In re Marriage of Rassier

• Decision Date: 22 March 2002
• Docket Number: No. B145310.,B145310.
• Citation: 118 Cal.Rptr.2d 113,96 Cal.App.4th 1431
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: In re MARRIAGE OF Barbara J. and Patrick J. RASSIER. Barbara J. Rassier, Appellant, v. Patrick J. Rassier, Respondent.

118 Cal.Rptr.2d 113

96 Cal.App.4th 1431

In re MARRIAGE OF Barbara J. and Patrick J. RASSIER.

Barbara J. Rassier, Appellant, v. Patrick J. Rassier, Respondent.

No. B145310.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 5.

March 22, 2002.

Review Denied June 19, 2002.

Michael L. Guisti for Appellant.

Loring M. Myers, Mahattan Beach, for Respondent.

MOSK, J.

INTRODUCTION

Appellant Barbara J. Rassier appeals from an order by the Los Angeles Superior Court modifying a spousal support obligation imposed upon respondent Patrick J. Rassier by order of a Florida court in a 1985 Florida dissolution of marriage judgment. Because we hold that notwithstanding that neither of the parties now resides in Florida, a California court does not have the power to modify a spousal support order issued by the Florida court, we reverse the modification order.

BACKGROUND

Barbara and Patrick¹ were married in 1968, separated in 1984, and divorced in 1985. At the time of their divorce, both Barbara and Patrick were residents of Florida; therefore, the dissolution proceedings were in a Florida court. The Florida court ordered Patrick to pay Barbara "permanent" spousal support of $900 per month, which support would terminate only upon Barbara's or Patrick's death or Barbara's remarriage.

Sometime after the divorce, Barbara moved to Guam and Patrick moved to California. In November 1998, Patrick stopped making his spousal support payments. In October 1999, Barbara registered, and sought to enforce, the Florida spousal support order in Los Angeles Superior Court, because at that time Patrick was a resident of Los Angeles County. The superior court issued a wage and earnings assignment order that ordered Patrick's employer to withhold a portion of Patrick's earnings and to pay the withheld earnings to Barbara through the Office of the Court Trustee.

In February 2000, Patrick filed an order to show cause in the same proceeding, asking the superior court to terminate the Florida court's spousal support order. Barbara opposed Patrick's request on the ground that the California court does not have jurisdiction to modify or terminate the Florida court's order, citing California Family Code sections 4909, subdivision (f), and 4910, subdivision (c).² The superior court granted Patrick's request and ordered Patrick's spousal support obligation reduced to $0 per month, holding that Florida no longer had exclusive and continuing jurisdiction over either party because neither party resided in Florida.

On appeal, Barbara contends that the superior court's order modifying the spousal support must be reversed because (1) under section 4909, subdivision (f), the court was precluded from modifying or terminating the order, (2) under the principle of comity, the California court must defer to the Florida court's jurisdiction over the order, and (3) even if the superior court had the power to modify or terminate the spousal support order, the court abused its discretion in reducing the award to zero. Because we hold that that section 4909, subdivision (f), precludes the modification of the Florida spousal support order and thus requires reversal of the superior court's order modifying the spousal support obligation, we need not address Barbara's other contentions.

DISCUSSION

Subdivision (f) of section 4909 provides, in relevant part: "A tribunal of this state may not modify a spousal support order issued by a tribunal of another state having continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over that order under the law of that state." Thus, the superior court, as a "tribunal of this state" (Fam.Code, § 4902), was precluded by statute from modifying the Florida spousal support order if Florida, under its law, has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over the order. It does.

