In re Marriage of Horner
| Decision Date | 24 June 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. 73540-9.,73540-9. |
| Citation | 151 Wash.2d 884,93 P.3d 124 |
| Parties | In the Matter of the MARRIAGE OF Lynn I. HORNER, Petitioner, and Joseph R. Horner, Respondent. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Catherine Wright Smith, Edwards Sieh Smith & Goodfriend PS, Seattle, Tonya Kowalski, Battle Ground, for petitioner.
Suzan L. Clark, Vancouver, for respondent.
Jill Diane Bowman, Seattle, for Amicus Curiae (Northwest Women's Law Center and Wash. State Coalition Against Domestic Violence).
In this child relocation case, the trial court denied relocation and the Court of Appeals affirmed, applying the abuse of discretion standard of review. We review this moot case because it presents issues of continuing and substantial public interest. We reverse the Court of Appeals because the trial court abused its discretion by denying relocation when neither its specific findings of fact nor its oral opinion indicate consideration and balancing of the 11 child relocation factors enumerated in RCW 26.09.520.
The legislature enacted Washington's child relocation act, RCW 26.09.405-.560, in 2000 (hereinafter CRA). Laws of 2000, ch. 21, § 1. The CRA shifts the analysis away from only the best interests of the child to an analysis that focuses on both the child and the relocating person. RCW 26.09.520. The CRA creates a rebuttable presumption that relocation will be permitted. Id. To rebut this presumption, an objecting party must demonstrate "that the detrimental effect of the relocation outweighs the benefit of the change to the child and the relocating person, based upon the following [child relocation] factors." Id. The factors are not weighted or listed in any particular order. Id. The factors consider:
A person who resides a majority of the time with a child initiates the relocation process by serving notice to all persons entitled to residential time or visitation with the child. RCW 26.09.430. Unless good cause is shown, the relocation is permitted if a person entitled to object does not file an objection within 30 days of his receipt of the notice of the relocation. RCW 26.09.500(1).
Less than six weeks after the parties' dissolution, petitioner notified respondent that she intended to relocate their daughter Natalie2 to Edmonds, Washington, so petitioner could care for her ill parents who resided in Edmonds. Respondent timely filed an objection asserting four arguments that loosely correlate to 4 of the 11 child relocation factors. Petitioner responded with a declaration asserting the benefits of the relocation.
During the hearing on the petition to relocate, respondent asked the trial court whether he should address the child relocation factors.3 The court did not respond and respondent did not discuss the factors. Similarly, the trial court did not discuss the child relocation factors in its oral ruling. The bulk of the ruling focused on the sibling relationship between Natalie and Kyle and the children's best interests in light of their split custody situation.
The trial court's order on objection to relocation/modification contained 14 findings of fact discussing the merits of the relocation. Findings 1 and 2 pertained to petitioner. Findings 3 though 11 focused on the sibling relationship between Natalie and Kyle and the children's best interests in light of their split custody situation. Findings 12 through 14 contained the court's ultimate conclusions and/or referenced important statutory language. Finding 12 stated "[t]he detrimental effects of the relocation outweigh the benefit of the change to the child and Petitioner." Clerk's Papers (CP) at 72. Finding 13 stated "[a]fter analysis of the factors for consideration outlined in RCW 26.09.520, the court has determined Respondent has rebutted the presumption that the relocation should be permitted." Id. Finding 14 stated "[f]or these reasons, Respondent's request for an order restraining Petitioner from changing the child Natalie's principle residence should be granted." Id. Accordingly, none of the findings specifically mentioned any of the child relocation factors, and the vast majority of the findings focused on the sibling relationship between Natalie and Kyle and the children's best interests in light of their split custody situation.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and a supplemental affidavit challenging many of the findings and reasserting the benefits of relocation. Respondent replied with a declaration refuting petitioner's challenges and assertions. The parties' submissions generally discussed the pros and cons of relocation, but failed to specifically mention RCW 26.09.520 and/or the child relocation factors. During oral argument on the motion for reconsideration, Respondent again asked whether he should address the child relocation factors and whether the court wished to enter additional findings on the factors.4 The court did not respond and respondent only briefly mentioned child relocation factors 1 and 3. The trial court denied petitioner's motion to reconsider in an oral ruling and a subsequent written order. Neither the ruling nor the order mentioned the child relocation factors, and the ruling again focused on the sibling relationship between Natalie and Kyle and the children's best interests in light of their split custody situation.
Petitioner appealed to Division Two. The Court of Appeals applied the abuse of discretion standard of review and affirmed holding "nothing in the record shows" that the trial court failed to consider the child relocation factors and that "[t]here is nothing in the statute or in the legislative history supplied by Lynn that requires a court to orally address each and every statutory factor on the record." In re Marriage of Horner, 114 Wash.App. 495, 501, 58 P.3d 317 (2002). This court granted the petition for review. In re Marriage of Horner, 149 Wash.2d 1027, 78 P.3d 656 (2003).
