In re M.A.

• Citation: 862 S.E.2d 169,378 N.C. 462
• Decision Date: 27 August 2021
• Docket Number: No. 218A20,218A20
• Parties: In the MATTER OF: M.A.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of North Carolina

378 N.C. 462

862 S.E.2d 169

In the MATTER OF: M.A.

No. 218A20

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Filed August 27, 2021

The Law Office of Derrick J. Hensley, PLLC, Chapel Hill, by Derrick J. Hensley, for petitioner-appellee Durham County Department of Social Services.

Carrie A. Hanger, Winston-Salem, for appellee Guardian ad Litem.

Peter Wood, for respondent-appellant mother.

HUDSON, Justice.

¶ 1 Respondent, the mother of M.A. (Mark)¹ , appeals from the trial court's order terminating her parental rights on the grounds of neglect and willful failure to make reasonable progress to correct the conditions that led to the child's removal from the home. Because we hold the trial court did not err in concluding that grounds existed to terminate respondent's parental rights under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1) based on neglect, we affirm the trial court's order.

I. Facts and Procedural History

¶ 2 On 1 June 2015, the Durham County Department of Social Services (DSS) obtained nonsecure custody of then ten-month-old Mark and his fifteen-year-old brother, J.M.² , and filed a juvenile petition alleging they were neglected juveniles. In the petition, DSS alleged that respondent and the children were chronically homeless and had been staying "from place to place." The petition further alleged that on 21 May 2015, J.M. returned from school to the place where they had been staying and was unable to locate respondent. Respondent did not leave any information or instructions on where she could be found. After still not being able to find respondent that evening, J.M. went to his maternal grandmother's senior residential complex at 1:00 a.m. to have a place to stay. On 1 June 2015, the maternal grandmother informed DSS that J.M. could no longer stay with her as her residence did not allow children, and she was concerned about being evicted. DSS believed Mark was with respondent, however she had not been located at the time of filing the petition.

¶ 3 On 2 June 2015, respondent showed up at DSS's office with Mark. The social worker addressed the allegations and petition with respondent and explained that DSS had obtained legal custody of her children on 1 June 2015. Respondent left Mark in the custody of DSS, and he was placed in foster care.

¶ 4 On 20 August 2015, the trial court entered an order adjudicating the children as neglected juveniles based on stipulations by the parties. In order to correct the conditions that led to the children's removal, the trial court ordered respondent to complete a psychological evaluation with collateral contacts and objective testing, and follow any recommendations for mental health treatment; complete a parenting class and demonstrate and verbalize an understanding of the skills learned; obtain and maintain stable housing; obtain and maintain stable employment; demonstrate an ability and willingness to meet the children's needs; refrain from substance abuse; maintain contact with the social worker and provide current contact information; and maintain visitation with the children. The trial court granted respondent two hours of supervised visitation every other week.

¶ 5 Following a review hearing held 17 November 2015, the trial court entered an order on 11 January 2016 continuing custody with DSS and placing Mark with his paternal great grandmother. The trial court found that respondent was employed and seeking housing, had started parenting classes, had completed a substance abuse assessment from which no services were recommended, and had completed a psychological evaluation.

¶ 6 In a review order entered on 7 June 2016, the trial court set the permanent plan for Mark as reunification with a secondary plan of guardianship. The trial court found that respondent had obtained a one-bedroom home through Housing for New Hope. DSS had assessed the home on 31 May 2016 and found it to be appropriate for Mark. The trial court further found that respondent was making progress and was not a safety risk to Mark during visits but that she still needed to complete the parenting course and obtain sufficient income to meet the needs of her children. The trial court allowed respondent unsupervised visitation with Mark with the possibility of transitioning to overnight visits. In addition to respondent's prior case plan requirements, the trial court ordered respondent to obtain a domestic violence assessment due to a history of domestic violence.

¶ 7 On 10 August 2016, Mark was placed in a foster home after the paternal great grandmother indicated she could no longer care for him due to her health. On 8 September 2016, respondent was awarded overnight unsupervised visits on the condition that the father not be present.

