In re Marriage of Woolley, 00CA0128.
Citation | 25 P.3d 1284 |
Decision Date | 10 May 2001 |
Docket Number | No. 00CA0128.,00CA0128. |
Parties | In re the MARRIAGE OF Michael B. WOOLLEY, Appellee, and Sheila D. Woolley, Appellant. |
Court | Court of Appeals of Colorado |
Jeffrey S. English & Associates, Jeffrey S. English, Lakewood, CO, for Appellee.
Donald Chad Goldy, Denver, CO, for Appellant.
Opinion by JUDGE NEY
In this post-dissolution proceeding, Sheila D. Woolley (mother) appeals the trial court's order allowing Michael B. Woolley (father) to move with their daughter from Colorado to Texas and also awarding mother only a portion of the attorney fees she requested. We affirm.
In the 1998 permanent orders, father was awarded sole legal custody of the daughter, but was not allowed to remove her from Colorado without an order of the court. Mother was awarded a minimum of twelve overnights of parenting time per month, depending on father's work schedule as a commercial airline pilot. That decision was affirmed on appeal. In re Marriage of Woolley, (Colo.App. No. 98CA2265, January 27, 2000) (not selected for official publication). On March 1, 1999, father filed a verified motion to remove the daughter from Colorado and relocate to Texas, where he had been commuting to work since the closure of his employer's Colorado base of operations. As grounds, he alleged that mother had failed to exercise even the minimum amount of parenting time, thereby necessitating father's employment of an overnight babysitter. Father noted that a move to Texas would eliminate his lengthy commute and decrease the amount of time the daughter would spend with a babysitter. Furthermore, father alleged that the daughter was frequently tardy to school when in mother's care, and a move to Texas would ensure that the daughter's educational needs would be met.
In response, mother filed, on March 4, 1999, a motion for stay pending appeal of the permanent orders, asserting that the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the removal motion and requesting that the removal issue not be set for hearing.
In May 1999, father filed a "Notice of Hearing on All Pending Matters," stating that on July 29, 1999, the court would hear, inter alia, the stay and removal motions, and complete a hearing on mother's request for attorney fees, which had been partially heard in April.
On July 1, 1999, however, the court, denied mother's motion for stay and ordered that the removal motion would be heard on July 29 immediately following the hearing on mother's request for attorney fees. Also on July 1, father filed a supplemental designation of witnesses, which included the daughter's therapist. The therapist testified at the hearing over mother's objection that father's disclosure was not timely.
The court subsequently granted father's request to remove the daughter from Colorado to Texas and modified mother's parenting time. Mother was awarded attorney fees in the amount of $4000, but that amount was reduced to $3550 to account for a credit due father. The court declined to award the entire $49,800 requested for attorney fees incurred through permanent orders.
Mother asserts various points of error on the removal issue, all of which we reject.
First, mother contends that the trial court erred in granting the request for removal, because she was given inadequate notice on July 1 of father's designation of the therapist as a witness under C.R.C.P. 26.2. She argues that she was therefore unable to prepare fully for the July 29 hearing. Under the circumstances, we disagree.
C.R.C.P. 26.2(a)(2)(C)(I) provides that in a domestic relations case the disclosure of expert testimony shall be made at least 60 days before the date set for the hearing. In re Marriage of Antuna, 8 P.3d 589 (Colo.App. 2000). The rule makes no specific provision for hearings set within shorter time periods. However, C.R.C.P. 16.2, which governs the management of domestic relations cases, provides that certain types of hearings may be set in a more expedited manner. Post-decree or modification matters may be set in fewer than 60 days, and in that event, the list of expert witnesses included in the trial management certificate must be filed "prior to the commencement of the hearing." C.R.C.P. 16.2(d)(3); see C.R.C.P. 16.2(d)(2) ( ); cf. C.R.C.P. 16.2(g) ( ).
