In re Marriage of De Guigne

• Decision Date: 30 April 2002
• Docket Number: No. A091882.,A091882.
• Citation: 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 430,97 Cal.App.4th 1353
• Parties: In re the MARRIAGE OF Christian and Vaughn de GUIGNE. Christian de Guigne, Appellant, v. Vaughn de Guigne, Respondent.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

119 Cal.Rptr.2d 430

97 Cal.App.4th 1353

In re the MARRIAGE OF Christian and Vaughn de GUIGNE Christian de Guigne, Appellant, v. Vaughn de Guigne, Respondent.

No. A091882.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 3.

April 30, 2002.

Rehearing Denied May 24, 2002.

Fancher & Wickland, Paige Leslie Wickland, San Francisco; Norris & Rossi LLP, Lana L. Norris for Appellant and Plaintiff.

Hersh Family Law Practice, P.C., Jill Hersh and Jenny Wald, for Defendant and Respondent.

CORRIGAN, J.

Here we hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion in setting child and spousal support amounts that exceed Appellant's total monthly income. Substantial evidence supports the conclusion that Appellant's extensive property holdings and the existence of special circumstances permit a deviation from codified support guidelines.

Appellant contends that the trial court exceeded its authority by effectively forcing him to sell his ancestral home and other inherited separate property to perpetuate an excessive level of marital spending. Appellant asserts that the trial court also erred in ordering him to make additional support payments for certain housing and educational expenses.

We modify the judgment as to the additional payments ordered, but otherwise affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Facts

Christian and Vaughn de Guigne were married in 1984, when Christian was 47 years old and Vaughn was 30.¹ They have two children: Allison, born in 1985, and Eleanor, born in 1989. The couple separated in November, 1996.

Christian was born into wealth and social prominence. His family home is a 16,000 square foot Hillsborough mansion built by his grandfather in 1918. The residence is surrounded by 47½ acres of land containing hiking trails, streams, wildlife, and gardens, in a setting of extraordinary quiet and privacy. The house has multiple bedrooms, 11 bathrooms, a ballroom, pavilion, formal dining room, library, and swimming pool. It contains valuable artwork, jewelry, furnishings and other items of personal property collected by Christian's parents and grandparents.

When Christian and Vaughn met in the early 1980's, Christian was not employed and had not worked since 1972. He relied on income from securities and family trusts. From 1964 to 1984, he lived in a Telegraph Hill house purchased with money from his father. Vaughn was also born in Hillsborough in very comfortable circumstances. However, due to her parents' divorce, Vaughn's standard of living was reduced when she was a teenager. Although she had a Masters Degree in Art Therapy when she met Christian, Vaughn was doing part-time volunteer work and was supported by a stock portfolio established by her father.

Christian inherited the Hillsborough property and its contents. He and Vaughn moved into the mansion shortly before their marriage and lived there together until Christian moved out in 1996. The family maintained an opulent lifestyle. The house was staffed by two housekeepers, three gardeners, a laundress, chef, childcare provider and a part-time chauffeur. The de Guignes frequently took costly vacations, and maintained multiple club memberships. The children attended private school and engaged in extracurricular activities including horseback riding, tennis and piano lessons, various other sports activities, and overnight camps. Vaughn purchased expensive clothing for herself and the girls, and incurred significant monthly expenses for personal services such as hair care, makeup and massage.

According to Vaughn, Christian insisted on a lifestyle similar to that enjoyed by his parents and expected Vaughn to emulate the very high standards of dress and fashion set by his mother. Christian strenuously disputed this assertion and recounted unsuccessful attempts to curtail his wife's spending. It is clear, however, that neither parent worked and the court found that annual household expenses averaged $450,000, consistently exceeding Christian's annual income of $240,000 from securities holdings and family trusts. Christian had sole control over the family finances and consistently liquidated his separate property assets during the marriage. Between 1986 and 1997, Christian withdrew over $4 million from his securities account. He also sold an antique knife collection for $425,000 and his Telegraph Hill house for $725,000. Some of the proceeds were used to meet household expenses.

