In re Marriage of Best
| Decision Date | 20 November 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 2-05-1001.,No. 2-05-0947.,2-05-0947.,2-05-1001. |
| Citation | 307 Ill.Dec. 173,859 N.E.2d 173 |
| Parties | In re MARRIAGE OF Steven Richard Devore BEST, Petitioner and Counterrespondent-Appellant, and Angela K. Farlow Best, Respondent and Counterpetitioner-Appellee. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Charles J. Fleck, Celia G. Gamrath, Schiller, DuCanto & Fleck, Lake Forest, for Steven R. Devore Best.
Matthew E. Kaplan, Sara L. Roberts, Matthew Kaplan & Associates, Libertyville, for Angela K. Farlow Best.
In consolidated appeals, petitioner, Steven Richard Devore Best, seeks review of two orders entered in this action for the dissolution of his marriage to respondent, Angela K. Farlow Best. The court entered the first order in response to petitioner's "Motion for Declaratory Judgment" (and later, an "Amended Motion for Declaratory Judgment"). In the motion, petitioner asked the court to declare the validity of the parties' antenuptial agreement and to rule that it barred any support payment and any payment of attorney fees by one party for the other. The court ruled that the agreement was valid, but held that it barred support only after a decree of dissolution or legal separation. The court further held that the agreement did not bar payment of attorney fees for proceedings other than those strictly directed to the marriage relationship. In particular, the agreement did not bar fees incurred in litigation of child custody. Petitioner challenges this construction. We hold sua sponte that the court's entry of the declaratory judgment was error because it did not satisfy the requirement of the declaratory judgment statute (735 ILCS 5/2-701 (West 2004)) that the judgment terminate a controversy. Petitioner also challenges as contrary to the agreement an order refusing to vacate an order requiring him to reinstate respondent on his health insurance policy. Petitioner characterizes the order to reinstate insurance, correctly we deem, as an injunction. However, we hold that the trial court was correct in ruling that the agreement did not apply to interim support, and we therefore affirm the order refusing to vacate the order to reinstate insurance.
Petitioner filed a petition for dissolution of marriage on February 4, 2004, when the parties had been married about 13 months. They had a single infant child. On March 26, 2004, respondent filed a "Motion for Declaratory Judgment." As amended, it asserted that the parties had entered into an antenuptial agreement and asked the court to declare that the agreement was valid and, among other things, barred payment of support and of dissolution-related attorney fees by one spouse on behalf of the other. We will describe the language of the agreement in more detail as it becomes relevant. Respondent disputed the validity and effect of the antenuptial agreement.
The court heard testimony of both parties about the circumstances surrounding their making of the agreement. This too we will describe in greater detail later. On April 28, 2004, the court found that the agreement was enforceable and ordered petitioner to pay respondent $2,000 a month in unallocated support, as well as expenses for the marital residence, in which respondent and the child were living. The court also ruled that the bar on attorney fees applied only to fees incurred in the portion of the action that related strictly to dissolution and property division, and so did not bar fees for the custody portion of the action or for an order of protection action. It made a finding under Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (155 Ill.2d R. 304(a)) that no reason existed to delay enforcement or appeal of the order. Petitioner moved for reconsideration.
While petitioner's motion for reconsideration was pending, the court, on respondent's motion, entered an order requiring petitioner to reinstate respondent as a beneficiary of his health insurance policy. Two months later, petitioner moved to vacate that order, "pursuant to Section 2-1401 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure" (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2004)), asserting that the order was contrary to the antenuptial agreement. Respondent countered that the relevant part of the agreement was applicable only when the marriage was dissolved or when the parties had legally separated. The court, on August 8, 2005, denied petitioner's motion regarding the insurance order and his motion to reconsider the declaratory judgment. In a single order disposing of both matters, it agreed with respondent that dissolution or legal separation was necessary before the relevant sections of the agreement took effect, thus extending its declaratory judgment ruling. Petitioner timely appealed the declaratory judgment order. On October 6, 2005, respondent moved in this court for permission to file a late notice of appeal of the order of August 8, 2005 (that is, the order refusing to vacate the order that petitioner reinstate respondent's health insurance). This court granted that motion.
In supplemental briefing, which we ordered because the case raises significant jurisdictional issues, petitioner asserts that the order of April 28, 2004, was final because it resolved respondent's action for a declaratory judgment. He further asserts that the August 8, 2005, order is appealable as an order refusing to dissolve an injunction.
