In re Marriage of Chehaiber

• Decision Date: 18 September 2009
• Docket Number: No. 2-08-0375.,No. 2-08-1030.,2-08-0375.,2-08-1030.
• Citation: 917 N.E.2d 5,334 Ill.Dec. 408
• Parties: In re MARRIAGE OF Manheir CHEHAIBER, Petitioner-Appellee and Cross-Appellant, and Millijana Vlastelica, Respondent-Appellant and Cross-Appellee. In re Marriage of Manheir Chehaiber, Petitioner-Appellee, and Millijana Vlastelica, Respondent-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

917 N.E.2d 5

334 Ill.Dec. 408

In re MARRIAGE OF Manheir CHEHAIBER, Petitioner-Appellee and Cross-Appellant, and Millijana Vlastelica, Respondent-Appellant and Cross-Appellee In re Marriage of Manheir Chehaiber, Petitioner-Appellee, and Millijana Vlastelica, Respondent-Appellant.

No. 2-08-0375.

No. 2-08-1030.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District.

September 18, 2009.

Rehearing Denied October 19, 2009.

William J. Harte, Joan M. Minnix, William J. Harte, Ltd., Chicago, IL, for Appellant.

Stephen R. Botti, Jamie L. Ryan, Botti Marinaccio, Ltd., Oak Brook, IL, for Appellee.

Justice O'MALLEY delivered the opinion of the court:

Respondent, Millijana Vlastelica, appeals the trial court's order resolving several postdissolution matters between her and her former husband, petitioner, Manheir Chehaiber. Petitioner cross-appeals the trial court's order altering the parties' schedule for visitation with their minor child, Kristian. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Although we are able to dispose of respondent's arguments in an unpublished portion of this opinion, petitioner's argument on cross-appeal presents an issue for which we see no controlling precedent. In his cross-appeal, petitioner argues that we should vacate the trial court's order modifying visitation, because the order constitutes a restriction on his visitation rights without the statutorily required finding that the restriction was necessary to avoid endangering the parties' child.¹ To support his argument, petitioner invokes section 607(c) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Act), which provides as follows:

"The court may modify an order granting or denying visitation rights of a parent whenever modification would serve the best interest of the child; but the court shall not restrict a parent's visitation rights unless it finds that the visitation would endanger seriously the child's physical, mental, moral, or emotional health." 750 ILCS 5/607(c) (West 2008). Petitioner argues that, when the trial court modified the parties' visitation schedule, it also restricted his visitation, because the modified schedule afforded him less visitation—certainly less overnight visitation—than did the prior schedule. Respondent counters that the trial court only modified petitioner's visitation. The parties thus ask us to interpret section 607(c) of the Act to determine the distinction, if any, between a modification of visitation and a restriction on visitation. In construing a statute, a court's primary goal is to determine the intent of the legislature, and the best indicator of that intent is the plain language of the statute in question. In re Marriage of Best, 228 Ill.2d 107, 116, 319 Ill.Dec. 815, 886 N.E.2d 939 (2008). If the plain language of a statute is clear, a court must apply it without resort to other aids of construction. Best, 228 Ill.2d at 116, 319 Ill.Dec. 815, 886 N.E.2d 939.

The plain language of section 607(c) provides no immediate resolution to the parties' dispute. As the above-quoted language indicates, section 607(c) sets out a best-interest-of-the-child standard to govern a court's decision on whether to "modify" visitation, but it requires a showing that the child is endangered for a court to "restrict" visitation. The word "modify" generally means, among other things, "to make more temperate and less extreme" or "to make minor changes in the form or structure of: alter without transforming." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1452 (1986). As other cases have noted, the word "restrict" generally means "`to keep within certain limits'" (Gibson v. Barton, 118 Ill.App.3d 576, 580, 74 Ill. Dec. 252, 455 N.E.2d 282 (1983), quoting Webster's New World Dictionary 1213 (2d col. ed.1976)) or to "limit, restrain, or confine within bounds" (In re Marriage of Solomon, 84 Ill.App.3d 901, 907, 40 Ill.Dec. 197, 405 N.E.2d 1289 (1980), citing Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1937 (1971)). Although there is generally a distinction between these two terms, in the context of an order affecting parties' previously set visitation rights, the terms are, for all practical purposes, synonymous. Any modification of a visitation order will restrict at least one party's visitation in a way it had not previously been restricted, and any new restriction on a party's visitation rights will necessarily constitute a modification of the visitation schedule. However, as respondent argues, it cannot be that the legislature intended the two terms to be coextensive, because it provided a different standard to apply to each action.

