In re Marriage of Denton

• Decision Date: 31 August 2005
• Docket Number: No. 26117.,26117.
• Citation: 169 S.W.3d 604
• Parties: In re the MARRIAGE OF Laura Lynn DENTON and Dannie Phillip Denton. Laura Lynn Denton, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Dannie Phillip Denton, Respondent-Respondent.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

169 S.W.3d 604

In re the MARRIAGE OF Laura Lynn DENTON and Dannie Phillip Denton.

Laura Lynn Denton, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Dannie Phillip Denton, Respondent-Respondent.

No. 26117.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District, Division Two.

August 31, 2005.

Fred H. Thornton III, Sikeston, MO, for Appellant.

Jim S. Green, Sikeston, MO, for Respondent.

JEFFREY W. BATES, Chief Judge.

Laura Denton ("Wife") appeals from a judgment which dissolved her marriage to Dannie Denton ("Husband"), divided the Dentons' marital property and awarded Wife $75 per month as child support for their only child, Jessica Denton ("Daughter"). Wife presents two points for decision. In Wife's first point, she contends the trial court erred in dividing the Dentons' marital property because Husband received the bulk of the marital assets. We deny this point because the Dentons' marital debts exceeded their assets, and Husband was allocated more of the debt than Wife. In Wife's second point, she contends the trial court erred in setting child support at $75 per month because the record does not contain a Form 14 worksheet or an explanation of how the court calculated the child support award. While Wife's second point has merit, the child support award must be reversed for a more fundamental reason. At the time the dissolution judgment was entered, the juvenile division of the Circuit Court of Scott County, Missouri, was exercising jurisdiction over Daughter. Since the juvenile division had exclusive original jurisdiction over proceedings involving Daughter, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter an award for child support in this dissolution action. Therefore, the judgment is affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded with instructions.

I. Standard of Review

In Wife's appeal, she challenges the division of marital property and the child support award. In this court-tried case, our review is governed by Rule 84.13(d).¹ Hall v. Hall, 53 S.W.3d 214, 217 (Mo.App.2001). The judgment will be affirmed unless there is no substantial evidence to support the judgment, the judgment is against the weight of the evidence or the judgment erroneously declares or applies the law. Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. banc 1976); In re Marriage of Petersen, 22 S.W.3d 760, 763 (Mo.App.2000).² A trial court is required to divide marital property in the exercise of its sound discretion. In re Marriage of Baker, 986 S.W.2d 950, 954 (Mo.App.1999). A trial court also possesses broad discretion in ordering child support. MacDonald v. Minton, 142 S.W.3d 247, 250 (Mo.App.2004). Thus, our task is to review the trial court's rulings on these two issues for compliance with Murphy and for an abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Reese, 155 S.W.3d 862, 869 (Mo.App.2005). "An abuse of discretion occurs only if the decree is so arbitrary or unreasonable that it indicates indifference and lack of proper judicial consideration." In re Marriage of Woodson, 92 S.W.3d 780, 785 (Mo. banc 2003). On appeal, we defer to the trial court's credibility determinations and view the evidence and all permissible inferences from that evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment. Mehra v. Mehra, 819 S.W.2d 351, 353 (Mo. banc 1991); Shields v. Shields, 59 S.W.3d 658, 660 (Mo.App.2001). We ignore all contrary evidence. Mehra, 819 S.W.2d at 353.

II. Facts and Procedural History

Husband and Wife were married in November 1985. Daughter, who was their only child, was born in May 1987. Husband and Wife separated in November 2001. Divorce proceedings were initiated in October 2002 by Wife. In her petition, she requested sole physical custody of Daughter, an award of child support and a division of the parties' marital property. Husband filed an answer to the petition and a cross-petition for dissolution of marriage. Husband requested that the parties share joint legal and physical custody of Daughter and that the marital property and debts be justly divided.

In January 2003, the juvenile court of Scott County, Missouri, assumed jurisdiction over Daughter for truancy and for refusing to obey her parents. Initially, she was placed in foster care, and she stayed with several different families. Daughter then became pregnant.

The dissolution action was tried on October 24, 2003. By that time, Daughter had given birth. With the permission of the juvenile division, Daughter and her infant son were residing in the home of Daughter's maternal grandmother. Wife, her brother and another child resided there as well. At trial, the court was made aware that the juvenile proceeding involving Daughter was still pending and she was under the juvenile division's jurisdiction.

