In re Maher's Estate

• Decision Date: 01 June 1938
• Docket Number: 26841.
• Citation: 79 P.2d 984,195 Wash. 126
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: In re MAHER'S ESTATE. v. MAHER et al. SCHMIDT et al.

79 P.2d 984

195 Wash. 126

In re MAHER'S ESTATE.

SCHMIDT et al. v. MAHER et al.

No. 26841.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

June 1, 1938

Appeal from Superior Court, King County; John R. Lyons, Judge pro tem.

Proceeding in the matter of the estate of Michael C. Maher, deceased wherein Margaret Maher and others claimed that they were entitled to the distribution of the estate. From the decree of distribution, M. G. Schmidt, administrator of the estate and the State of Washington appeal.

Affirmed.

C. T. Hardinger, of Seattle, for appellant Schmidt.

William H. Pemberton and Charles Snyder, both of Olympia, for the state.

Hyland Elvidge & Alvord, Monroe Watt, and Michael F. Ward, all of Seattle, for respondents.

BEALS Justice.

Michael Maher, or Michael C. Maher, a bachelor, a resident of King county, Washington, died, intestate, April 28, 1934, leaving estate in King county, subject to administration therein. After appropriate proceedings had, M. G. Schmidt was, May 11, 1934, appointed administrator of the estate, and thereafter qualified as such.

November 26, 1935, the administrator filed his final report, alleging that the estate was ready to be closed, and also filed his petition for distribution, in which it was alleged that the administrator had made diligent effort to discover the heirs at law of the decedent, but had been unable to find any such heirs. The administrator prayed that the estate be distributed 'as the court may order and direct,' and that he be discharged from his trust.

December 31, 1935, the date fixed for the hearing on the final account and petition for distribution, Margaret Maher, Martin Maher, Agnes Hudson and Julia Curtin appeared in the proceeding, claiming to be sisters and a brother of the decedent, and entitled to receive portions of his estate as heirs at law. The matter was continued from time to time, and during the month of June, 1936, John Maher, Mary Hessian and Robert William Rennie appeared, claiming that they were, respectively, a brother, a sister, and a nephew (a son of a deceased sister) of Michael Maher, and consequently heirs at law. Depositions on behalf of the various claimants were taken and filed in the proceeding. In due time the matter came on regularly to be heard Before the court, the final account was approved, and a decree entered distributing the estate to the seven persons above named, one-seventh to each.

The state of Washington appeared in the proceeding (through its supervisor of the inheritance tax and escheat division), claiming that the estate should escheat to the state, and, with the administrator, moved for a new trial. Upon the denial of their motions, the state and the administrator have prosecuted separate appeals from the decree of distribution.

Appellant supervisor has assigned error upon the admission in evidence of certain supplemental depositions of Mary Hessian and John Maher. Error is also assigned upon the refusal of the trial court to find that Michael Maher died without known heirs, and that his estate should escheat to the state of Washington, and upon the decree entered distributing the estate to the persons above named as heirs at law of the decedent. Respondents have appeared and filed a brief in support of the decree as entered.

Respondents move to dismiss the appeal of M. G. Schmidt, as administrator, upon the ground that, under the law and the facts of this case, appellant, as administrator, was not aggrieved by the decree, and has no right to appeal therefrom. August 14, 1937, the trial court entered, ex parte, an order authorizing and directing the administrator to appeal to this court from the decree of distribution which had been entered July 22, 1937, and further authorizing the administrator to deposit, out of the funds of the estate, the sum of $200, to stand as security for costs on the appeal which the court directed be taken. August 24th following, the administrator filed in the office of the county clerk his notice of appeal, which had been regularly served, and on the same day deposited the sum of $200 as a cash appeal bond.

The administrator has appeared in this court and filed briefs, urging only questions which concern the right of respondents to receive the estate of Michael Maher, as his heirs at law. The administrator presents no question concerning any debts due from the estate or fees or allowances due himself or his counsel.