These two rules cannot be read in isolation. See C.R.C.P. 26.2 committee comment (discussing the interrelationship between C.R.C.P. 16.2 and 26.2). We must, if possible, construe the two rules to give consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to both and to avoid an inconsistent or absurd result. See generally In re Marriage of Ford, 851 P.2d 295 (Colo.App.1993)
. Furthermore, if the rules cannot be reconciled, and there is a conflict between specific and general rules, the specific provisions control to the extent of the inconsistency. See generally In re the Custody of C.C.R.S., 892 P.2d 246 (Colo.1995).
If a hearing is set in the shorter time frame envisioned by C.R.C.P. 16.2, then the 60-day time limit for disclosure of expert witness testimony set forth in C.R.C.P. 26.2 cannot be met. In that case, the more general provisions in C.R.C.P. 26.2 must yield to C.R.C.P. 16.2, which contains specific provisions for post-decree and modification matters subject to a shortened time schedule.
Few areas of the law require more expeditious resolution than those involving the residential custody of a minor child. In re the Custody of C.C.R.S., 872 P.2d 1337 (Colo.App.1993) (, )aff'd, 892 P.2d 246 (Colo.1995); see In re Marriage of Francis, 919 P.2d 776 (Colo.1996)
( ); G.A. v. C.V., 976 P.2d 881 (Colo.App.1999) ( ). Thus, shortening the time frame for hearing a removal motion is certainly within the trial court's discretion. See C.R.C.P. 16.2(d)(3) ( ).
Here, the trial court recognized that the daughter, who was seven years old at the time of the removal hearing, would have to enroll in a school within a matter of weeks after the July 29 hearing. Deference to the daughter's schedule was entirely understandable, especially given the court's suspicion that mother had filed the motion for stay in order to preclude a hearing on father's removal motion. Therefore, we perceive no abuse of discretion in the court's decision to proceed with the hearing over mother's objection to the shortened time schedule and imperfect disclosure.
Furthermore, mother's failure to object to the July 1 designation of the therapist until the July 29 hearing lends further support to our decision. See Perkins v. Flatiron Structures Co., 849 P.2d 832 (Colo.App.1992)
(. ) And, given that the therapist had been treating the daughter for two years and had testified at the permanent orders hearing, see In re Marriage of Woolley, supra, any surprise or prejudice was mitigated. See Keith v. Valdez, 934 P.2d 897 (Colo.App.1997) ( ).
Next, mother contends that the therapist was not properly qualified under § 14-10-127(4), C.R.S.2000. We reject this contention.
Section 14-10-127, C.R.S.2000, applies to evaluations performed to assist the court in determining the allocation of parental responsibilities. See People in Interest of D.C., 851 P.2d 291 (Colo.App.1993)
(. ) The therapist here was the treating therapist and was designated as a witness to testify as to "her observations of the minor child." Thus, the custody evaluation provisions of § 14-10-127 were not implicated.
Mother also contends that the court erred in entering the removal order, because, under the shortened time frame, she was unable to obtain expert witnesses and an offense-specific evaluation of father. We disagree.
At the hearing, mother requested an offense-specific evaluation of father under C.R.C.P. 26.2(a)(5) in an effort to prove that father had sexually abused the daughter. However, the court found that this issue had been fully resolved at the permanent orders hearing and that there was no basis for any new allegations. This finding, coupled with mother's tardy request, negates any abuse of the court's discretion in denying the request. See In re Marriage of Antuna, supra. Likewise, there is no indication that mother tried, in the time she did have, to obtain expert witnesses.
Mother's final contention as to the removal issue is that the trial court's imposition of time constraints and its refusal to grant a continuance related to the hearing, was an abuse of discretion. Again, we disagree.
The right to a full and fair hearing, including the right to cross-examination, must be afforded to litigants in dissolution proceedings. And, a court's interest in administrative efficiency may not take precedence over this due process right. In re Marriage of Goldin, 923 P.2d 376 (Colo.App. 1996).
However, where, as here, the hearing spanned two days, and mother's presentation of evidence and argument consumed well over 100 pages of transcript, the time constraints were not unreasonable. See In re Marriage of Goldin, su...
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ARTICLE 10
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