In re Marriage of Sokol

• Docket Number: 21-1918
• Decision Date: 27 January 2023
• Citation: 985 N.W.2d 177
• Parties: IN RE the MARRIAGE OF Rachael Kay SOKOL and David Langdon Sokol. Upon the Petition of Rachael Kay Sokol, Appellee, and Concerning David Langdon Sokol, Appellant.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

985 N.W.2d 177

IN RE the MARRIAGE OF Rachael Kay SOKOL and David Langdon Sokol. Upon the Petition of Rachael Kay Sokol, Appellee, and Concerning David Langdon Sokol, Appellant.

No. 21-1918

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Submitted December 14, 2022

Filed January 27, 2023

Kate Simon and Tyler J. Johnston of Cordell Law, LLP, Des Moines, for appellant.

Stacey N. Warren of CashattWarren Family Law, P.C., Des Moines, for appellee.

McDonald, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which Christensen, C.J., and Oxley, McDermott, and May, JJ., joined. Mansfield, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Waterman, J., joined.

McDONALD, Justice.

Transitional spousal support "is appropriate when a party capable of self-support nevertheless needs short-term financial assistance to transition from married to single life." In re Marriage of Mills , 983 N.W.2d 61, 73 (Iowa 2022) (emphasis omitted) (quoting In re Marriage of Pazhoor , 971 N.W.2d 530, 545 (Iowa 2022) ). Transitional spousal "support is intended to resolve a short-term liquidity crunch" and "should be of a short duration." Id. at 73. In this case, the court of appeals modified a dissolution decree to award a payee spouse seven years’ transitional spousal support. On further review, we conclude the court of appeals erred in modifying the decree to award transitional spousal support under the circumstances presented.

I.

Rachael and David Sokol married in 2002. There were two children born into the marriage, one in 2006 and another in 2014. In 2019, Rachael petitioned for dissolution of the marriage. Following a two-day virtual trial, the district court entered its decree in August 2021.

At the time of the decree, Rachael was 45 and David was 43. Rachael earned $440,000 per year as a doctor. David owned a home repair and remodeling business, which he started in 2013. The company grew over the years and had approximately $553,000 in revenue in 2020; David, however, had never paid himself a salary from the company. Based on the company financials, the district court imputed to him annual income of $50,000. The Sokols owned a residence, a commercial property, several vehicles, retirement accounts, extensive personal property, and other assets. The Sokols also had debt, including mortgages on the property, Rachael's student loans, and several credit cards.

With respect to the children, the district court granted Rachael and David joint legal custody and shared physical care, with Rachael to pay David $2,000 per month in child support. Although the district court granted the parties joint legal custody of the children, the decree provided Rachael could "decide on the course of action" with respect to decisions for the children. Regarding the division of property, the district court equitably divided the Sokols’ assets. Rachael received the marital home, one vehicle, her retirement account, half of the expected income tax refunds, various tactical gear, the entirety of her student loan debt, and all the couple's shared credit card debt. David received the commercial property, two vehicles, his retirement account, half of the expected income tax returns, and all assets belonging to his business. In total, the district court awarded each party net assets of approximately $660,000. As to spousal support, the district court ordered Rachael to pay David $3,000 per month in rehabilitative spousal support for four years. The district court reasoned the support was necessary to give David time to build a more "concrete, realistic business model" and "improve his earning capacity."

David timely filed his notice of appeal, and we transferred the matter to the court of appeals. With respect to custody, David argued the district court's grant of final decision-making authority to Rachael was not consistent with joint legal custody. Regarding the property division, David argued: (1) the district court double-counted the value of commercial property awarded to him, (2) the district court erred in awarding Rachael certain guns and tactical gear that were registered in David's name, (3) the district court erred in awarding Rachael $85,000 more than David by rejecting his valuation of certain property, and (4) the district court erred in treating Rachael's medical school debt as a marital debt. As to spousal support, David argued the length of the marriage warranted traditional, rather than rehabilitative, spousal support. David emphasized that more substantial awards are commonplace in dissolutions of long marriages in which one spouse has significantly higher earning capacity than the other.

