In re Marriage of Briddle, No. 6-782/05-2115 (Iowa App. 3/14/2007), 6-782/05-2115

Decision Date14 March 2007
Docket NumberNo. 6-782/05-2115,6-782/05-2115
PartiesIN RE THE MARRIAGE OF ELIZABETH A. BRIDDLE AND DAVID J. BRIDDLE Upon the Petition of ELIZABETH A. BRIDDLE, Petitioner-Appellee, And Concerning DAVID J. BRIDDLE, Respondent-Appellant.
CourtIowa Court of Appeals

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Arthur Gamble (motion to enforce settlement) and Jerrold W. Jordan (dissolution), Judges.

Respondent-appellant appeals the economic provisions of the decree dissolving his marriage to petitioner-appellee, seeking, among other things, enforcement of a settlement agreement. AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.

Patricia Shoff of Belin, Lamson, McCormick, Zumbach, Flynn, A P.C., Des Moines, for appellant.

Lawrence Marcucci, West Des Monies, for appellee.

Heard by Sackett, C.J., and Zimmer and Eisenhauer, JJ.

SACKETT, C.J.

David J. Briddle appeals, challenging the economic provisions of the decree dissolving his marriage to Elizabeth A. Briddle. David first contends that a settlement agreement reached by the parties be enforced. He contends that if the agreement is not enforced then the decree should be modified as (1) the property provisions are punitive and based on erroneous valuation, (2) the child support is excessive, and (3) the attorney fee award is not equitable. The settlement agreement should be enforced. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

I. SCOPE OF REVIEW

We review de novo a refusal to enforce a settlement agreement in dissolution. In re Marriage of Jones, 653 N.W.2d 589, 592 (Iowa 2002), In re Marriage of Zeliadt, 390 N.W.2d 117, 118 (Iowa 1986). In Jones, the court determined it had de novo review where a party contended the court of appeals had no legal right to repudiate a stipulation in dissolution. Jones, 653 N.W.2d at 592. The economic provisions of a divorce decree are also reviewed de novo. Iowa R. App. P. 6.4.

In a de novo review we examine the entire record and adjudicate anew the issues properly presented on appeal. In re Marriage of Steenhoek, 305 N.W.2d 448, 452 (Iowa 1982). We give weight to the fact findings of the trial court, especially when considering the credibility of witnesses, but are not bound by them. Iowa R. App. P. 6.14(6)(g); In re Marriage of Grady-Woods, 577 N.W.2d 851, 852 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998). We approach this issue from a gender-neutral position avoiding sexual stereotypes. In re Marriage of Pratt, 489 N.W.2d 56, 58 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992); see also In re Marriage of Bethke, 484 N.W.2d 604, 608 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992).

II. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

The parties were married in September of 2002. They are the parents of three children born in 1995, 1997, and 1999. At the time of the marriage David, who has a high school education, was employed by and owned minority interests in two closely-held corporations. By the time of the dissolution he had minority interests in nine closely-held corporations. The corporations owned antique malls and/or provided the advertising and management services for the malls. David received an annual salary of $72,800 from Fun & Action, Inc., one of the corporations. In addition he received varying taxable distributions up to $183,887 in 2003 from those of the other corporations which were taxed as S corporations.1

Elizabeth had been a real estate agent prior to the birth of the parties' second child and at the time of trial had completed training and was employed as a cardiac sonographer at an annual salary of $46,000. During the marriage the parties acquired certain real estate interests and David continued to acquire interests in the closely-held corporations.

Elizabeth filed her petition for dissolution on October 10, 2002. Following the filing Elizabeth sought discovery most particularly aimed at obtaining financial information about David's interests in the various corporations. The discovery requests were denied by the corporations and the district court refused to grant Elizabeth's requests for production, but did order David to seek an order to obtain the records as a minority shareholder and make them available to Elizabeth. The discovery process was confrontational and tried the patience of more than one district court judge.

A trial date was ultimately set for Monday, February 7, 2005. On Saturday, February 5, 2005, two days before the scheduled trial date, the parties and their attorneys met with attorney Steve Lytle, who acted as a mediator, at 8 a.m. and concluded negotiations and reached a settlement at 7 p.m. that day. On February 8, 2005, Lytle provided attorneys for both parties2 a writing setting forth in detail what his notes reflected to be the mediated settlement reached on Saturday, February 5, 2005. In closing Lytle wrote, "If either of you believe I have misstated the essentials of the agreement reached on Saturday, please contact me immediately."

On February 9, 2005, David's attorney faxed to Elizabeth's attorney a draft of a decree of dissolution of the marriage together with supporting documents prepared pursuant to the parties' mediation agreement. He asked that Elizabeth's attorney get back to him as soon as possible with any additions, corrections, or suggested changes.

There was no communication from Elizabeth's attorney to either Lytle or David's attorney. Consequently, on February 23, 2005, David filed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement. Elizabeth filed no written resistance. Finally, on March 7, 2005, two days before the scheduled March 9 hearing, Elizabeth's attorney sent a letter to David's attorney contending that David had made a material misrepresentation in that Elizabeth was unaware until her attorney received the draft decree from David's attorney that in addition to an annual income of $72,800 David received income of another $100,000 to $150,000 a year. Elizabeth's attorney also listed seven items that Elizabeth wanted, noting, "I know there are some substantive changes here. However, this is [sic] may be the only way to save the settlement."

A hearing on the motion was held. Lytle was called as a witness. He was qualified as an expert in family law. He testified he believed the parties reached an agreement as to the essential issues unresolved. He further testified that at 7 p.m. on Saturday he went over each issue with the parties and their attorneys that they had agreed to and said he would have the agreement written up and sent to each attorney by Tuesday, which he in fact did.

At the hearing on the motion to enforce the settlement David contended Elizabeth knew he received additional income. Elizabeth contended she had negotiated alimony and child support based on the lower figure. The district court accepted Elizabeth's version and denied the motion to enforce the settlement. The district court found that David had failed to disclose his actual income to Elizabeth before and during mediation and that David did not give a clear statement under oath as to his income.

David contends that neither of the grounds the district court relied on in its refusal to enforce is tenable. He contends that Elizabeth was aware of his additional income. He points to a filing on temporary support where he stated he had additional income from one of the companies. He also advances that prior joint tax returns showed taxable distributions from S corporations. He further argues the distributions vary from year to year making it impossible to predict an accurate figure of his annual income.

The matter ultimately went to trial and after a five-day hearing the district court requested the parties to prepare proposed decrees which each did. The court adopted Elizabeth's decree including all findings therein with several minor word changes and a reduction of alimony from $2000 a month for three years to $1000 a month for the same period. David filed an Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.904(2) motion setting forth some twenty-one areas in the decree where he contended the district court applied the incorrect law and/or made provisions that were grossly unfair to him. The district court denied the motion in its entirety and this appeal followed.3

A. Settlement Agreement

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