In re M.T.

• Decision Date: 22 June 2006
• Docket Number: No. 99310.,99310.
• Citation: 221 Ill.2d 517,852 N.E.2d 792
• Parties: In re M.T., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. M.T., Appellee).
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

852 N.E.2d 792

221 Ill.2d 517

In re M.T., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. M.T., Appellee).

No. 99310.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

June 22, 2006.

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Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, Springfield, Richard A. Devine, State's Attorney, Chicago (Linda D. Woloshin, Assistant Attorney General, Chicago, Renee G. Goldfarb, Michelle Katz, James E. Fitzgerald, Mary Boland and Annette Collins, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.

Michael J. Pelletier, Deputy Defender, and Beth Herndobler, Assistant Appellate Defender, Office of State Appellate Defender, Chicago, for appellee.

Justice KILBRIDE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion:

In this case, the minor respondent was adjudicated delinquent following a judicial determination that he had violated the indecent solicitation of an adult statute (statute or solicitation statute) (720 ILCS 5/11-6.5(a) (West 2000)). The appellate court held that the statute violated the proportionate penalties clause of our state constitution (Ill. Const.1970, art. I, § 11) based on its use of cross-comparison analysis and found the entire statute unconstitutional. The State appealed, and respondent cross-appealed. We reverse the appellate court's judgment because we no longer apply cross-comparison analysis in proportionate penalties cases. We agree with the appellate court that the statute applies equally to adult and juvenile offenders and that the statute does not violate due process principles. We also hold that respondent has standing to raise the due process challenge.

I. BACKGROUND

Respondent, 16-year-old M.T., was adjudicated delinquent because he was found to have violated the solicitation statute. On March 16, 2001, while at school, respondent asked 16-year-old A.T. whether he wanted to receive oral sex, and A.T. responded affirmatively. A.T. followed respondent's instructions to go to the high school science room. Respondent told A.D., another minor, to "go tell that b* * * to go down to [the science] room." A.D. believed respondent was referring to an 18-year-old junior named E.J.¹ A.D. relayed respondent's message to E.J., who went to the science room. A.T. testified that respondent and E.J. were in the science room when he entered. E.J. testified that after A.T. entered the room, respondent told her to perform oral sex on A.T., and she complied because she was afraid respondent would physically harm her if she refused. Respondent denied all of the allegations against him, but was nonetheless found to have violated the statute and was adjudicated delinquent. He was made a ward of the state and sentenced as a juvenile to 18 months' probation, seven days in the Juvenile Detention Center, with credit for time served, 23 additional days in custody with a stay of the mittimus, and registration and evaluation as a sex offender.

Respondent appealed, arguing that the solicitation statute did not apply to juveniles and that it violated both the due process clauses of the federal and state constitutions (U.S. Const., amend. XIV; Ill. Const.1970, art. I, § 2) and the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const.1970, art. I, § 11). The appellate court held that the statute applied to juveniles, was not unconstitutionally vague as it applied to respondent, and that respondent lacked standing to raise his facial constitutional claims. In re M.T., 346 Ill.App.3d 83, 281 Ill.Dec. 780, 804 N.E.2d 1075 (2004). Respondent filed a petition for leave to appeal in this court.

We initially denied respondent's petition, but issued a supervisory order directing the appellate court to vacate its judgment and consider his due process and proportionate penalties challenges on the merits. In re M.T., 209 Ill.2d 581, 283 Ill.Dec. 719, 808 N.E.2d 1007 (2004) (supervisory order). The appellate court subsequently filed an opinion reiterating its original beliefs that the solicitation statute applied to juveniles and that respondent lacked standing to make his due process and proportionate penalties arguments. Following our instructions to review the latter arguments on the merits, the appellate court also held that the statute did not violate due process principles, but that it did violate the proportionate penalties clause in such a pervasive manner that the entire statute was rendered unconstitutional. 352 Ill.App.3d 131, 287 Ill.Dec. 592, 816 N.E.2d 354. This court allowed the State's petition for leave to appeal as a matter of right. 177 Ill.2d R. 315. Respondent cross-appealed.

II. ANALYSIS

The State first asserts that the minor respondent lacks standing to challenge the constitutionality of the solicitation statute since its sentencing provisions were inapplicable to him. The State also argues that the appellate court erred by concluding that the statute violates the proportionate penalties clause. In respondent's brief, he maintains that he has standing to raise his constitutional claims and that the statute violates the proportionate penalties clause both when the issue is analyzed under our prior cross-comparison analysis, previously used for comparing different offenses with similar purposes, and when it is reviewed by considering the severity of the penalties for offenses containing identical elements, relying in part on People v. Graves, 207 Ill.2d 478, 279 Ill.Dec. 502, 800 N.E.2d 790 (2003).

