In re Mason's Estate
| Decision Date | 23 May 1939 |
| Docket Number | 27932. |
| Parties | In re MASON'S ESTATE. v. UTTERBACK et al. MASON et al. |
| Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
Rehearing Denied June 20, 1939.
Syllabus by the Court.
1. A testator has a sound mind for testamentary purposes when he can understand and carry in mind, in a general way, the nature and situation of his property, and his relations to the persons around him, to those who naturally have some claim to his remembrance and to those in whom and the things in which he has been chiefly interested. He must understand the act which he is doing and the relation in which he stands to the objects of his bounty and to those who ought to be in his mind on the occasion of making a will.
2. In determining the mental status of a testator, presumption of sanity must be indulged, and, where a will appears to be a rational act performed in a rational manner, such presumption and such apparently rational act amount to evidence of testamentary capacity.
3. The testamentary capacity of a testator must be determined as of the time of the making and execution of the will. In determining that question, prior and subsequent acts have bearing only to the extent of assisting in determining the mental status of the testator at the time of the execution of the will.
4. It is not sufficient, to defeat a will, merely to establish that the testator was a victim of some delusion. The evidence must go further and establish that the will itself was the product of that delusion and that the testator devised his property in a way which, except for that delusion, he would not have done.
5. The judgment of the trial court admitting a will to probate will not be disturbed upon appeal to this court unless such judgment is against the clear weight of the evidence.
Appeal from District Court, Bryan County; Roy Paul, Judge.
Proceeding in the matter of the estate of Minnie W. Mason, deceased wherein W. E. Utterback, executor, filed a petition to admit the will to probate, opposed by Dan B. Mason and Hall L Mason, contestants. From a judgment in favor of W. E Utterback, executor, and others as proponents, the contestants appeal.
Judgment affirmed.
McDonald & McDonald and D. S. McDonald, Jr., all of Durant, for plaintiffs in error.
A. H. Ferguson, James W. Batchelor, and Priscilla W. Utterback, all of Durant, for defendants in error.
Minnie M. Mason died July 16, 1936, leaving a will with codicil attached. The petition to admit the will to probate, filed by the executor named in said will, was contested by Dan B. Mason and Hall L. Mason, plaintiffs in error herein. Upon a proper hearing the will was admitted to probate by the County Court of Bryan County, and upon appeal, by the contestants, the District Court of Bryan County affirmed the judgment admitting said will to probate. Contestants appeal from the order of the district court upon the ground that testatrix did not possess testamentary capacity at the time of executing the will and codicil.
A brief statement of the events preceding the death of the testatrix is necessary. In 1930 George A. Mason died intestate, leaving as his heirs the testatrix herein, his widow, and four sons, G. A.
Mason, Jr., Dan B. Mason, Hall L. Mason, and Elmo Mason. He left an estate of approximately $100,000 in value, consisting principally of real property. The surviving sons and widow entered into a written agreement soon after Mr. Mason's death giving Mrs. Mason, who was administratrix of the estate, exclusive control and income from the estate during her lifetime with the understanding that none of the heirs would ask for distribution of the estate during her lifetime. Mrs. Mason employed her son, Hall Mason, as manager of the estate at a salary of $100 per month and expenses. Apparently this arrangement was not satisfactory, and in January, 1935, the mother and sons entered another agreement dividing the estate in the following manner: one-third to Mrs. Mason and the remaining two-thirds equally among the four sons. The county court then ordered the estate distributed in accordance with this agreement. Mrs. Mason's share, consisting of some twenty pieces of real property and some personalty, was valued at approximately $35,000. On July 16, 1936, Mrs. Mason died and left surviving four sons heretofore named and six grandchildren. The grandchildren were Bobbie Ray Mason, son of G. A. Mason, Jr.; Dorothy Frances and Edna May Mason, daughters of Hall Mason by his first marriage, and an infant son of Hall Mason by his second wife; Ruby Jane Mason, adopted daughter of Dan Mason, adopted during the lifetime of Dan Mason's first wife; and John Allen Mason, son of Elmo Mason. Thus grandchildren by all four sons survived the testatrix.