The court of appeals affirmed the dissolution decree with modifications. With respect to custody, the court of appeals held the grant of final decision-making authority to Rachael was not consistent with joint legal custody and modified the decree accordingly. Regarding the property division, the court of appeals affirmed the district court in all respects. As to spousal support, the court of appeals modified David's award from rehabilitative support at $3,000 per month for four years to transitional support at $5,000 per month for seven years. In the court of appeals’ view, this was necessary to "bridge the gap" and "assist[ ] David with the transition from married to single life." The court of appeals also reasoned the "award will provide David time to build his business and draw sufficient income to maintain a comparable standard of living to what he enjoyed during the marriage."

Rachael filed an application for further review contesting the court of appeals modification of the spousal support award. David did not resist the application for further review, and he did not seek further review of any issue. "When considering an application for further review, we have discretion to review all the issues raised on appeal or in the application for further review or only a portion thereof." In re Marriage of Mauer , 874 N.W.2d 103, 106 (Iowa 2016). We exercise our discretion by limiting our review to the spousal support award. The decision of the court of appeals is final as to all other issues. See id.

II.

Our review of a spousal support award is de novo. In re Marriage of Mann , 943 N.W.2d 15, 18 (Iowa 2020). "Although our review is de novo, we afford deference to the district court for institutional and pragmatic reasons." Hensch v. Mysak , 902 N.W.2d 822, 824 (Iowa Ct. App. 2017). The institutional deference afforded the district court in determining spousal support counsels against undue tinkering with spousal support awards. An appellate court should disturb the district court's determination of spousal support "only when there has been a failure to do equity." In re Marriage of Gust , 858 N.W.2d 402, 406 (Iowa 2015) (quoting In re Marriage of Olson , 705 N.W.2d 312, 315 (Iowa 2005) ). Otherwise, "[w]hen appellate courts unduly refine these important, but often conjectural, judgment calls, they thereby foster appeals in hosts of cases, at staggering expense to the parties wholly disproportionate to any benefit they might hope to realize." In re Marriage of Benson , 545 N.W.2d 252, 257 (Iowa 1996) (en banc).

III.

Alimony originated in English ecclesiastical courts as an obligation of the husband to provide continued support for his wife upon separation. E.g. Cynthia Lee Starnes, One More Time: Alimony, Intuition, and the Remarriage-Termination Rule , 81 Ind. L.J. 971, 983 (2006) [hereinafter Starnes]. This was a time when absolute divorce was not available, or at least not readily available:

Prior to the English reforms of 1857, the rationale for alimony was simple enough: upon marriage a husband undertook a lifetime obligation to support his wife. Although he could obtain a legal separation from her (divorce a mensa et thoro ), rarely could he fully sever marital ties (divorce a vinculo ). Accordingly, a husband's duty of support continued throughout his wife's life, whether or not they lived together. Alimony was the mechanism, designed by the English ecclesiastical courts, for enforcing the husband's lifetime obligation to support and sustain his wife. Indeed, the word "alimony" derives from the Latin "alimonia ," which means sustenance.

Underpinning the husband's support obligation was an assumption that married women should not be expected to support themselves. Employment opportunities for women were limited, and a married woman's property was subject to her husband's control. Indeed, at common law a married woman's identity merged into that of her husband, who bore a moral and legal obligation to provide for her. As Blackstone observed, "[T]he very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband; under whose wing, protection, and cover, she performs everything...."

Id. (alteration and omission in original) (footnotes omitted) (quoting 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries * 442); accord Jolly v. Jolly , 1 Iowa 9, 11 (1855) ("It is the nourishment—the maintenance—the allowance made for the support of the wife, which is given and fixed by the proper court out of the husband's estate, when they are legally separated."); Robert Kirkman Collins, The Theory of Marital Residuals: Applying an Income Adjustment Calculus to the Enigma of Alimony , 24 Harv. Women's L.J. 23, 39–48 (2001) [hereinafter Collins] (summarizing historical justifications for alimony); Chester G. Vernier & John B. Hurlbut, The Historical Background of Alimony Law and Its Present Statutory Structure , 6 L. & Contemp. Probs. 197, 197–98 (1939) (summarizing history of alimony).

Iowa had long-recognized alimony—the duty of the husband to provide for his former wife—as a form of relief for the wife in a dissolution action. Our territorial statutes provided "the court shall make such order and decree touching ... the alimony and maintenance of the wife ... as from the nature of the case and circumstances of the parties may appear...