degree in Electrical Engineering and a Master's Degree in Engineering Computer Science. He currently works as an engineer for a major corporation. Mark has a Bachelor's Degree in Political Science and a Master's Degree in Public Administration. He now works as a Court Administrator in the state of Pennsylvania.
The petitioners own a condominium that they bought jointly and have shared since 1990. They have committed themselves to each other as a family to the extent legally possible, and they seek to raise Hillary together, whether or not their joint petition to adopt her is approved. They have, for example, introduced Hillary to, and included her as, a part of both of their extended families. They shared in her baptism at their church. They have enrolled her in a monthly play group arranged by the Gay and Lesbian Parent Coalition of Washington. Hillary is a beneficiary in their wills, insurance policies and other funds.
Hillary appears to be bonded equally well to both Bruce and Mark. She calls Bruce "Daddy" and Mark "Poppy." Bruce cooks most of the meals, while Mark often reads the bedtime stories. They both take Hillary on outings. The Department of Human Services has recommended in favor of their joint petition.
The judge added:
[T]he only issue before the court is a legal one since factually this court is satisfied by all of the evidence that Mark D. is fit and suitable to raise Hillary, even alone, and that this court would conclude on a single petition by Mark D. that it would be in Hillary's best interests to be adopted by him.
The judge then ruled, for reasons explained below, that the adoption statute did not permit Mark to join in Bruce's adoption of Hillary. This appeal followed.
Before offering our analysis, we believe it will be helpful to provide the following summary of decision:
1. D.C.Code § 16-302 (1989 Repl.) expressly authorizes adoptions by "[a]ny person," without limitation. It then imposes a restriction on adoption by a spouse of the natural parent (that parent must "consent"), as well as a restriction on adoption by every other married petitioner (the petitioner's spouse must "join[] in the petition"). There is no...
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