People v. Lee

• Decision Date: 07 April 2005
• Docket Number: No. 97944.,97944.
• Citation: 293 Ill.Dec. 267,828 N.E.2d 237,214 Ill.2d 476
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. James LEE, Appellee.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

828 N.E.2d 237

214 Ill.2d 476

293 Ill.Dec. 267

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. James LEE, Appellee.

No. 97944.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

April 7, 2005.

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, Springfield, Jeff Tomczak, State's Attorney, Joliet (Gary Feinerman, Solicitor General, Linda D. Woloshin, Ira Kohlman, Assistant Attorneys General, Chicago, Norbert J. Goetten, Lawrence M. Bauer, Judith Z. Kelly, Office of the State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, Ottawa, of counsel), for the People.

Robert Agostinelli, Deputy Defender, Mark D. Fisher, Assistant Defender, Office of the State Appellate Defender, Ottawa, for appellee.

Justice FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

A divided panel of the appellate court held that the Joliet municipal offense of loitering for the purpose of engaging in drug-related activity was facially unconstitutional based on vagueness. As a result, the appellate court reversed the drug possession convictions of defendant, James Lee. 345 Ill.App.3d 782, 281 Ill.Dec. 236, 803 N.E.2d 640. Although we agree with the ultimate disposition, we do so on the more limited grounds that the arresting officers lacked probable cause to arrest defendant and, accordingly, do not reach the constitutional question.

BACKGROUND

Defendant was indicted in the circuit court of Will County on one count of unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver (720 ILCS 570/401(d) (West 2000)) and one count of unlawful possession of a controlled substance (720 ILCS 570/402(c) (West 2000)). Defendant filed a motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence, contending that there was no probable cause for his arrest.

The circuit court held a suppression hearing. The only witnesses who testified were Joliet police officers David Mueller and Guy Jones. The following evidence was adduced at the hearing. At approximately 2 p.m. on August 15, 2000, the officers received a dispatch instructing them to go to the corner of Second and Mississippi Streets. The officers were directed to investigate a citizen complaint regarding three males selling drugs at the corner. Officer Mueller had investigated prior complaints from that citizen. According to Mueller: "Most of them were well-founded." Also, the City had designated the area as "high-drug" and "high-gang."

The officers arrived at the area in a marked squad car and parked approximately two blocks away from the intersection of Second and Mississippi Streets. The officers observed defendant and the other two men for approximately three to five minutes. Officer Mueller testified that, upon his arrival at the scene, he saw the three men talking to the driver of a parked van. Mueller knew that defendant had previously been arrested for drug possession. Also, Mueller knew that one of the other two men with defendant, Willard May, was a member of a street gang. Officer Jones testified that the three men were standing on the corner when he saw the van pull up to the curb and park, and the three men approached the van and spoke to the driver.

The officers did not see an exchange of money or drugs. However, based on their experience, they believed that a drug transaction had taken place or was about to take place. When the van drove away, the officers approached the three men, who did not attempt to flee. A protective pat-down search did not disclose any weapons or contraband. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). However, the officers arrested defendant and the two other men for violating Joliet's drug-loitering ordinance.

The Joliet drug-loitering ordinance provides: "It is unlawful for any person to loiter in or near any thoroughfare, place open to the public, or near any public or private place in a manner and under circumstances manifesting the purpose to engage in drug-related activity," contrary to any "local, state or federal law prohibiting the manufacture, distribution, delivery, use, or possession of a controlled substance." Joliet Municipal Code § 21-10.1(a) (1990). Section (b) of the ordinance lists nine criteria as being "[a]mong the circumstances which may be considered in determining whether such purpose is `manifested'":

"(1) such person is a known unlawful drug user, possessor, or seller. * * *;

(2) such person is currently subject to an order prohibiting his or her presence in a high drug activity geographic area;

(3) such person behaves in such a manner as to raise a reasonable suspicion that he or she is about to engage in or is then engaged in an unlawful drug-related activity, including by way of example only, such person is acting as a `lookout';

(4) such person is physically identified by the officer as a member of a `gang' or association which has as its purpose illegal drug activity;

(5) such person transfers small objects or packages for currency in a furtive fashion;

(6) such person takes flight upon the appearance of a police officer;

(7) such person manifestly endeavors to conceal himself or herself or any object which reasonably could be involved in an unlawful drug-related activity;

(8) the area involved is by public repute known to be an area of unlawful drug use and trafficking; or (9) the premises involved are known to have been reported to law enforcement as a place suspected of drug activity." Joliet Municipal Code § 21-10.1(b) (1990).

