In re Mack

Decision Date05 June 1935
Docket NumberNo. 22610.,22610.
Citation196 N.E. 197,360 Ill. 343
PartiesIn re MACK.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Information to disbar Louis W. Mack, attorney.

Respondent disbarred.

Charles M. Thomson, of Chicago, amicus curiae.

Joseph B. Lawler and C. Ray Smith, both of Chicago, for respondent.

FARTHING, Justice.

The disbarment of Louis W. Mack is recommended in the report and supplemental report filed in this cause by the committee on grievances of the Chicago Bar Association, acting as commissioners of this court.

Respondent's, Mack's, motion for leave to file certain additional exhibits and to make them part of the record as an appendix thereto was taken with the case. That motion is hereby allowed, and the releases executed by the complainants, who charged that respondent was guilty of unprofessional and unethical conduct, will be given whatever evidentiary value they afford to show the intention respondent had in retaining funds belonging to his clients.

None of the seven complaints were sworn to. Although three were filed before we entered the order of April 21, 1933, making the committee on grievances of the Chicago Bar Association commissioners of this court in disciplinary matters, the only hearing abstracted began with December 9 in that year. That order effected a change in procedure alone, and there is, therefore, no merit in the contention of respondent that the commissioners of this court were without jurisdiction because the complaints are not verified. In re Casey, 359 Ill. 496, 195 N. E. 39. However, we prefer to set out the facts with reference to the three earliest complaints lodged against respondent and to base the decision in this matter upon those charges filed after the order of April, 1933, was entered.

Louis W. Mack was licensed to practice law by this court on Cotober 18, 1909. Since that time he has practiced law in Chicago. On March 17, 1932, Walter C. Liebner, of Milwaukee, Wis., and Russel S. Diaz, of Chicago, executed a contract by which Liebner agreed to sell to Diaz Liebner's interests in land acquired under the foreclosure of a second mortgage. Diaz was to, and did, deposit with Mack $1,750 to be held by respondent as earnest money, conditioned upon the examination of title to the land by Diaz's attorney. The last of the $1,750 was deposited with Mack on March 9, 1932. On March 31, 1932, Diaz borrowed $250 of the earnest money from Mack, and on May 21, 1932, gave Liebner his note for this $250. This left $1,500 in respondent's hands. Diaz notified Mack of the arrangement with Liebner as to the $250, and on May 21, 1932, advised Mack that the latter would not represent Diaz thereafter in any matters whatsoever. Liebner and Diaz reached the point where Diaz was satisfied as to the title to the land covered by the second mortgage and was ready to close the purchase. Accordingly, Liebner demanded the remaining $1,500 of Mack on May 23, 1932. On this last named day respondent wrote to Liebner and Diaz stating that he would pay the $1,500 to Liebner on June 2, 1932. By the original report of the commissioners, dated December 12, 1933, it is found that respondent fraudulently converted this $1,500 and that he had failed and refused to pay it over to Liebner.

Respondent says that Diaz was acting for one Edgar C. Wilson, that Wilson and Liebner were not on good terms, and that the interest of Wilson in the purchase from Liebner was concealed from Liebner. Respondent also claims that many creditors of Diaz made claims against the $1,750 in his hands, and that he could not, on this account, pay the money to Liebner. It is not claimed that any garnishment or other process was ever served on Mack by any such creditor of Diaz. One of the exhibits allowed to be filed by Mack as an appendix is a release from Liebner, who received $1,000, and another is a release from Wilson, who received $250. Mack retained the other $250 out of the $1,500 in his hands. His objections to this complaint are that Liebner's attorney, Merritt C. Bragdon, Jr., signed it, that it was not sworn to or signed by Liebner, and that the complaint is stale.

The facts relative to the second complaint are that A. H. Meyer, of Oak Park, Ill., on June 21, 1927, employed respondent to collect two promissory notes from J. L. Barnard, one for $200 and the other for $1,729.01. With the notes was a life insurance policy as collateral. Respondent told Meyer from time to time that he was making an effort to collect and had forwarded the notes and policy to an attorney either in St. Paul or Minneapolis, where the debtor lived. Meyer demanded the return of the notes and insurance policy in June, 1930, and discharged Mack. Mack seems to have never returned these papers to Meyer. As a part of this complaint, there is also involved the payment of $89.27 to respondent by Meyer on March 13, 1928, covering the first installmentdue on Meyer's income tax for 1927. Respondent failed to pay this money to the internal revenue collector and had not repaid it to Meyer when the original report of the commissioners was filed herein. About May 1, 1928, Meyer also paid to Mack $379.63, which was the amount of the 1926 taxes on Meyer's home in Oak Park. The taxes levied on this property for 1927 amounted to $515.97. Mack was to pay the same amount as had been paid by Meyer for 1926 and was to protest against the remainder of the 1927 tax. Instead he retained the money, and as a result Meyer was compelled to redeem the property from a sale for delinquent taxes.

Respondent contends that he did not receive the money from Meyer, although Mack's indorsement appears on the check in evidence for $379.63. He says that one Fitzgerald did receive the money at Meyer's insistence; that Fitzgerald had a room in the same office suite with Mack but was not a member of his firm or an employee of Mack; and that Fitzgerald and Meyer, with a third man, robbed Mack's office and took the actual cash, $379.63, the notes, the insurance policy, and many other valuable papers. However, one of the exhibits in the appendix is a release from Meyer, for which Mack paid him $379.63.

The third complaint was based on a transaction in which Mack received $4,376 on December 5, 1928, with which to settle the accounts of the Jahn & Ollier Engraving Company and the Western Newspaper Union due from the American Homes Bureau. These creditors had agreed to accept 50 per cent. of their claims under a composition. Herbert Kent was named assignee under an assignment for the benefit of creditors, and he and these two creditors demanded that Mack turn the money over to him. Mack refused to put the money to its intended use and claimed that the fund was subject to his attorney fees. Finally, after repeated demands and some hearings before the committee on grievances, the fund was turned over to Kent on June 13, 1929.

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4 cases
  • Heirich, In re
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • June 15, 1956
    ...charge against him, was heard in his own behalf, and was deprived of no right to which he was entitled under the law. In re Mack, 360 Ill. 343, 196 N.E. 197. It is asserted that not every member of the commission voted upon the report submitted to the court. That was not essential. The majo......
  • Minnis v. Friend
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • June 5, 1935
  • In re Needham
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • October 7, 1936
    ...charge against him, was heard in his own behalf, and was deprived of no right to which he was entitled under the law. In re Mack, 360 Ill. 343, 196 N.E. 197. It is asserted that not every member of the commission voted upon the report submitted to the court. That was not essential. The majo......
  • In re Malmin
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • October 13, 1936
    ...re Grosso, 359 Ill. 243, 194 N.E. 514;In re Casey, 359 Ill. 496, 195 N.E. 39;In re Horwitz, 360 Ill. 313, 196 N.E. 208; In re Mack, 360 Ill. 343, 196 N.E. 197;In re Kolb, 362 Ill. 190, 199 N.E. 92), that the sufficiency of such proceedings to confer jurisdiction is no longer a debatable sub......

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