In Re Sullivan's Estate, 48 Wash. 631, 94 P. 483, 95 P. 71, this court considered the appeals of several parties, including one taken by the administrator. Motions were made to dismiss the administrator's appeal, upon the ground that as administrator he had no appealable interest in the order appealed from, it being also contended that he, in his individual capacity, had taken no exception to a finding of the court to the effect that his final account had been settled. Considering the motion to dismiss, this court said (page 487): 'That account has, in the light of subsequent history, become other than a final account, although so called then and in this record. He is not precluded by that finding from asserting as an individual error as to the court's decree so far as it affects his relations to the estate since that so-called final account was filed and settled. As administrator he has an appealable interest, to the end that it is his duty to guard against the error of a distribution without some ample provision for all known obligations of the estate. The motions to dismiss the appeals are denied.'

Clearly, as stated by the court, it is the duty of an administrator to object to distribution of an estate until ample provision is made for the known debts due therefrom, and from an order failing to make an adequate provision for the payment of such debts, the administrator may appeal.

In re Welch's Estate, 106 Cal. 427, 39 P. 805, the supreme court of California, in considering a motion to dismiss an appeal taken by an administrator, said: 'A motion to dismiss is made, upon the ground that the appellant is not a party aggrieved, and in support of the motions are cited the numerous cases which decide that an executor or administrator has in general no such interest in the conflicting claims of heirs and devisees as will warrant his appeal from adjudications fixing their rights, and distributing the estate accordingly. [Citing cases.] The rule as declared by these cases does not admit of question. It is a sound proposition that administrators, general or special, like receivers and other trustees or custodians of funds for designated purposes, are not ordinarily affected by orders in reference to their disposition, and therefore will not be heard on appeal from such orders. But this rule has its well-defined limitations. Wherever an order or decree involves a construction of the proper exercise of the duties of the officer, wherever it presents a question as to the right or power of the trustee to comply with it, wherever obedience to it might subject him to liability, the rule does not operate.'

In the case last cited, the court properly stated the general rule, and correctly noted certain exceptions thereto, one of the exceptions being that recognized by this court In Re Sullivan's Estate, supra.

The general rule is that an administrator, as such, cannot appeal from a decree of distribution determining the persons who should receive an estate, either as heirs at law of the decedent or as distributees under a will. In re Cannon's Estate, 18 Wash. 101, 50 P. 1021; Cairns v. Donahey, 59 Wash. 130, 109 P. 334; In re Tucker's Estate, 116 Wash. 475, 199 P. 765.

The administrator relies upon the opinion of this court in Re Downings' Estates, 146 Wash. 154, 262 P. 235, in which is found this language (page 237): 'In the present case, while counsel for appellants had represented the administrator with the wills annexed throughout the probate proceeding, upon the entry of the order for a decree of distribution the administrator himself could have appealed, in order to obtain a proper distribution of the estate under the law, since it is his duty to guard against error in distribution. In re Sullivan's Estate, 48 Wash. 631, 94 P. 483, 95 P. 71.'

The language quoted was not necessary to the decision of any question presented in the case decided, as the administrator had not appealed. While it is the duty of the administrator 'to guard against error in distribution,' this duty extends no further than to see that all availablé evidence is fully and truthfully presented to the superior court at the hearing on the petition for distribution of the estate. When the superior court has determined that question, the duty of the administrator ends. The opinion of this court in Re Sullivan's Estate, supra, went no further than to hold that an administrator could appeal from an order of distribution which failed to make adequate provision for payment of the debts due from the estate. That is an entirely different question, and the opinion in Re Sullivan's Estate does not support the broad language, which is dicta merely, quoted from the opinion in Re Downings' Estates, supra. The language contained in the opinion in the Sullivan estate Case was explained in the opinion in Re Tucker's Estate, supra.

While it is the duty of an administrator to guard against error in the distribution of an estate, by exercising the greatest possible care to see that the names of the persons entitled under the law to receive the estate, either as heirs at law or legatees, are brought to the attention of the court, and that their names and respective interests are fully and correctly stated in the decree of distribution which is to be presented to the court for signature, when after a full...