¶ 8 In a 2 May 2017 permanency-planning-review order, the trial court continued the permanent plan of reunification but changed the secondary plan to adoption. The trial court found that respondent completed a domestic violence assessment in December 2016 which recommended mental health treatment and domestic violence counseling. Respondent completed a mental health assessment on 28 February 2017, and no treatment was recommended. However, DSS was concerned that respondent underreported her domestic violence history. Respondent completed an addendum to the initial assessment on 15 August 2017. However, the trial court found that respondent "continued to minimize her domestic violence history and its impact on her."

¶ 9 After another hearing, the trial court subsequently entered a permanency-planning-review order continuing the permanent plan of reunification with a secondary plan of adoption. The trial court found that respondent had housing and had been employed at the same company for the past eighteen months. However, the trial court found that respondent's participation in domestic violence counseling had been "sporadic" and that respondent did not fully acknowledge the effects of her domestic violence history, nor did she fully understand the reasons the trial court was ordering her to engage in domestic violence counseling.

¶ 10 On 24 May 2018, DSS filed a motion to terminate respondent's parental rights to Mark alleging the grounds of neglect and willfully leaving the child in foster care for more than twelve months without making reasonable progress to correct the conditions that led to his removal from the home. See N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1)–(2) (2019). DSS alleged that respondent failed to demonstrate a willingness and ability to meet Mark's needs due to respondent's "delays in scheduling and attending assessments and treatment, her sporadic attendance at treatment, incomplete disclosures regarding problems and failure to utilize all visitation opportunities with the child." DSS further alleged that respondent "exhibit[ed] a pattern of behavior of disengagement and lack of follow through" as she had "several older children for whom she failed to engage in services in order to safely parent th[o]se children."

¶ 11 Following a hearing on 20 and 23 July 2018, the trial court entered a permanency-planning-review order on 28 August 2018 changing the permanent plan to adoption with a secondary plan of guardianship. The trial court found that although respondent had stable housing, she had yet to complete the Parenting Capacity Assessment that was ordered in October 2017 which would address respondent's understanding of the impact of her domestic violence and her ability to keep Mark and herself safe. The trial court further found that respondent missed a permanency planning review meeting and failed to provide an explanation, and that respondent was not at her home when the social worker conducted a pop-in visit during Mark's unsupervised visitation. The trial court found that it is not possible for Mark to return to respondent's care within the next six months because she "has not completed her court ordered services, especially the Parenting Capacity Assessment, ... and her sporadic attendance of domestic violence counseling."

¶ 12 The trial court conducted a termination-of-parental-rights hearing on 15 August, 9 and 15 October, 14 November, and 6 and 11 December 2019. On 27 February 2020, the trial court entered an order concluding that respondent's parental rights were subject to termination on the grounds of neglect and willful failure to make reasonable progress to correct the conditions that led to Mark's removal from the home. The trial court further concluded that termination of respondent's parental rights was in Mark's best interests. Accordingly, the trial court terminated respondent's parental rights. Respondent appealed.

II. Analysis

¶ 13 On appeal, respondent contends the trial court erred by adjudicating grounds for termination of her parental rights under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1) and (2). Because only one ground is necessary to terminate parental rights, we only address respondent's arguments regarding the ground of neglect. See In re A.R.A. , 373 N.C. 190, 194, 835 S.E.2d 417 (2019).

¶ 14 We review a trial court's adjudication "to determine whether the findings are supported by clear, cogent and convincing evidence and the findings support the conclusions of law." In re Montgomery , 311 N.C. 101, 111, 316 S.E.2d 246 (1984). Unchallenged findings of fact "are deemed supported by competent evidence and are binding on appeal." In re T.N.H. , 372 N.C. 403, 407, 831 S.E.2d 54 (2019). "Moreover, we review only those findings necessary to support the trial court's determination that grounds existed to terminate respondent's parental rights." Id. "The trial court's conclusions of law are reviewable de novo on appeal." In re J.O.D. , 374 N.C. 797, 801, 844 S.E.2d 570 (2020).

¶ 15 A trial court may terminate parental rights when it concludes the parent has neglected the juvenile within the meaning of N.C.G.S. § 7B-101. N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1). A neglected juvenile is one "whose parent, guardian, custodian, or caretaker does not provide proper care, supervision, or discipline; ... or who lives in...