Subdivision (6) of Florida Statutes section 88.2051, which enactment is part of the Florida Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, provides, in relevant part: "A tribunal of this state [Florida] issuing a support order consistent with the law of this state has continuing exclusive jurisdiction over a spousal support order throughout the existence of the support obligation." Although the Florida Uniform Interstate Support Act was not in effect at the time the Florida court issued the original spousal support order in this case, Florida courts have determined that the act "applies to all proceedings for support or for modification of support orders ... commenced on or after [July 1, 1997]." (Department of Revenue ex rel. Cascella v. Cascella (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2000) 751 So.2d 1273, 1274, emphasis added; see also Department of Revenue ex rel Sloan v. Sloan (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1999) 743 So.2d 1131, 1133, fn. 3.) Therefore, Florida Statutes section 88.2051 applies to Patrick's request to terminate the spousal support order; and California Family Code section 4909, subdivision (f) precludes the superior court from modifying the Florida spousal support order because, under Florida Statutes section 88.2051, the Florida court that issued the support order has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over the order.

Even if the law in effect at the time of the Florida spousal support order did control whether the Florida court has continuing exclusive jurisdiction over the order, the result is the same. Florida Statutes section 61.14, as it read in 1985, provided in relevant part:

(1) [W]hen a party is required by court order to make any payments, and the circumstances or the financial ability of either party has changed[,] ... either party may apply to the circuit court of the circuit ... in which the order was rendered, for a judgment decreasing or increasing the amount of support, maintenance, or alimony, and the court has jurisdiction to make orders as equity requires .... [¶] (2) ... No person shall commence, or cause to be commenced, as party or attorney or agent or otherwise, in behalf of either party in any court, an action or proceeding otherwise than as herein provided, nor shall any court have jurisdiction to entertain any action or proceeding otherwise than as herein provided to enforce the recovery of separate support, maintenance, or alimony otherwise than pursuant to the order.

(Historical and Statutory Notes, 5A West's Fla. Stat. Ann. (1997 ed.) § 61.14, p. 62.) Thus, under Florida law as it existed at the time of the spousal support order, the Florida court that issued the order has continuing jurisdiction to modify or terminate the support obligation for as long as the obligation exists (under subdivision (1)), and that jurisdiction is exclusive (under subdivision (2)).

The superior court's conclusion that Florida no longer had exclusive and continuing jurisdiction over the parties because neither party resided in Florida is immaterial to whether a California court may modify a Florida spousal support order. As noted above, California law prohibits a California court from modifying a spousal support order issued by a court in another state when, as in this case, the court in that other state has continuing exclusive jurisdiction over the order. Thus, whether the parties reside in the issuing state at the time modification is sought is of no consequence.

In any event, the superior court's conclusion that Florida no longer had jurisdiction over the parties is incorrect with respect to the modification of the Florida spousal support order, because the Florida court has the power to retain and retains exclusive jurisdiction over the parties in and for the dissolution proceeding by virtue of its jurisdiction over its support order. It is well-established that once a court obtains personal jurisdiction over a party in an action, jurisdiction over the party continues for subsequent proceedings that arise out of that action. (See, e.g., Rest.2d Conf. Of Laws (Rev. May 19, 1988) § 26 ["If a state obtains judicial jurisdiction over a party to an action, the jurisdiction continues throughout all subsequent proceedings which arise out of the original claim"]; Michigan Trust Co. v. Ferry (1913) 228 U.S. 346, 353, 33 S.Ct. 550, 57 L.Ed. 867 ["if a judicial proceeding is begun with jurisdiction over the person of the party concerned it is within the power of a State to bind him by every subsequent order in the cause"].)

As the comments to section 26 of the Restatement Second of Conflict of Laws explain, "[t]he continuance of a state's judicial jurisdiction, once such jurisdiction has been obtained, is not dependent upon the constant existence of some jurisdictional basis. Such a basis must exist at the initiation of the proceeding; it need not continuously do so thereafter." (Rest.2d Conf. of Laws, supra, § 26, com. a, p. 24.) Once a court obtains jurisdiction over the parties in an action and enters an order in that action, the court retains jurisdiction to vacate, reverse, or modify that order even if there is no other basis for jurisdiction over the parties at that time, such as when the parties move out of the state in which the court is located, and even if there has been a lapse of many years between the issuance of the order and the request for modification. (Id. at com. b, p. 25.)³

In this case, the Florida court obtained jurisdiction over Patrick and Barbara at the time of the original marital dissolution proceeding that resulted in the spousal support order at issue. Despite the passage of time...