Referring to the ordinance, Officers Mueller and Jones each testified that subsection (3) was present, in that defendant behaved in such a manner as to raise a reasonable suspicion that he was about to engage in or was then engaged in an unlawful drug-related activity; that subsection (8) was present, in that the area was known to be an area of unlawful drug use and trafficking; and that subsection (9) was present, in that the area had been reported to law enforcement as a place suspected of drug activity. In addition, Officer Mueller testified that subsection (4) was present, in that defendant was associating with May, a known member of a street gang which has as its purpose illegal drug activity. In addition to these criteria, Officer Mueller knew that defendant had been previously arrested for a drug offense. Officer Mueller testified that three criteria must be present to find a violation of the ordinance, while Officer Jones testified that two criteria must be present to find a violation.

Following the evidence, defense counsel argued both that the ordinance is unconstitutionally vague and that the officers lacked probable cause to arrest defendant. Without findings or any elaboration, the circuit court denied defendant's motion to suppress.

A jury trial was held at which substantially similar evidence was presented. The evidence also established that a search incident to defendant's arrest disclosed six baggies of cocaine totaling 0.8 grams in one of defendant's pants pockets. The jury convicted defendant of both offenses. The circuit court entered judgment on both offenses, but finding merger, sentenced defendant to a four-year prison term on the delivery conviction.

On appeal, a divided panel of the appellate court reversed defendant's convictions, holding that the Joliet drug-loitering ordinance was facially unconstitutional based on vagueness. 345 Ill.App.3d 782, 281 Ill. Dec. 236, 803 N.E.2d 640. Concurring in the judgment, Presiding Justice Holdridge opined that the ordinance is not unconstitutionally vague on its face. However, he was of the opinion that the police lacked probable cause to arrest defendant. Therefore, the justice agreed with the appellate court majority that defendant's convictions should be reversed. 345 Ill.App.3d at 788, 281 Ill.Dec. 236, 803 N.E.2d 640 (Holdridge, P.J., specially concurring).

We allowed the State's petition for appeal as a matter of right (134 Ill.2d R. 317). Additional pertinent background will be discussed in the context of the analysis of the issues.

ANALYSIS

In addition to seeking relief pertaining to trial and sentencing, defendant requested the appellate court to reverse the circuit court's denial of his motion to suppress, reverse his convictions, and vacate his sentence "for one or all of the following reasons." Defendant first argued that the Joliet drug-loitering ordinance was facially unconstitutional. Defendant next argued that "even if the ordinance was constitutional, the police lacked probable cause to arrest defendant for violating the ordinance."

The appellate court focused its analysis exclusively on defendant's constitutional challenge to the Joliet drug-loitering ordinance, concluding that the ordinance was facially unconstitutional based on vagueness. The court did not even mention that defendant raised alternative contentions. 345 Ill.App.3d at 784-88, 281 Ill.Dec. 236, 803 N.E.2d 640. The appellate court's invalidation of the ordinance was erroneous. A court should not compromise the stability of the legal system by declaring legislation unconstitutional when a particular case does not require it. Trent v. Winningham, 172 Ill.2d 420, 425, 217 Ill.Dec. 741, 667 N.E.2d 1317 (1996); see People v. Cornelius, 213 Ill.2d 178, 189, 290 Ill.Dec. 237, 821 N.E.2d 288 (2004).

While the constitutional question was sufficient for this court to review the appellate court judgment as a matter of right (134 Ill.2d R. 317), as we view the record, it is not necessary to determine the constitutionality of the Joliet drug-loitering ordinance. This court will not consider a constitutional question if the case can be decided on other grounds. People v. Nash, 173 Ill.2d 423, 432, 220 Ill.Dec. 154, 672 N.E.2d 1166 (1996); People v. Chiafreddo, 381 Ill. 214, 219, 44 N.E.2d 888 (1942). It is a court's duty to construe a statute so as to uphold its validity whenever reasonably possible. People v. Huddleston, 212 Ill.2d 107, 129, 287 Ill.Dec. 560, 816 N.E.2d 322 (2004). Because a court will avoid determining a constitutional question if the case can be resolved on other,...