Most of the Illinois cases that have considered the distinction between an order to "modify" visitation and an order to "restrict" visitation have cited a litany of examples of restrictions and modifications but stopped short of offering an explanation for why the examples fit one description but not the other. A typical case, In re Marriage of Lee, 246 Ill.App.3d 628, 186 Ill.Dec. 257, 615 N.E.2d 1314 (1993), explains the distinction as follows:

"A restriction of visitation is an action which limits, restrains, or confines visitation within bounds. A termination of visitation is a restriction, as is a prohibition on overnight visitation. Likewise, a requirement that visitation be supervised, occur in the home of the custodial parent, or outside the home of the noncustodial parent is a restriction. However, eliminating one day from a weekend visitation or shortening a summer visitation due to the activities of the child is not a restriction." Lee, 246 Ill. App.3d at 645, 186 Ill.Dec. 257, 615 N.E.2d 1314, citing In re Marriage of LaTour, 241 Ill.App.3d 500, 504, 181 Ill. Dec. 865, 608 N.E.2d 1339 (1993) (collecting cases).

See also In re Marriage of Tisckos, 161 Ill.App.3d 302, 310, 112 Ill.Dec. 860, 514 N.E.2d 523 (1987); Gibson, 118 Ill.App.3d at 580, 74 Ill.Dec. 252, 455 N.E.2d 282. These examples shed some light on the distinction between "modified" and "restricted" visitation, but they do not explicitly state the reasoning behind the distinction. Our applying the above examples without an understanding of the legislature's purpose in drawing the distinction would amount to no better than a blind guess as to whether our application matches the legislative intent. In order to have any confidence that our decision reflects the legislature's intent, we must reach some understanding of the purpose underlying the modify-restrict distinction in section 607(c) of the Act.

That understanding would prove elusive if we were confined to consulting the language of only section 607(c). However, we are not so confined. A court looking to the language of a statute to ascertain legislative intent should evaluate the statute as a whole; the language within each section of a statute must be examined in light of the entire statute. Henrich v. Libertyville High School, 186 Ill.2d 381, 387, 238 Ill.Dec. 576, 712 N.E.2d 298 (1998). When we add the context of the remainder of section 607 of the Act, specifically section 607(a), the legislative intent embodied in section 607(c) begins to emerge.

Section 607(a) of the Act, which governs a court's initial visitation determination, provides as follows, in pertinent part:

"A parent not granted custody of the child is entitled to reasonable visitation rights unless the court finds, after a hearing, that visitation would endanger seriously the child's physical, mental, moral or emotional health." 750 ILCS 5/607(a) (West 2008).

Section 607(a) thus ensures a noncustodial parent's right to reasonable visitation, "unless the court finds, after a hearing, that visitation would endanger seriously the child's physical, mental, moral or emotional health." This quoted language is echoed precisely in section 607(c)'s description of the circumstances under which a court may "restrict" a parent's visitation rights. See 750 ILCS 5/607(c) (West 2008) (court cannot restrict rights "unless it finds that the visitation would endanger seriously the child's physical, mental, moral or emotional health"). We cannot attribute this similarity to coincidence; it must reflect a conscious choice on the part of the legislature to equate the decision to restrict a parent's already-awarded visitation with the decision to deny the parent reasonable visitation in the first place. Cf. Guillen v. Potomac Insurance Co., 203 Ill.2d 141, 152, 271 Ill.Dec. 350, 785 N.E.2d 1 (2003) (where the same words appear in different parts of the same statute, they generally should be given the same interpretation).

Indeed, although we find no Illinois cases directly explaining the distinction between the terms "modify" and "restrict" as they are used in section 607(c), many opinions imply that the "restrict" portion of section 607(c) is a specific application of the general rule stated in section 607(a), that the noncustodial parent should be given reasonable visitation unless doing so would endanger the child. See In re Marriage of Diehl, 221 Ill.App.3d 410, 428-29, 164 Ill.Dec. 73, 582 N.E.2d 281 (1991) (saying that section 607(a) of the Act states "the general rule" for visitation and that "[s]ection 607(c) provides the rule for requests to modify a pre-existing visitation order"); Crichton v. Crichton, 75 Ill. App.3d 326, 328, 31 Ill.Dec. 12, 393 N.E.2d 1319 (1979) (quoting sections 607(a) and 607(c) together); cf. In re Marriage of Ashby, 193 Ill.App.3d 366, 378, 140 Ill.Dec. 272, 549 N.E.2d 923 (1990) (section 607(c)'s requirement that endangerment be shown before a restriction may be imposed "states a strong public policy designed to preserve the relationship of parent and child"); In re Marriage of Neat, 101 Ill. App.3d 1046, 1048, 57 Ill.Dec. 413, 428 N.E.2d 1093 (1981) (the endangerment standard contained in section 607(a) is deliberately more stringent than the best-interest standard, in order to protect parents' entitlement to visitation).

By placing ...