In respondent's cross-appeal, he reiterates the latter proportionate penalties arguments, as well as raising two other issues: (1) whether the indecent solicitation of an adult statute (720 ILCS 5/11-6.5 (West 2000)) may be properly applied to juvenile offenders; and (2) whether the statute is a facial violation of the due process clause of the United States and the Illinois constitutions (U.S. Const., amend. XIV; Ill. Const.1970, art. I, § 2). Respondent's latter contention is comprised of two discrete arguments. In these arguments, he contends the statute: (1) improperly turns misdemeanor conduct into a felony; and (2) does not contain the requirement of a culpable mental state or criminal purpose, thus potentially criminalizing innocent conduct. We first address the applicability of the statute to juvenile offenders because it presents an issue of statutory construction not implicating constitutional considerations that need not be addressed if the appeal may be resolved on other grounds. See People v. Lee, 214 Ill.2d 476, 482, 293 Ill.Dec. 267, 828 N.E.2d 237 (2005).

A. Application of the Solicitation Statute to Juvenile Offenders

Respondent contends that the indecent solicitation of an adult statute does not apply to juveniles because the legislature intended to protect minors by criminalizing the acts of adults who "arrange" sexual penetration or sexual conduct between adults and children. In support, respondent cites brief portions of the record in the state General Assembly indicating that the original impetus for the bill was the difficulty a State's Attorney experienced in prosecuting an adult who had lured juveniles into sexual encounters with other adults. From this, respondent generalizes that the statute was not intended to apply to juveniles who arrange similar contacts, relying on In re Detention of Lieberman, 201 Ill.2d 300, 307, 267 Ill.Dec. 81, 776 N.E.2d 218 (2002), for his approach to statutory interpretation. As an issue of statutory construction, respondent's argument is subject to de novo review. In re B.L.S., 202 Ill.2d 510, 514, 270 Ill.Dec. 23, 782 N.E.2d 217 (2002).

In Lieberman, this court reiterated our long-standing principle that the primary objective of a reviewing court is to determine and effectuate the intent of the legislature, subordinating all other rules of construction. Lieberman, 201 Ill.2d at 307, 267 Ill.Dec. 81, 776 N.E.2d 218. We emphasized that "`the most reliable indicator'" of that intent is the language selected by the legislature, given its plain and ordinary meaning. Lieberman, 201 Ill.2d at 308, 267 Ill.Dec. 81, 776 N.E.2d 218, quoting Michigan Avenue National Bank v. County of Cook, 191 Ill.2d 493, 504, 247 Ill.Dec. 473, 732 N.E.2d 528 (2000). In addition, we noted that specific provisions must be read in relation to the entire statute, with all words being construed in relation to other relevant sections. Whenever possible, each word should be construed to avoid rendering it superfluous. With those fundamental concepts in mind, we indicated that courts may sometimes consider both the statutory language and "the reason and necessity for the law, the evils sought to be remedied, and the purpose to be achieved." Lieberman, 201 Ill.2d at 308, 267 Ill.Dec. 81, 776 N.E.2d 218. We then examined whether the definition of "a `[s]exually violent offense'" as used in the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act (725 ILCS 207/1 et seq. (West 1998)) included the now-repealed crime of rape. Lieberman, 201 Ill.2d at 310, 267 Ill.Dec. 81, 776 N.E.2d 218.

In looking beyond the literal language of the statute, we explained that "`"[w]here the spirit and intent of the General Assembly in adopting an act are clearly expressed and its objects and purposes are clearly set forth, courts are not bound by the literal language of a particular clause which would defeat the obvious intent of the legislature."'" Lieberman, 201 Ill.2d at 312, 267 Ill.Dec. 81, 776 N.E.2d 218, quoting People v. McCoy, 63 Ill.2d 40, 45, 344 N.E.2d 436 (1976), quoting Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago v. Illinois State Toll Highway Comm'n, 42 Ill.2d 385, 395, 251 N.E.2d 253 (1969). Finding that the exclusion of a conviction for rape from the category of sexually violent offenses would "lead[ ] to absurd results and prejudice[ ] the public interest in keeping citizens safe from violent sexual offenders," we held that the legislature's omission of the repealed crime was an apparent oversight and that a contrary interpretation would "`frustrate the spirit of ...