Initially, we consider the extent of our jurisdiction. We consider first the April 28 order. We hold that the court's declaratory judgment was appealable under Rule 304(a). However, by the terms of the declaratory judgment statute, a court errs in entering a declaratory judgment when the issue of the availability of nondeclaratory relief has fully ripened and the declaratory judgment thus does not terminate the controversy. Further, if a court enters a declaratory judgment and a Rule 304(a) goes on to rule on the same issues when deciding the availability of nondeclaratory relief, it allows the parties to evade the limits on interlocutory appeals. Therefore, we review sua sponte whether the declaratory judgment satisfies the termination-of-controversy requirement of the declaratory judgment statute. We find that the declaratory judgment did not, and we therefore reverse it. Next, we consider the proper classification of the order requiring petitioner to reinstate respondent's health insurance. We conclude that, although the function of that order was to provide interim support to respondent, it required petitioner to take specific action other than the payment of money, and thus we must treat it as an injunction. We therefore have jurisdiction to review the August 8 order (denying the motion to vacate the insurance order) as an order refusing to dissolve an injunction. The August 8 order raises the issue of the correctness of the trial court's ruling that the agreement did not bar support while the parties were neither divorced nor legally separated. We hold that one must construe the agreement to apply only after the parties are divorced or legally separated. We therefore affirm the trial court's decision to leave in place the order that required petitioner to reinstate respondent's health insurance.
We start with a review of our jurisdiction over the appeal of the declaratory judgment. Our inquiry has three parts. First, we consider whether the raising of certain rights in a declaratory judgment action creates a claim whose resolution is subject to separate appeal under Rule 304(a). Although we view this issue as problematic, we conclude that a separate declaratory judgment claim exists. Second, we consider whether petitioner's filing, entitled a "motion," was sufficient to raise the claim. We hold that, although petitioner should have raised the claim by amending his petition for dissolution, respondent waived that issue, and the claim was properly before the court. Third, we examine the mandate of the declaratory judgment statute that a court not enter such a judgment unless it terminates a part of the controversy. We hold that this requirement is critical to maintaining the jurisdictional distinction between interlocutory and final orders, and we therefore examine sua sponte whether the judgment met this requirement. We further hold that the judgment did not.
If an order resolves fewer than all of the claims pending in a proceeding, the order is not appealable unless the trial court makes a written finding that no just reason exists to delay appeal or enforcement of the order. 155 Ill.2d R. 304(a). However, if an order does not resolve an entire claim, it is not a final order, and a finding under Rule 304(a) cannot confer appealability on it. See, e.g., Revolution Portfolio, LLC v. Beale, 332 Ill.App.3d 595, 598-99, 266 Ill.Dec. 236, 774 N.E.2d 14 (2002). We therefore consider what claims were before the trial court.
If one does not consider a declaratory judgment action to raise a separate claim, then the only claim that was before the court was the dissolution claim. Typically, a dissolution action raises only one claim for purposes of Rule 304(a); all the issues decided in the action, such as support and child custody, are inseparable subparts of that claim. In re Marriage of Leopando, 96 Ill.2d 114, 118-20, 70 Ill.Dec. 263, 449 N.E.2d 137 (1983). Thus, matters of respondent's entitlement to interim support, at least absent a declaratory judgment action, were a part of this unified dissolution claim. A judgment resolving the dissolution claim is appealable only when the court issues the dissolution judgment.
Petitioner's appeal came earlier. Therefore, the appeal was proper under Rule 304(a) only if a declaratory judgment action raises a claim separate from claims for nondeclaratory relief pertaining to the same substantive right. We hold, with some trepidation, that a declaratory judgment action does raise such a separate...
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Universal Underwriters v. Judge & James
... ... In re Marriage of Best, 369 Ill.App.3d 254, 259, 307 Ill.Dec. 173, 859 N.E.2d 173, 180 (2006) ... 865 N.E.2d 540 ... Moreover, Supreme Court ... ...
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Marriage of Rosenbaum-Golden and Golden
... ... Prenuptial agreements are contracts, and the rules governing the interpretation of contracts apply to their interpretation. In re Marriage of Best, 369 Ill.App.3d 254, 265, 307 Ill.Dec. 173, 859 N.E.2d 173 (2006). "A court's primary goal in the construction of a contract is to decide and give effect to the intent of the parties as it is expressed through the words of the contract." Best, 369 Ill. App.3d at 266, 307 Ill.Dec. 173, 859 N.E.2d ... ...
- In re Marriage of Best, 2-05-0947.
- In re Marriage of Best