Before we granted review, Kyle turned 18, petitioner's parents recovered from their health problems, and petitioner, acting pro se, served respondent with a revised parenting plan and notice of her intent to relocate Natalie from Vancouver, Washington, to Atlanta, Georgia.5 The day after this court granted review, respondent timely filed an objection to the Atlanta relocation in Clark County Superior Court. Subsequently, petitioner alleged that she did not receive proper service of respondent's objection, obtained an ex parte order approving the relocation and the revised parenting plan, and relocated Natalie to Atlanta.6
A. Is the issue of what a trial court must do in a child relocation case with respect to the child relocation factors an issue of continuing and substantial public interest that this court should review although the case is moot?
B. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it failed to enter specific findings of fact or articulate in its oral opinion the child relocation factors?
A. The Trial Court's Failure To Enter Specific Findings or Articulate in its Oral Opinion the Child Relocation Factors Raises an Issue of Continuing and Substantial Public Interest that this Court Will Review Although this Case is Moot
"A case is moot if a court can no longer provide effective relief." Orwick v. City of Seattle, 103 Wash.2d 249, 253, 692 P.2d 793 (1984). As a general rule, this court will not review a moot case. Id. However, this court may review a moot case if it presents issues of continuing and substantial public interest. Westerman v. Cary, 125 Wash.2d 277, 286, 892 P.2d 1067 (1994) (quoting Sorenson v. City of Bellingham, 80 Wash.2d 547, 558, 496 P.2d 512 (1972)). In deciding whether a case presents issues of continuing and substantial public interest:
Three factors in particular are determinative: (1) whether the issue is of a public or private nature; (2) whether an authoritative determination is desirable to provide future guidance to public officers; and (3) whether the issue is likely to recur. A fourth factor may also play a role: the level of genuine adverseness and the quality of advocacy of the issues. Lastly, the court may consider the likelihood that the issue will escape review because the facts of the controversy are short-lived.
Id. at 286-87, 892 P.2d 1067 (citations and quotation marks omitted).
This...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Satomi Owners Ass'n v. Satomi, LLC
...moot by settlement among the parties). ¶ 17 "As a general rule, this court will not review a moot case." In re Marriage of Horner, 151 Wash.2d 884, 891, 93 P.3d 124 (2004) (citing Orwick v. City of Seattle, 103 Wash.2d 249, 253, 692 P.2d 793 (1984)). "However, this court may review a moot c......
-
Landstar Inway, Inc. v. Doe
...if its “ ‘decision is manifestly unreasonable or based upon untenable grounds or reasons.’ ” in rE marriage oF horner, 151 wash.2d 884, 893, 93 P.3d 124 (2004) (quoting State v. Brown, 132 Wash.2d 529, 572, 940 P.2d 546 (1997)). A trial court's “decision is manifestly unreasonable if it is ......
-
Underwood v. Underwood
...enter written findings on each factor or make an oral ruling supported by substantial evidence on each factor. In re Marriage of Horner, 151 Wash.2d 884, 896, 93 P.3d 124 (2004). “[T]he trial court has discretion to grant or deny a relocation after considering the RCW 26.09.520 relocation f......
-
Blomstrom v. Tripp
...that order. In this context, it is not clear how a reviewing court could " ‘provide effective relief.’ " In re Marriage of Horner, 151 Wash.2d 884, 891, 93 P.3d 124 (2004) (quoting Orwick v. City of Seattle, 103 Wash.2d 249, 253, 692 P.2d 793 (1984) ). The claim is thus moot.¶28 The petitio......
-
Table of Cases
...v., 137 Wn. App. 441, 154 P.3d 250 (2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48.07[2] Horner, In re Marriage of, 151 Wn.2d 884, 93 P.3d 124 (2004) . . . . . . . . 24.04[3][b]; 47.03[13]; 65.03[4] Hoseth, In re Marriage of, 115 Wn. App. 563, 63 P.3d 164 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......
-
§52.6 Analysis
...for finding on reasons for deviation from minimum need standard under RCW 26.19.075(2)-(4)). In re Marriage of Horner, 151 Wn.2d 884, 93 P.3d 124 (2004). The Washington Supreme Court held that a trial court must consider all the statutory factors in the Child Relocation Act, RCW 26.09.405-.......
-
Table of Cases
...Fed. Way, 110 Wn. App. 204, 39 P.3d 366, review denied, 147 Wn.2d 1005 (2002): 21.4(1), 21.4(4) Horner, In re Marriage of, 151 Wn.2d 884, 93 P.3d 124 (2004): 12.9(6), 13.3 Hotel Emps. & Rest. Emps., Local 8 v. Jensen, 51 Wn. App. 676, 754 P.2d 1277 (1988): 9.13 Hough v. Ballard, 108 Wn. App......
-
§24.04 General Principles
...to address and provide evidence related to the 11 factors enumerated in RCW 26.09.520. See In re Marriage of Horner, 151 Wn.2d 884, 894, 93 P.3d 124 (2004); Bay v. Jensen, 147 Wn. App. 641, 196 P.3d 753 (2008) (holding that the trial court abused its discretion by granting an order allowing......