In re Martin's Estate

• Decision Date: 14 November 1914
• Docket Number: 11932.
• Citation: 82 Wash. 226,144 P. 42
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: In re MARTIN'S ESTATE. v. MARTIN. POLK

144 P. 42

82 Wash. 226

In re MARTIN'S ESTATE.

POLK v. MARTIN.

No. 11932.

Supreme Court of Washington

November 14, 1914

Department 2. Appeal from Superior Court, Kitsap County; Walter M French, Judge.

In the matter of the estate of Alma L. Martin, deceased. Petition by Mabel Polk against William G. Martin, as administrator. From an order sustaining a demurrer to the petition and dismissing the proceedings, the petitioner appeals. Order reversed and remanded, with directions.

Hamlin & Meier, of Seattle, for appellant.

F. W Moore, of Bremerton, for respondent.

FULLERTON J.

Alma L Martin died intestate in Kitsap county on April 21, 1913, leaving an estate therein, consisting of real and personal property. She left as her heirs at law her husband, William G. Martin, and a daughter by a former marriage, Mabel Polk. Letters of administration on the estate were granted to the husband, Martin, on May 10, 1913, who in due time thereafter returned and filed in the estate proceedings an inventory of the property of the estate. On December 13, 1913, the daughter, conceiving that the administrator had not made and returned a true, correct and full inventory of the property of the estate, filed in the superior court a petition praying that a citation be issued to the administrator requiring him to appear on a day certain and show cause why certain property alleged to have been omitted from the inventory should not be included therein. The petition, after reciting the death of Alma L. Martin, the appointment of William G. Martin as the administrator of her estate, the filing by the administrator of an inventory purporting to be a full and correct inventory of the property of the estate, continued as follows:

'That the said inventory so made and returned into court by the said administrator is not a true, full, and correct inventory of the property belonging to said estate, in that the said inventory includes only an undivided community interest of one-half in and to the real property described in said inventory; further in that the said inventory does not contain all of the household goods and effects of said deceased; further in that certain other personal property has not been included therein, to wit, an automobile of the value of about $400, and certain shares of stock in the Bremerton-Charleston Light & Fuel Company, a corporation, of the value, as your petitioner is informed and believes, of $2,000; further in that the said inventory does not include moneys on hand and in the possession of the said William G. Martin at the time of the death of said decedent--all of which property so omitted from the said inventory was the community property of the said Alma L. Martin, deceased, and the said William G. Martin, her husband. That your petitioner has heretofore made due demand upon the said administrator to include, in an inventory of the property of said estate, the property above described, to comply with which said demand the said administrator has failed, neglected, and refused.'

On the filing of the petition the court directed that a citation issue as prayed for therein, directing the administrator to appear on December 27, 1913. A citation was issued as directed, service of which was made on the administrator. On the day appointed the administrator appeared specially and objected to the jurisdiction of the court to proceed to a hearing upon the petition, on the ground that the citation was not under the seal of the court, that no copy of the petition was attached to the citation, and because the citation failed to show that the petitioner had an interest in the estate. The objections were overruled by the court, whereupon the administrator demurred generally to the petition. This demurrer the court sustained, and entered an order dismissing the proceedings. The petitioner, feeling aggrieved by the order of the court, prosecutes this appeal.

The respondent moves to dismiss the appeal, basing his motion on the ground that the order is not reviewable as an independent order, but must be reviewed, if reviewed at all, on an appeal from the order settling the final account of the administrator with the estate and directing the estate's distribution. But we think the order appealable as an independent order. By section 1450 of the Code (Rem. & Bal.), it is made the duty of the administrator to make and return into court, within one month after his appointment, a true inventory of all the property belonging to the decedent, that shall come to his possession or knowledge. By section 1458 it is provided that, whenever any property shall come to the knowledge or possession of the administrator not included in the inventory, he shall cause the same to be inventoried and appraised as soon as practicable after the discovery thereof, and the making of such inventory may be enforced after notice by attachment, to which may be added the revocation of the letters. By section 1461 complaint to the court that property belonging to the estate has not been inventoried and appraised may be made by an heir, creditor, legatee, or any one interested in the estate, and it is made the duty of the court, on such complaint being made, to cite the person holding such property to appear and be examined touching the same. These sections of the statute clearly contemplate that all questions concerning the ownership or right of possession of property, claimed by a person having an interest in the estate to be the property thereof, shall be tried and determined during the course of the administration. And it must follow as of course, we think, that an appeal from such orders as the court may make in the premises shall be taken within the time limited by statute for taking appeals. Any other rule would prolong the administration of the estate, and would not, as the respondent supposes, result in the bringing of questions touching the due administration of the estate before the appellate court by piecemeal. If, for example, this court should conclude with the respondent that the order here appealed from was reviewable only on an appeal from an order settling the final account, and an appeal should be taken from that order, it is plain that, if the court should then determine that the order is erroneous, it would pass upon no other question, but would send the case back, with instructions to proceed with the hearing, and, if property was discovered not administered upon, to proceed further with the administration of the estate. In other words, the court would be compelled to hold that the final settlement of the estate was had prematurely, and that other questions, dependent upon the final settlement, were not before the court for review. Moreover, it is not only the policy of the statute, but to the interest of heirs, legatees, and creditors of an estate, that the property belonging thereto be brought at once within the jurisdiction of the court, as the person thereafter having it in possession must give bond for its safe-keeping, thus lessening the possibility of its loss to the persons to whom it will ultimately...