The will in question was executed by Mrs. Mason in July, 1935, having been prepared at her request by W. E. Utterback, an attorney who had been her counsel in the affairs relative to her husband's estate. The testatrix had apparently gone to him voluntarily and unaccompanied and proposed that he prepare her will. Mr. Utterback was named as executor in said will and shortly after the death of Mrs. Mason filed a petition for probate of the will in the County Court of Bryan County. G. A. Mason, Jr., and Elmo Mason, the two sons who received bequests under the will, thereupon agreed to the appointment of W. E. Utterback as executor and waived notice of hearing. In the hearing in the county court they were consulted by counsel for proponents in examining witnesses for the contestants but did not testify themselves, but at the trial in the district court they testified in behalf of the contestants, their brothers, Dan B. Mason and Hall L. Mason, who received nothing under the will and were contesting it. The sole question presented by this appeal is whether Mrs. Minnie M. Mason was possessed of testamentary capacity at the time of executing the will and codicil thereto.
Under the terms of the will herein G. A. Mason, Jr., and Elmo Mason, sons of the testatrix, each received a life estate in a tract of land with remainder to the grandchildren, and after specific bequests were made to a niece and all the grandchildren, except the infant son of Hall Mason, the residue was divided as follows: said sons, G. A. Mason, Jr., and Elmo Mason, were to take an undivided one-fourth each; Dorothy Frances and Edna May Mason, granddaughters of the testatrix and daughters of Hall Mason by his first marriage, were to take equal shares in an undivided one-fourth in trust until they became twenty-one years of age; and the remaining one-fourth was granted to Ruby Jane Mason, granddaughter of testatrix and adopted daughter of Dan B. Mason, in trust until she became twenty-one years of age. It was further provided that said Dan B. Mason was to have no part in the control or management of the properties taken in trust by said Ruby Jane Mason during her minority. At the specific direction of the testatrix paragraph 12 of the will was included, stating that Dan B. Mason was purposely omitted from the will because of the manner in which he had treated the testatrix. The other son, Hall Mason, is referred to in the will only as the father of the two children Dorothy Frances and Edna May. By the terms of the codicil a devise of a tract of land to Lula Frances Miller, a niece of the testatrix, for life with remainder to the sons, G. A. Mason, Jr., and Elmo Mason, and the three granddaughters, was revoked and the property devised to her grandsons, Bobbie Ray Mason and John Allen Mason, who had received less than the granddaughters.
Before considering the evidence we shall briefly refer to the established principles of law pertinent to the question of testamentary capacity. This court has frequently held that a testator has a sound mind for testamentary purposes when he can understand and carry in mind, in a general way, the nature and situation of his property, and his relation to the persons around him, to those who naturally have some claim to his remembrance, and to those in whom and things in which he has been chiefly interested, and that he must understand the act which he is doing and the relation in which he stands to the objects of his bounty and to those who ought to be in his mind on the occasion of making his will. Payton v. Shipley, 80 Okl. 145, 195 P. 125; In re Wah-kon-tah-he-um-pah's Estate, 109 Okl. 126, 234 P. 210; In re Estate of Tayrien, 117 Okl. 216, 246 P. 400; In re Riddle's Estate, 165 Okl. 248, 25 P.2d 763.
The question of mental capacity to make a will is a question of fact, and is to be determined from the condition of the testator's mind at the time of the making of the will; and in determining the mental status of the testator the presumption of sanity will be indulged; and where a will appears to be a rational act performed in a rational manner, such presumption and such apparently rational act amounts to evidence of testamentary capacity; and in determining the mental status of a testator in a will contest, the question to determine is, "Did the testator possess testamentary capacity at the time of the making of the will?" Prior and subsequent acts have bearing only to the extent of helping to determine the mental status at the time of the execution of the will. In re Estate of Tayrien, supra; Exendine, Ex'r v. Red Corn, 108 Okl. 1, 232 P. 46; In re Wah-kon-tah-he-um-pah's Estate, 109 Okl. 126, 234 P. 210; Dickey v. Dickey, 66 Okl. 269, 168 P. 1018; In re Blackfeather's Estate, 54 Okl. 1, 153 P. 839; In re George Weir's Will, 9 Dana., Ky., 434; Bilby v. Stewart, 55 Okl. 767, 153 P. 1173.
Regarding delusions on the part of a testator as affecting testamentary capacity the rule is well expressed, and aptly illustrated by the...
To continue reading
Request your trial