In re Marshall
Decision Date | 22 May 2023 |
Docket Number | 81659-4-I |
Parties | In the Matter of the Personal Restraint Petition of: STEVEN MAURICE MARSHALL, Petitioner. |
Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Steven Marshall was convicted of murder in the first degree with a firearm enhancement and unlawful possession of a firearm in the second degree, which this court affirmed on direct appeal. He subsequently filed this personal restraint petition (PRP) claiming ineffective assistance of counsel based on representation before and during trial. He also argues that ineffective assistance should be presumed because of his attorney's subsequent resignation in lieu of discipline from the state bar association. Marshall fails to establish either that counsel was deficient or that he was prejudiced by counsel's representation. Therefore, we deny his petition.
A jury found Marshall guilty of one count of murder in the first degree with a firearm enhancement and one count of unlawful possession of a firearm in the second degree for the murder of Ryan Prince. These convictions were affirmed by this court on direct appeal. State v. Marshall No. 76119-6-I (Wash.Ct.App. Mar. 25, 2019) (unpublished) https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/761196.pdf.
The underlying facts and procedural history were set out in Marshall's direct appeal as follows:
Marshall, No. 76119-6-I, slip op. at 2-5. The court sentenced Marshall to concurrent prison terms of 374 months for the murder and 16 months for the unlawful firearm possession, and an additional 60 months for the firearm enhancement which was run consecutively, for a total of 434 months in prison.
In his direct appeal, Marshall argued the court had violated his right to access the courts by refusing to hear pro se motions he had filed on his own behalf. Id. at 6-14. He claimed the court then erred by admitting testimony about his pro se motions in violation of ER 403. Id. at 14. He also alleged prosecutorial misconduct when the prosecutor elicited a lay witness opinion about Marshall's guilt. Id. at 15-20. In a statement of additional grounds, Marshall asserted that (1) the police conducted an illegal stop, seizure, and interrogation of his ex-wife, Allison Sierra; (2) Sierra's interrogation violated spousal privilege; (3) the State illegally intercepted his mail to and from the jail without a warrant; (4) trial counsel was deficient for not moving to suppress evidence from Sierra's cell phone; (5) trial counsel was deficient for not challenging a juror whose friend had died in a home invasion; (6) trial counsel was deficient for not requesting lesser-included offense instructions; and (7) a witness's testimony regarding a statement by Marshall's co-defendant violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses. Id. at 20-22.
On direct appeal, regarding his pro se motions, we held that Marshall had no right to "hybrid" representation or to file motions on his own behalf while represented by counsel, and also that he had not properly preserved his ER 403 claim. Id. at 12. We concluded that Marshall failed to object to the alleged prosecutorial misconduct and any misconduct was not so flagrant and ill- intentioned that it could not have been cured by a jury instruction. Id. at 19-20. We also rejected Marshall's additional grounds. Id. at 20-22.
Marshall's convictions became final on August 23, 2019. He timely filed this personal restraint petition on July 17, 2020.
This court will grant a personal restraint petition (PRP) if a petitioner is subject to unlawful restraint. RAP 16.4(a). Relevant to Marshall's PRP, restraint is unlawful if it violates the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution or laws of the State of Washington. RAP 16.4(c)(2). Relief by way of a collateral challenge to a conviction is extraordinary, and a petitioner must meet a high standard before this court will disturb an otherwise settled judgment. In re Pers. Restraint of Coats 173 Wn.2d 123, 132, 267 P.3d 324 (2011).
A collateral challenge may raise both constitutional and nonconstitutional errors. In re Pers. Restraint of Elmore, 162 Wn.2d 236, 251, 172 P.3d 335 (2007). For a PRP based on a constitutional error, a petitioner must show that a constitutional error occurred and the error resulted in actual and substantial prejudice. In re Pers. Restraint of Williams, 198 Wn.2d 342, 353, 496 P.3d 289 (2021). A petitioner who alleges unlawful restraint based on nonconstitutional error must demonstrate a fundamental defect resulting in a complete miscarriage of justice. Elmore, 162 Wn.2d at 251.
As a general rule, a collateral attack on a criminal conviction cannot simply be a reiteration of issues resolved at trial or on direct appeal. In re Pers. Restraint of Gentry 137 Wn.2d 378, 388-89, 972 P.2d 1250 (1999). "The petitioner in a personal restraint petition is prohibited from renewing an issue that was raised and rejected on direct appeal unless the interests of justice require relitigation of that issue." In re Pers. Restraint of Davis, 152 Wn.2d 647, 671, 101 P.3d 1 (2004). Instead, a PRP petitioner "should raise new points of fact and law that were not or could not have been raised in the principal action." Gentry, 137 Wn.2d at 388-89. A "new" issue is not created merely by supporting a previous ground for relief with different factual allegations or with different legal arguments. Davis, 152 Wn.2d at 671. Similarly, a petitioner cannot recast an issue previously resolved on direct...
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