The marriage generated no community property. Christian testified that his separate property Hillsborough estate was worth $8.5 million. Vaughn's appraisal experts placed the value at $25-30 million if the house and land were sold as a unit. According to expert testimony, the value of the home on 7½ acres would be $7.5 to $10 million, and the remaining 40 acres would be worth $15 million or more. The real estate is by far Christian's most significant asset. The corpus of Christian's primary family trust was valued at an estimated $3.8 million at the time of trial, but these assets are not under Christian's control. Vaughn's securities account was worth $260,000 at the time of trial.

Support Orders

The issues of child and spousal support were tried before a retired judge sitting pro tempore by stipulation of the parties. Vaughn sought an award of child and spousal support in excess of $32,000 per month, in addition to the costs of housing and household help which she contemplated would be added to Christian's support obligation once her permanent residence was determined. Applying statutory guidelines to his annual trust and securities income of $240,000, Christian requested an order for child support of $4,844 per month and monthly spousal support of $6,706. In addition, he expressed a willingness to pay for the children's tuition and other education expenses. Subject to certain conditions, he proposed that Vaughn and the children remain in the Hillsborough residence, with reduced household staff. On his income and expense declaration, Christian listed his own monthly living expenses as $13,313. This sum included $1,470 for dues in six private clubs.

The trial court ordered Christian to pay $15,000 per month in child support and $12,500 per month in spousal support beginning when Vaughn

[97 Cal.App.4th 359]

obtained rental housing. The court also required Christian to pay all the children's private school tuition and tutoring expenses, and to pay Vaughn a lump sum of $30,000 to cover rental deposits and furniture purchases. A judgment of dissolution in accordance with these terms was entered in May 2000, and this timely appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

I. Appealability

Vaughn challenges our jurisdiction to hear Christian's appeal under Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1. According to Vaughn, the judgment is neither final nor appealable because it includes a provision specifying that Vaughn's prospective move into rental housing might constitute a changed circumstance warranting modification of support. Initially, the trial court expressed reluctance to set permanent support terms without knowing what Vaughn and the children's actual expenses would be. The modification provision incorporated in the final judgment addresses this uncertainty.

Inclusion of this language does not render the judgment non-appealable. The judgment created enforceable rights and obligations modifiable as provided by statute. Any support judgment may be modified in light of changed circumstances. (See Fam.Code, § 3651.)² In any event, even temporary support orders are appealable. (In re Marriage of Skelley (1976) 18 Cal.3d 365, 367-368, 134 Cal.Rptr. 197, 556 P.2d 297.) The judgment in this case was final in form and substance, and thus appealable.

II. Child Support

A. Background

Statutory guidelines regulate the determination of child support in California. (See §§ 4050-203; In re Marriage of Fini (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1040, 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 749.) The guideline amount of child support, calculated by applying a mathematical formula to the relative incomes of the parents, is presumptively correct. (See §§ 4055, 4057, subd. (a).) That presumption may be rebutted by "admissible evidence showing that application of the formula would be unjust or inappropriate in the particular case, consistent with the principles set forth in Section 4053 ...."(§ 4057, subd. (b).)

Section 4053 makes clear that the court's paramount concern in adhering to or departing from the guideline amount must be the interests of the children: "(a) A parent's first and principal obligation is to support his or her minor children according to the parent's circumstances and station in life[;][¶] (b) Both parents are mutually responsible for the support of their children[;][¶] ... [¶] (d) Each parent should pay for the support of the children according to his or her ability[;][¶] (e) The guideline seeks to place the interests of children as the state's top priority[;][¶] (f) Children should share in the standard of living of both parents. Child support may therefore appropriately improve the standard of living of the custodial household to improve the lives of the children...."

Here, the court awarded child support in an amount three times greater than the guideline provides, citing section 4057, subdivision (b)(5) as the basis for this departure. That provision permits a deviation from the guideline if the court finds that "[application of the formula would be unjust or inappropriate due to the special circumstances of the particular case." The question, then, is whether special circumstances support the deviation here.

The court found that a $4,844 per monthly child support award would subvert the overriding principle behind the support guideline. It would not serve the interests of the de Guigne children, which must remain paramount. Those interests were best protected, the court found, by shielding the children as much as possible from a drastic reduction in their standard of living. The order was not intended to maintain...