As of the trial date, both Husband and Wife were unemployed. Husband had become an employee of the United States Postal Service in 1985, but he was suspended indefinitely without pay in July 2003 after criminal charges were filed against him.³ Husband could not return to work for the Post Office unless he was acquitted of the charges, and he did not expect to do so. Wife's last job had been with the Sikeston Public School system, but she was fired in March 2001. She also had criminal charges filed against her after the parties separated, which culminated in her plea of guilty to the felony of child endangerment in March or April 2003.

The Dentons had marital debts totaling approximately $107,000.⁴ Generally speaking, their marital property consisted of a house, automobiles, household goods, other personal belongings and Husband's federal civil service pension plan. To the extent the Dentons had any opinions as to the value of their possessions, they provided the trial court with that information via their trial testimony. In some instances, the Dentons agreed on an item's value. In other instances, the court was left with only one spouse's input on value due to the other spouse's lack of knowledge. On a few occasions, the Dentons' testimony as to the value of a particular piece of property (e.g., the house) was in dispute. Frankly, the Dentons' testimony was equivocal and imprecise in many respects; however, both parties' testimony suffered from the same deficiencies. This freewheeling approach to valuation was utilized at trial in attempting to establish the value of Husband's pension plan. In Wife's case-in-chief, she called Husband as an adverse witness. Husband gave the following testimony concerning his pension:

Q. Okay. You have a retirement or pension plan through United States Postal Service; is that correct?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And how much is that — how much is built into that at this time?

A. 21,000.

Q. And that's built up over your 15 years of working there during the marriage?

A. Yes, sir. I've also had to borrow against that, too.

Q. Okay. Is it 21,000 after what you borrowed against it, or is it 21,000 minus what you borrowed against it?

A. It's 21,000 when I had to borrow against it.

Husband testified that he borrowed the money to pay legal expenses for Wife's son from a prior marriage. Wife's attorney asked no further questions to ascertain when Husband borrowed against his pension plan or the total amount of such loans. Based upon the foregoing testimony, the trial court could have concluded that Husband's pension plan had been reduced by loans to a total value of only $21,000 as of the date of trial. During Wife's direct examination, she testified that, based on statements she had seen, the pension plan had been worth $60,000 in 2002. At the conclusion of the trial, the court left the record open so Wife could present some additional information concerning Husband's pension plan.

Thereafter, Wife furnished the trial court with a quarterly statement from Husband's pension plan covering the period of June 1, 2003 through September 30, 2003. According to this document, the total account value as of June 1, 2003 was $71,154. Husband had worked long enough for the Post Office to become vested in the plan. As of September 30, 2003, the value of the pension plan was $58,859. Husband had borrowed $15,000 from the plan on August 4, 2003. Because the statement only reflected activity through September 30, 2003, the document did not establish the value of the pension plan as of the trial date or address whether Husband had borrowed additional sums from the plan between September 30, 2003 and the date of trial.

The trial court entered judgment on January 23, 2004. The only provisions of the judgment pertinent to this appeal are those involving the division of marital property and the child support award. We summarize below the trial court's rulings on these two issues.

First, as requested, the trial court divided the Dentons' marital property and allocated the marital debts between them. The judgment did not assign any values to the marital property awarded either party. Only a few of the debts had values assigned. Viewed in a light most favorable to the judgment and disregarding any contrary evidence, the trial court divided the marital property and allocated the marital debts as follows:

1. Wife was awarded an automobile, household goods and personal property worth approximately $6,850. She was required to pay marital debts in the amount of $21,400. These debts were comprised of the $1,400 cellular telephone bill and the $20,000 loan to Wife's mother. Thus, the amount of debt allocated to Wife exceeded the value of the marital assets awarded to her by $14,350.

2. The trial court awarded the Husband the following assets: (a) the house, which was worth $45,000; (b) one operational automobile, two nonoperational automobiles, a small travel camper, household goods and other personal property worth approximately $2,750; and (c) a $21,000 pension plan. Husband was allocated marital debts in the amount of $85,500. These debts were comprised of the $44,500 home mortgage, $20,000 in medical bills, the $16,000 loan from Husband's mother and the $5,000 loan from Husband's brother. Thus, the...